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ARTICLES
TEE HEURISTICS OF INTELLECTUAL DUE
PROCESS: A PRIMER FOR TRIERS
OF SCIENCE
ERICA BEECHER-MONAS "
Scientific evidence is an inescapable facet of modern litigation. The Supreme
Cour; beginning with the seminal case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc, and continuing with General Electric Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael, has instructed federal judges to evaluate the scientific validity of
such evidence in determining the evidence's adinissibiliV. In this Article, Professor
Erica Beecher-Monas argues that many judges ignore the science component of
their "gatekeeping" duties, focusing instead on rules of convenience that have little
scientific justification. As a result, size demonstrates that judges reject even scientifi-
cally uncontroversial evidence that would have little trouble finding admissibility
under the pre-Daubert "general consensus" standard and admit evidence that is
scientifically baseless. Such faulty analysis of scientific evidence deprives litigants
of intellectual due process from judges and undercuts the proper functioning and
credibility of the judicial system. Beecher-Monas contends that understanding cer-
tain basic principles underlying all fields of science will enable judges to make bet-
ter admissibility decisions. Based on the language of science and criteria scientists
use to assess validity, as well as the Supreme Court's requirements in Daubert,
Joiner, and Kumho Tire, Beecher-Monas proposes a five-step framework for
sound analysis of scientific evidence Size then demonstrates the usefulness of the
heuristic in two cases where applying the heuristic would have changed the outcome
dramatically. The franzework proposed in this Article will allow triers of science to
make scientifically justifiable admissibility assessments, and in so doing will give
litigants in cases involving scientific evidence the intellectual due process they
deserve
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INTRODUCTION
Presenting scientific evidence in court once seemed like a fairly
straightforward proposition. Like most litigators, I used to believe my
job was merely to find the right expert, to ask the right questions, and
then to get out of the way of the testimony.' Now, finding the right
expert, crucial though it may be, is only the first step in a complex
process that involves educating the court about the methods and ter-
1 For over 70 years, the admissibility of scientific expert testimony depended only on
whether the evidence purported to reflect a consensus of the relevant scientific community.
This "general acceptance" standard was articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923), which explained that "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
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minology of science. Ever since the Supreme Court, in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 instructed the federal judiciary to
make admissibility determinations based on an analysis of the scien-
tific validity of the proffered testimony, and on whether the testimony
"fits" the issues in the case, there has been a major paradigm shift in
the way courts and litigants approach scientific evidence. And,just in
case anyone thought Daubert was an aberration that the federal
courts could soon forget, the Supreme Court reiterated the trial
judge's mandate to review testimony for scientific validity and "fit" in
2 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3 Daubert involved birth defect claims relating to the antinausea drug Bendectin.
Plaintiffs proffered expert causation testimony, which the trial and appellate courts had
ruled inadmissible. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575-76
(S.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 509 U.S.
579, 597-98 (1993). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, categorically dispatching
the general acceptance test used by the lower courts in their determinations, finding it to
be an "austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence." Dauber4 509 U.S. at 589. The Daubert Court announced the new standard for
scientific evidence in light of its reading of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Court ruled that judges must examine prof-
fered expert testimony to determine "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology prop-
erly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
Daubert is a federal standard, involving construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Yet most states have adopted rules modeled on the Federal Rules. See Paul Giannelli &
Edward Imwinkelied, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from the U.S. Supreme Court's
Decision in Kunho ires, Crim. Just., Winter 2000, at 12, 15 (analyzing impact of Daubert
on states and noting that "numerous jurisdictions have rejected Fye in favor of the
Daubert approach, other courts have opted to retain the Frye test"); see also Erica
Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evi-
dence, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 55, 78-82 (1998). While adopting rules modeled on the Federal
Rules does not necessitate that states adopt the construction given the Rules by the federal
courts, many states have done so. See id. Even those states such as New York that
continue to follow the general acceptance standard frequently feel compelled to enter the
discourse about scientific validity encouraged by Daubert. See, e.g, People v. Wernick,
674 N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) ("No threshold evidentiary foundation whatsoever was
offered that acknowledged the validity or existence of defense counsel's postulate to war-
rant these experts using this kind of extrapolated material to bolster their expert opinions."
(emphasis added)); Clemente v. Blumenberg, 705 N.Y.S.2d 792, 798-99 (Sup. Ct. 1999)
(noting that although New York does not follow Daubert, New York law contains many
principles inherent in Daubert, including importance of judge's role as gatekeeper in deter-
mining scientific validity of expert evidence); Wahl v. American Honda Motor Co., 693
N.Y.S.2d 875, 877-78 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (using Daubert standard to admit engineering testi-
mony since Frye test in New York only applies to "novel" or scientific evidence); Collins v.
Welch, 678 N.Y.S.2d 444, 446-47 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (engaging in validity analysis while ac-
knowledging New York's use of Frye general acceptance standard). For a further discus-
sion of Daubert, its interpretation of Rule 702, and its impact on state and federal law, see
Beecher-Monas, supra, at 78-82.
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General Electric Co. v. Joiner,4 and extended its scope to technical as
well as scientific evidence in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.5
Like all paradigm shifts, this one has created a great deal of angst
among those who operated under the old regime,6 in which counting
scientific noses was enough of an inquiry to determine if proffered
testimony met minimal admissibility standards.7 In an earlier article, I
explained that although Daubert provided some guidelines, its sugges-
tions for resolving whether contested expert testimony meets the cri-
teria of good science were sketchy, at best.8 In that article, I outlined
4 522 U.S. 136 (1997). In Joiner, the Supreme Court upheld the traditional abuse of
discretion standard of review for evidentiary issues, applying it even to scientific testimony.
See id. at 146.
5 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Before Kumho Tire, some courts had been avoiding the
Daubert inquiry by classifying evidence such as psychological testimony, engineering testi-
mony, and identification evidence such as handwriting analysis as "technical" or "soft sci-
ence" rather than as "scientific." See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287,
1297 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[t]here is some question as to whether the Daubert anal-
ysis should be applied at all to 'soft' sciences such as psychology"); United States v.
DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1171 (2d Cir. 1993) (" "'[S]oft science" expertise is less likely
to overwhelm the common sense of the average juror than "hard science" expertise .... '
(quoting Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, A Practical Guide to the Admissibility of Novel Ex-
pert Evidence in Criminal Trials Under Federal Rule 702, 22 St. Mary's L.J. 181, 198
(1990))); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (admitting
handwriting analysis testimony, concluding that while such testimony would probably not
pass Daubert scrutiny, since it is technical rather than scientific, it falls "outside the scope
of Daubert").
In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court emphasized that the trial judge's gatekeeping obli-
gation applies to all expert testimony. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147. The Court em-
phasized the importance of observing professional standards of intellectual rigor in all
expert testimony, and concluded that "a trial court should consider the specific factors
identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testi-
mony." Id. at 152. The Court acknowledged that not all of the Daubert factors apply to all
testimony, even to testimony based on traditional laboratory sciences, but emphasized that
empirical support, the existence of protocols, and sound methodology are basic require-
ments for any expert testimony. See id. at 150, 153-58. For a further discussion of the
impact of the Supreme Court's trio of scientific evidence cases-Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho 7ire-on scientific testimony, see Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, The
Law and the Brain: Judging Scientific Evidence of Intent, 1 J. Appellate Prac. & Process
243, 246-51 (1999). For further commentary on the applicability of Daubert and this Arti-
cle to "nonscientific" expert testimony, see infra note 32.
6 See, for example, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1995), where Judge Kozinski, on remand, complained that "though we are largely un-
trained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we are
reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts' proposed testimony
amounts to 'scientific knowledge,' constitutes 'good science,' and was 'derived by the scien-
tific method."' For a critique of courts' post-Daubert handling of scientific evidence, see
Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 1481, 1513-16 (1995).
7 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
8 See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: 'Tiers of
Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 1047, 1051 (1999) ("In Daubert, the
Supreme Court's explanation.., was cursory at best."). The Court established four guide-
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and critiqued various frameworks available to help federal judges in
these decisions.9 These attempts at guidance, while important first
steps, focus on the concerns of scientists in creating good science
rather than on evaluating the unavoidably imperfect science that ex-
ists, and therefore do not resolve the problems judges face in making
Daubert admissibility decisions.10 Understanding how experiments
lines for the judge to consider (1) whether the proffered testimony is testable, (2) whether
it has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) whether protocols and error rates
exist for the methodology, and (4) whether it has achieved general acceptance. See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. The "Daubert question" ordinarily arises in pretrial motions
under Federal Rule of Evidence 104. These hearings, in which the trial judge hears and
rules on proffers of scientific evidence, are becoming more frequent. Indeed, these hear-
ings are commonly referred to as "Daubert hearings." For a discussion of the procedural
aspects of the "Daubert question," see Beecher-Monas, supra note 3, at 76-78.
9 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1076-93. For example, the Federal Judicial
Center's manual for evaluating scientific evidence outlines a variety of key scientific points
that may arise in admissibility determinations. See generally Federal Judicial Ctr., Refer-
ence Manual on Scientific Evidence (1994) [hereinafter Federal Judicial Ctr. Manual]. The
post-Daubert legal literature on scientific evidence admissibility is extensive. See Thomas
Lyons, Frye, Daubert and Where Do We Go From Here?, I. BJ., Jan. 1997, at 5, 25
(observing that Daubert "has spawned an enormous reaction" with average of over four
articles per month appearing in legal periodicals analyzing decision and issues it raises).
Courses have even sprung up to help familiarize judges with scientific issues. See, e.g.,
John M. Conley & David NV. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The Federal Judicial
Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L Rev. 1183, 1205 n.139
(1996) (referring to authors' courses for judges).
10 For example, shortly after Dauber4 Bert Black and coauthors offered a list of nine
guidelines to help judges evaluate good science. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law
in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 Tex. L Rev. 715,782-
85 (1994). These nine factors are (1) explanatory power, (2) falsifiability, (3) logical consis-
tency, (4) scope of testing, (5) consistency with accepted theories, (6) subsequent applica-
tion and use by the scientific community, (7) precision, (8) post-hypothesis testing, and (9)
peer review and publication. See id. Never intended to be used as a checklist, the explicit
purpose of the guidelines was to explain the concerns of scientists in doing their work. See
id. at 782.
One useful framework that has been largely ignored by the judiciary is that provided
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its scientific validity determinations.
See Environmental Protection Agency Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assess-
ment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,961 (1996) [hereinafter EPA Proposed Guidelines] (empha-
sizing importance of considering all evidence in "addressing the likelihood of human
carcinogenic effects of the agent and the conditions under which such effects may be ex-
pressed"). Agency administrators for regulatory agencies such as the EPA routinely evalu-
ate competing scientific claims in their permitting decisions and risk assessments. The
context of EPA decisionmaking is far more analogous to Daubert judicial validity determi-
nations than the context discussed in previous studies of creating the best possible empiri-
cal tests of proposed hypotheses. Now that Joiner has confirmed the standard of review for
scientific evidence, both trial court admissibility determinations and agency determinations
such as the EPA's are subject to the same "abuse of discretion" standard. See General
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,146 (1997) (using "abuse of discretion" standard of review
for trial court scientific evidence admissibility determinations); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1994) (using "arbitrary, capricious ... abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" standard of review for administrative agency actions). As in eviden-
tiary determinations, the basis for agency review is whether the facts and logic used in
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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should be designed is unquestionably useful to judges in evaluating
scientific testimony. But it is not enough. Judges are not in the busi-
ness of designing experiments to minimize flaws in concept and execu-
tion. They are in the business of determining whether the flawed
studies-and all studies are flawed in some respects-that underlie
the expert's opinion really support the expert's testimony. Thus, in
the absence of concrete guidance, judges and lawyers remain per-
plexed about the required inquiry.
In this Article, I seek to provide a rough, but useful, guide for
evaluating scientific testimony, based on a synthesis of the Supreme
Court's evidentiary trilogy, the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) evidentiary framework," and teachings from the philosophy of
science.' 2 Judges, after all, are not the only outsiders who must evalu-
ate scientific evidence. Scientists who work outside of a given field
critique each others' work all the time by taking information gleaned
from one discipline and applying it to another; this is how science ad-
vances.' 3 How is this possible without intimate knowledge of the par-
ticular type of research being discussed? Common understandings
about probabilistic and analogy-based reasoning underlie all scientific
disciplines.' 4 Even nonscientists can learn this kind of reasoning.15
arriving at the determinations are supportable. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that court must "care-
fully review the record to ascertain that the agency has made a reasoned decision based on
'reasonable extrapolations from some reliable evidence"' (quoting Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1986))), vacated in part, 921 F.2d 326
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
11 See supra note 10.
12 I draw heavily from the work of Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Ernest Nagel, Patrick
Suppes, and others. Although these philosophers often disagree with each other, they
share many areas of common understanding, and each offers insights about particular as-
pects of the validity determination.
13 See Gero Decher, Fuzzy Nanoassemblies: Toward Layered Polymeric Multicom-
posites, 277 Science 1232, 1232 (1997) (observing how "materials science has developed
into an interdisciplinary field" that draws from "organic, polymeric, and even biological"
disciplines); Sheila Jasanoff et al., Conversations with the Community: AAAS at the Mil-
lennium, 278 Science 2066, 2066 (1997) (describing interdisciplinary research as "basic to
the conduct of science"); Jeffrey Mervis, NSF Revamps Graduate Training Grants, 275
Science 918 (1997) ("It has become a truism that science is increasingly multi-
disciplinary .... ").
14 Definitions of probabilistic thinking are elusive. See Theodore Colton, Statistics in
Medicine 63 (1974) ("There is no completely satisfactory definition of probability."). What
I mean by probabilistic thinking, and the notion on which scientists generally agree, is the
frequentist definition: The "probability of an event is the event's long-run relative fre-
quency in repeated trials under similar conditions." Id. (emphasis added). Long-run rela-
tive frequency refers to the proportion of times that a particular trait or event being
measured occurs within a given population. See Martin Stemstein, Statistics 15 (1994).
"In other words, the probability of an event A is its relative frequency of occurrence-or
the proportion of times the event occurs-in a large number of trials repeated under virtu-
ally identical conditions." Marcello Pagano & Kimberlee Gauvreau, Principles of Bios-
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The object of demystifying scientific argument 16 and making it
more accessible to lawyers and judges is not to transform lawyers and
judges into amateur scientists,' 7 but to help them resolve a legal policy
issue: whether a scientific hypothesis proffered by experts is useful in
resolving a legal dispute. The purpose of the admissibility inquiry, af-
ter all, is not to decide whose expert is correct, but whether the expert
can provide information to help the factfinder resolve an issue in the
case.' 8 That is, the judge must decide whether a descriptive claim
about the world has sufficient indicia of reliability and relevance to
the case at hand to enter the courtroom. For scientific evidence, the
question is whether the testimony has met the standards and methods
tatistics 127 (2d ed. 2000). Thus, it is an error, for example, to think that one can know the
probability of disease causation after exposure to a toxic chemical in any given case. See
Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Cau-
sation, 40 Jurimetrics 321, 328 (2000) (explaining that "when an exposure is known to be
harmful in some cases, available data from epidemiology and biology are simply incapable
of telling us whether a given case was 'more probably than not' harmed by exposure"
(emphasis added)). Probabilistic thinking recognizes that the most that can be said in this
example is that exposure caused a certain excess incidence of disease in a particular popu-
lation under certain conditions. For further discussion of probabilistic reasoning, see infra
Part LB.1.
15 "Though the details of science may be remote from common experience, nonscien-
fists can understand the fundamental characteristics that separate valid science from pale
imitations." Black et al., supra note 10, at 720; see also Francisco J. Ayala & Bert Black,
Science and the Courts, 81 Am. Sci. 230, 238 (1993) (arguing that judges have ability to
analyze scientific testimony and apply scientific standards to assess its validity).
16 An argument is "[a]ny inferential analysis leading to a stated conclusion." 2 David
A. Schum, Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst 15 (19S7). Scientific infer-
ence drawing consists of proffering empirical data to support or refute hypotheses explain-
ing observations about the natural world. See Wesley C. Salmon, The Foundations of
Scientific Inference 1-53 (1967) (summarizing arguments about falsifiability, testability, and
confirmation).
17 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed this concern in his opinion in Daubert, where he
worried that the majority was forcing judges "to become amateur scientists in order to
perform [their] role." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18 See Anthony Z. Roisman, The Courts, Daubert, and Environmental Torts: Gate-
keepers or Auditors?, 14 Pace Envtl. L Rev. 545,548 (1997) (observing that "when experts
offer conflicting opinions the court is not to decide which expert is correct"). Contrary to
one critic's metaphor, the judge's task is not like having to decide which of -two groups of
expert mathematicians [whol disagree about a complex mathematical question" is correct.
Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 Yale U. 1535,
1538 (1998). In tort and criminal cases, the judge's task is not to decide whether a given
solution or theory is correct, but to decide whether, given the current state of knowledge
about the solution or theory as propounded by competing experts, it is sufficiently trust-
worthy to come into evidence in order to prove or disprove a legal issue. Examples of legal
issues which scientific hypotheses could help prove or disprove include whether a defen-
dant pharmaceutical company's drug could have caused the plaintiff's injuries, or whether
a criminal defendant's presence could be established at the scene of the crime.
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of science.19 While judges do need a mental framework for this analy-
sis, they do not need to be trained scientists.
Evidentiary decisionmaking thus falls squarely within the increas-
ingly important realm of interdisciplinary studies.20 This Article seeks
to expand the interdisciplinary tradition by developing a conceptual
framework enabling legal actors to approach questions of scientific
evidence in a logical, analytic fashion.21 It seeks to illustrate unifying
themes common to scientific thinking of all stripes. I assert that un-
derstanding the language and structure of scientific argument and the
way "science" is produced provides an invaluable tool in deciphering
the logic behind the testimony.
The framework proposed in this Article is intended to resolve
some major issues on which the courts are still foundering. In so do-
ing, it seeks to equip judges with the tools necessary to provide "intel-
lectual due process"-a structured reasoning process that is not
arbitrary-to the parties in cases involving scientific evidence.22 This
19 See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1102 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony, the district court must 'consider whether the testi-
mony has been subjected to the scientific method; it must rule out subjective belief or
unsupported speculation."' (quoting Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted))). See generally Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game: Einstein,
Realism, and the Quantum Theory (1986) (asserting that questions about truth claims of
science must be answered by reference to methods and standards of science).
20 As George Priest noted, "the increase of interdisciplinary 'law and' scholarship ...
refine[s] our understanding of the law." George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary
Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge
Edwards, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1929, 1934 (1993); see also Robert J. Condlin, "What's Really
Going On?" A Study of Lawyer and Scientist Inter-Disciplinary Discourse, 25 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. LJ. 181, 182-83 (1999) ("[Sjcience and law have become pervasively
intertwined .... Science based choices and problems pervade the most difficult issues of
social regulation facing legislatures and courts.").
21 To be valuable to society, lawyers and judges must have a grasp of the issues
presented in litigation, a growing number of which involve questions of scientific evidence.
See David L. Faigman, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law at xiii
(1999) ("[S]ince law must rely on science, it is incumbent on lawyers and policy makers to
understand it."); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry
and Legal Policy, in Law in a Changing America 56, 58 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. ed., 1968)
(arguing that "we in the legal world need some literacy as to scientific method").
22 See Brewer, supra note 18, at 1539 (arguing that intellectual due process is norm that
"places important epistemic constraints on the reasoning process by which legal deci-
sionmakers apply laws to individual litigants ... [and requires] that the decisionmaking
process not be arbitrary from an epistemic point of view"). Professor Scott Brewer devel-
oped the concept of intellectual due process and argues that intellectual due process is
incompatible with the way most judges currently decide questions of scientific validity. See
id. at 1539. I agree with Professor Brewer's criticism that judges' "reliance on such indicia
of expertise as credentials, reputation, and demeanor" instead of scientific understanding
"yield[s] only epistemically arbitrary judgments." Id. I do not, however, share Brewer's
pessimism with regard to the abilities of the judiciary to learn how to assess scientific argu-
ment. See id. at 1680 (concluding that "unless judges are routinely and systematically
trained in scientific theories and methods, Daubert does not offer a promising overall solu-
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Article seeks to empower judges to utilize the approach required by
Daubert to provide the intellectual due process necessary in every
case.23
The heuristic proposed here consists of five basic parts and em-
phasizes the underlying principles common to all fields of science. To
meet the requirements of intellectual due process in making admissi-
bility determinations, I suggest that judges (and the lawyers who edu-
cate them about their cases) must be able to do five things: (1)
identify and examine the proffered theory and hypothesis for their
power to explain the data; (2) examine the data that supports (and
undermines) the expert's theory; (3) use supportable assumptions to
fill the inevitable gaps between data and theory;24 (4) examine the
methodology; and (5) engage in probabilistic assessment of the link
between the data and the hypothesis- 5
tion"). Indeed, Brewer acknowledges that "[n]othing in [his] Article suggests that a nonex-
pert judge cannot become sufficiently epistemically competent, even without the formal
training of a scientist." Id. This Article provides a framework to enable judges to achieve
just such epistemic competence.
23 Throughout this Article, I argue that judges are capable of providing intellectual due
process to litigants on issues of scientific evidence. It is imperative, however, that judges
educate themselves about the kinds of evidence before them, make default assumptions
that are justifiable on scientific and policy grounds, and explicitly give the basis for their
decision in the form of a written opinion.
24 The reliance on assumptions within the heuristic may strike many legal readers as a
departure from legal concepts of causation. In science, however, background theories and
assumptions underpin any theory, hypothesis, or experiment. See I Schum, supra note 16,
at 35 (noting necessity and importance of assumptions in scientific argument). Being able
to identify and critique these background assumptions is key to understanding scientific
argument. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text for discussion of the role of back-
ground assumptions.
25 This Article asserts that the underlying principles of reasoning in law and science are
not different, although context and culture determine their application. I include induc-
tive, deductive, and abductive reasoning in this statement. All three forms of reasoning are
important tools in analysis. See 1 Schum, supra note 16, at 18-20 (offering elegant explana-
tion of inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning and process of logical inference). In
short, for deductive argument to be valid, the truth of the premises must guarantee the
truth of the conclusion. See id. at 18. The paradigmatic form of the deductive argument is
the Aristotelian syllogism. See Majorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle 67 (1963). By in-
ductive reasoning, I mean both inductive generalization, involving probabilistic generaliza-
tion from the particular, and inductive analogy, in which one concludes that some
particular instance will have the aggregate characteristics given in the premises. See
Stephen F. Barker, The Elements of Logic 223-31 (2d ed. 1974). Exemplary reasoning is
sometimes referred to as abduction. For an article describing the process of legal reasoning
by analogy as a species of abduction, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics,
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 Harv. L Rev. 923,
947 (1996), arguing that
[A]bduction is a disciplined (albeit, in contrast to deduction, not a rigidly
guided) form of inference;... it has a substantial degree of rational force;
and... it plays a vital role in exemplary, analogical reasoning, just as it does in
explanatory and justificatory reasoning in science and other fields of inquiry.
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It is my hope in designing this heuristic that judges Will be able to
make better admissibility decisions. The common law's long-standing
requirement that judges explain the basis of their reasoning and that
the basis be well-founded forms the cornerstone of a system that as-
pires to rationality.26 This Article seeks to equip judges-and the law-
yers who must practice before them-in that endeavor.
Part I of this Article presents an overview of scientific argument,
discussing the meaning scientists attach to scientific method and its
rhetorical use. Building on this understanding of scientific argument
and analysis, Part II presents the proposed heuristic, and explains
each of its steps in detail. Part III applies the heuristic in two cases, a
toxic tort case and a criminal case.
I
EVALUATING SCIENTIc ARGUMENT: WHAT Is THE
SCIENTIFIC METHOD ANYWAY?
According to the Supreme Court, whether testimony amounts to
admissible scientific knowledge depends on whether it has been "de-
rived by the scientific method." 27 The Supreme Court provided four
guidelines for this inquiry: testability, peer review and publication,
error rate and the existence of protocols, and general acceptance. 28
Other than setting out its four "flexible" guidelines, however, the Su-
preme Court gave federal judges no inkling as to what the "scientific
method" was all about.29 Although most of us have heard the term
"scientific method," and Webster's Dictionary defines it,30 expecting
judges to decide whether expert testimony has been derived from its
criteria-without more guidance-seems a stretch. Federal judges
now know that it is their job to determine the scientific validity of
Charles Sanders Peirce introduced the theory of abduction to explain how scientists select
a relatively small number of hypotheses to test from a large number of logically possible
explanations for their observations. See Charles S. Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce
150-56 (Justus BuchIer ed., 1955).
26 See Brewer, supra note 25, at 930 ("The normative order constituted by the legal
system, informed by 'rule of law' principles as well as by many others, aspires to be rational
in significant ways.").
27 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
28 See id at 593-94. For a critique of these guidelines, see Beecher-Monas, supra note 8,
at 1052-55.
29 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 594.
30 Webster's Dictionary defines "scientific method" as "principles and procedures for
the systematic pursuit of knowledge involving the recognition and formulation of a prob-
lem, the collection of data through observation and experiment, and the formulation and
testing of hypotheses." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1051 (1989).
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expert testimony,3 1 and that to perform this task, they must refer to
the scientific method.3 2 But what is the scientific method, anyway?
A. Scientific Method: The Myth
As commonly understood, "scientific method" means taking an
idea about how things work, framing it as a testable hypothesis, and
testing the hypothesis to see if it holds true, all measured and ex-
pressed in mathematical-probabilistic-terms.3 3 Despite the Su-
preme Court's reference to the scientific method as the cornerstone of
scientific knowledge, however, there is no monolithic "scientific
method." 4 Karl Popper, the preeminent philosopher of science cited
by the Daubert Court S3 thoroughly debunked any such notion.36
There is no all-inclusive set of rules that can be applied to science to
determine its validity.3 7 Differences arise among scientists in different
31 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Daubert).
32 The content of the scientific expert's testimony must be "scientific knowledge."
Dauber4 509 U.S. at 590. To be scientific knowledge, the testimony must be "derived by
the scientific method." Id. In Kunho Tire, the Supreme Court extended the requirements
of Daubert to all expert testimony, including nonlaboratory sciences such as engineering.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). Understanding scientific
method as a form of argument applicable to all forms of expert testimony makes this Arti-
cle relevant even to technical testimony, and highlights the flimsiness of the whole dichot-
omy between "technical" and "scientific" testimony. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill,
supra note 5, at 249 ("Understanding the methodology, requiring the existence and mainte-
nance of standards controlling the technique's operation, and examining how often a given
procedure yields mistaken results, are crucial to evaluating an expert's conclusions."). Tes-
timony of all kinds either has empirical support or it does not. The type of data may be
different, as may be the means of gathering it, but the argument still must meet the re-
quirements of intellectual honesty, which is the essence of the scientific method. See supra
note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Kumho 71re).
33 See Charles Van Doren, A History of Knowledge 188-89 (1991) (describing this ver-
sion of scientific method, termed "experiment," as "[tihe best known method, but not nec-
essarily the most often employed").
34 See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 254 (noting that for Popper,
"there was no such thing as the 'scientific method"').
35 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citing Popper for belief that testability is key to deter-
mining theory's standing).
36 See Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 278 (rev. ed. 1992) (explaining
that science is not system of certainty, or well-established statements, nor can it ever attain
truth, or even probability).
37 Occasionally, commentators argue that the postulates proposed by Robert Koch and
Friedrich Gustav Jacob Henle, or those by Austin Bradford Hill, can be used as criteria for
good science. See, e.&, Kenneth R. Foster & Peter NV. Huber, Judging Science 28 (1997).
Hill's postulates require consideration of strength of association, consistency with other
scientists' results, specificity of association, temporality, biological gradient or dose-re-
sponse curve, biological plausibility, coherence, and analogy with similar evidence. See id.
at 30-31. Koch and Henle outlined 10 criteria for causation, including (1) higher preva-
lence of disease in exposed than unexposed populations, (2) those with the disease should
have had more exposure to the agent than healthy populations, (3) experiments should
demonstrate increased incidence of disease in exposed as opposed to unexposed popula-
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disciplines, and even within the same discipline, with respect to the
amount of evidence needed to support a theory.38 Instead of a mono-
lithic scientific method, there are many methods and many proce-
dures.39 The only essential ingredient for good science-and hence
tions, (4) temporality, (5) linear dose-response curve, (6) biological plausibility, and a num-
ber of other factors relating to immune responses. See Alfred S. Evans, Causation and
Disease: The Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 Yale J. Biology & Med. 175, 192 tbl.13
(1976); see also Foster & Huber, supra, at 28 (describing Evans's list as "modern version"
of Koch's postulates). But while these respected canons are unquestionably useful in de-
signing optimal experiments, they cannot be-and were not intended to be-used as a
checklist for sound science. See Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: As-
sociation or Causation?, 58 Proceedings Royal Soc'y Med. 295, 295-300 (1965), reprinted in
Evolution of Epidemiologic Ideas: Annotated Readings on Concepts and Methods 15-20
(Sander Greenland ed., 1987); see also Foster & Huber, supra, at 28 (noting that "[miost
scientists would agree that evidence satisfying all Koch's postulates establishes a compel-
ling case" for causation, but explaining that they are neither necessary nor sufficient condi-
tions for inferring causation); Evans, supra, at 192 (explaining that Koch's postulates "were
not regarded as rigid criteria by Koch himself and should not be today").
38 For an example, consider the debate among scientists over which chemicals are
human carcinogens. See Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky Gold, Too Many Rodent Carcino-
gens: Mitogenesis Increases Mutagenesis, 249 Science 970, 970-71 (1990) (questioning
animal studies-based evidence showing chemicals to be carcinogens in humans). But see
Jean Marx, Animal Carcinogen Testing Challenged, 250 Science 743 (1990) (explaining
theories of Ames's critics that animal studies conducted to date provide sufficient evidence
of carcinogenicity of chemicals in humans).
39 Unfortunately for judges searching for clear rules to distinguish good science from
bad, there simply are none. Even good studies may not meet all the possible criteria for a
"perfect" study. Hill cautioned: "I do not believe .. that we can usefully lay down some
hard-and-fast rules of evidence that must be obeyed before we accept cause and effect."
See Hill, reprinted in Evolution of Epidemiologic Ideas, supra note 37, at 19 (discussing his
evidentiary factors used to prove that particular agent caused disease). In fact, none of the
factors Hill proposed provided "indisputable evidence for or against the cause-and-effect
hypothesis." Id. For example, though most scientists would place great weight on Hill's
criterion of consistency of observed effect, it may be absent even from strong causal con-
nections. See Sander Greenland, Preface to Hill, reprinted in Evolution of Epidemiologic
Ideas, supra note 37, at 14, 14 (noting that "a careful reading of Hill shows that he did not
intend to offer a list of necessary conditions" and that of Hill's factors, only temporality is
necessary (emphasis added)).
While finding a consistent specific association between exposure and a particular dis-
ease might be persuasive, such an association is rarely observed. See Hill, supra note 37, at
297 (noting that finding "specificity" greatly strengthens conclusion of causation but is not
required in order to make conclusions). These strong specific associations are often re-
ferred to by courts as a "signature" disease, although most courts recognize that such as-
sociations are not a prerequisite for admissibility. See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (D. Or. 1996) (examining causation evidence in silicone
exposure case despite absence of "signature disorder" for silicone exposure, although ulti-
mately excluding evidence); Maiorana v. National Gypsum Co. (In re Joint Dist. Asbestos
Litig.), 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 52 F.3d 1124 (2d
Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that mesothelioma is "signature disease" for asbestos, but still
examining causal relationship between plaintiffs' colon cancer and asbestos exposure). A
linear dose-response curve, indicating a positive relationship between the administered
dose and its effect (i.e., the higher the dose, the stronger the effect), is similarly important,
but the absence of such a response does not destroy necessarily the causal inference, al-
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the only overarching method-is that good science must be open to
critique and revision.40 Scientists recognize that what matters most is
the explanatory power of the proffered theory and how well the data
support the theory.41
Purportedly, the scientific method is a way to ensure objectivity.42
But the scientific method is no guarantee of objectivity.43 Although
empirical content is fundamental to science, the view that facts are
"immanent in an objective reality waiting to be discovered by any
scientists who look in the right place" is just as false in science as it is
in law.44 Mere observation of the world does not lead to scientific
though it does indicate a more complex relationship between the agent and disease. See
Hill, reprinted in Evolution of Epidemiologic Ideas, supra note 37, at 18.
The Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual accepts this proposition, noting that al-
though the presence of a linear dose-response relationship -strengthens the conclusion that
the relationship... is causal[,] ... a dose-response relationship is not necessary to infer
causation." Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Federal Judicial
Ctr. Manual, supra note 9, at 121, 164. The one exception to the notion that the Hill
criteria need not be met for causation to exist is that the temporality factor-the notion
that cause should precede effect-is universally recognized as a prerequisite for admissibil-
ity. Yet all agree that temporality alone is not enough. See Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial
Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 Va. Envtl. LJ. 1, 43 (1996) (stating that
temporality "has become recognized as the one factor which should actually be viewed as a
requirement for the admissibility of studies"); see also Greenland, supra, at 14 (noting that
temporality is only Hill factor considered necessary to establish causation). As an example
of the insufficiency of temporality alone, consider that just because most dead men are
bald does not necessarily mean that baldness is fatal.
40 See Popper, supra note 36, at 279 (stating that scientists' conjectures, once proffered,
are not "dogmatically upheld," but rather scientists attempt to "overthrow them"). This
ability of good science to withstand constant critique is what Popper called "falsifiability,"
a concept that the Supreme Court emphasized in Daubert. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593
(citing Popper and noting that falsifiability is key in determining whether proffered evi-
dence constitutes scientific knowledge).
41 See Popper, supra note 36, at 108, ll (stating that best theory -holds its own in
competition with other theories" and that there is "nothing 'absolute' about [science]").
42 See id. at 44 (explaining Kant's idea that scientific justification consists of objective
verification (citing Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 645 (N. Jemp Smith transl.,
1933))); cf. Sean O'Connor, The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science: Will the Real
Karl Popper Please Stand Up?, 35 Jurimetrics 263, 266-67 (1995) (explaining Kantian ob-
jectivist view that we "impose a logical order and structure onto our experience of the
world").
43 See Karl R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework 8 (M.A. Nottumo ed., 1994)
("There is no pure, disinterested, theory-free observation.").
44 Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redwc Science, Law and Politics, 11 Yale L &
Pol'y Rev. 1, 15 (1993).
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knowledge. 45 Observation must be informed by theory.4 6 Science is a
creative enterprise. 47
Thus, science is about more than a mere accumulation of facts.
But, to make matters more difficult for judges seeking a set of rules
for assessing science, just as "facts" are intertwined with subjective
values in legal decisionmaking, 48 scientific conclusions are also based
on subjective judgments made at key points ranging from the initial
decision to study a particular phenomenon through the collection, cat-
egorization, and interpretation of data.49 Interpreting experiments is
neither a simple nor a disinterested process.5 0 On the contrary, scien-
tific paradigms are-like legal paradigms-socially constructed 5'
45 See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 161
(1958) ("Factuality is not science. Only a comparatively few peculiar facts are scientific
facts, while the enormous rest are without scientific interest.").
46 See Popper, supra note 36, at 107 ("Theory dominates the experimental work from
its initial planning up to the finishing touches in the laboratory."). A striking example is
given by a leading scientist: "[E]ven the so-called 'fact' that a star is located in a certain
position in the heavens is a consequence of Einstein's theory which determines how much
light may deviate from a straight line." Stephen G. Brush, Prediction and Theory Evalua-
tion: The Case of Light Bending, 246 Science 1124, 1126 (1989).
47 Although we think of scientific facts as having been discovered, rather than
fabricated, the etymology of the word "fact" is from the Latin facere, which means "to
make." See Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge 3 (1981). As one
scientist explained, "[m]ost of the reality with which scientists deal is highly precon-
structed, if not wholly artificial." Id. For an excellent discussion of how theory and fact
intertwine, see generally Harold I. Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment (1979).
48 See, e.g., William Twining, Rethinking Evidence 107 (1990) (noting that since "triers
of fact are regularly and unavoidably involved in making evaluations... it is misleading to
suggest that legal enquiries into questions of fact are value-free").
49 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 200 (2d ed. 1970) (ar-
guing that manner in which science develops is largely determined by values and experi-
ence shared by scientific community); see also David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not:
Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L.J.
1005, 1028 (1989) ("Scientists select problems on the basis of what seems important, and to
this extent all science is culture-bound."); Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Mod-
em Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 995, 1035 (1994) ("[T]he scientific method
necessarily encompasses a multitude of value-laden judgments that affect the outcome of
research.").
50 Although the systematic testing of proposed explanations of reality is a basic feature
of scientific process, it is the theoretical construct-the hypothesis-which precedes and
pervades experimentation. See Popper, supra note 36, at 107 n.*3. An example of this is
the emptiness of the data dredging experiments, in which computers were employed to
elicit huge quantities of "facts" that no one yet has been able to understand. Cf. Patricia K.
Woolf, Deception in Scientific Research, in American Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci-
ence, Project on Scientific Fraud and Misconduct: Report on Workshop Number One 37,
78 (1988) (describing data dredging as "making inappropriate or unwarranted inferences
based on unreported statistical techniques"); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Dis-
course of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1899 n.163 (1988) ("Without a method-
ology, fact gathering becomes a mechanical or incoherent process that has little intellectual
appeal.").
51 As an initial matter, the availability of funding for particular experiments-clearly a
social phenomenon reflecting exigencies of politics and demand-determines which theo-
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through a process of discussion and consensus-building about theories,
experimental methods, instrumentation, and validation.5 This does
not make them any less reliable, however.5
Acknowledging that science is a creative process does not imply
that everything is up for grabs.54 There are shared perceptions of va-
lidity. That is, even if there is no set of inflexible "rules" for judging
the validity of a scientific argument, there are criteria for formulating
and testing scientific ideas.55 To be defined legitimately as science, a
hypothesis or argument still must have persisted despite radical
ries will be examined and which data analyzed. In addition, what we come to know is
inextricably a social process. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge 69 (Colin Gordon
ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) ("Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of re-
gion, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process
by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power.").
Further, what will count as "truth" is a matter of negotiation between various factions that
have a stake in the matter. Thus, the definition of "scientific" fact "must be sought through
interpretation of the changing borders and territories of what is taken as science." Thomas
F. Gieryn, Boundaries of Science, in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies 393,
417 (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds., 1995). For example, the feminist critique of science studies
the shifts in the boundary of what counts as science toward the masculine and away from
the feminine, claiming that not only are women underrepresented in science, but scientific
research underrepresents women. See id. at 420-24.
52 See Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32
Jurimetrics 345, 347 (1992) (explaining view that "the 'facts' that scientists present to the
rest of the world are not simple reflections of nature; rather, these 'facts' are produced by
human agency, through the institutions and processes of science, and hence they invariably
contain a social component"). Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science provides useful in-
sight into the sociology of scientific paradigm change. See generally Kuhn, supra note 49.
For a view that, while science does reveal "reality," it does so by the process of consensus
and community activity, see generally Henry H. Bauer, Scientific Literacy and the Myth of
the Scientific Method (1992). It does not follow from the consensual nature of the enter-
prise that scientific conclusions are completely indeterminate, however. See J2N. Ziman,
Public Knowledge 9 (1968) (arguing that nature constrains science's goal of reaching con-
sensus of rational opinion). The shared perceptions regarding how to determine experi-
mental and technical validity provide some constraints, just as shared perceptions of
accepted judicial methodology provide restraints on judicial activism.
53 See Popper, supra note 43, at 13 (observing that "the objectivity and the rationality
of progress in science [are] not due to the personal objectivity and rationality of the scien-
tist," but to their ability to stand up to critical examination).
54 See id. at 33 (criticizing notion that truth is relative to intellectual background).
55 Cf. Popper, supra note 36, at 313-14 (explaining that theories only convey informa-
tion to extent they are capable of being systematically tested). These shared perceptions of
validity depend on testing the internal consistency of the theory, the consistency of the
theory with other theories, and the consistency of the theory with the empirical data. See
id. at 315. Most importantly, validity requires that science continually question and criti-
cize all of its theories, constantly refining its explanations. See id. at 317 (stating that
[W]e must not look upon science as a 'body of knowledge,' but rather as a
system of hypotheses... with which we work as long as they stand up to tests,
and of which we are never justified in saying that we know that they are 'true'
or 'more or less certain' or even 'probable."').
For an explanation of Popper's philosophy, see Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note
5, at 255 ("[T]he aim of science is to achieve better and better explanations.").
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changes in its content. 56 Such science consists of background assump-
tions about the way the world works, coupled with canons of experi-
mental design and theoretical exemplars or models that translate
background assumptions into working rules that guide the selection of
problems and inform acceptable procedures for their solution.57 Ex-
plicitly acknowledging the subjective element inherent in all scientific
methodologies thus does not make science an arbitrary enterprise, but
instead opens for questioning the underlying assumptions of a particu-
lar scientific argument. To determine what is really at stake when ex-
perts disagree, it is necessary to examine those underlying
assumptions.58
B. Scientific Method: The Reality
Whether or not the scientific method exists in practice, scientists
and nonscientists alike frame their arguments about scientific issues as
though it does.59 Even Popper did not dispute that there are indeed
good methods in science.60 He merely cautioned against sanctioning
any rules that would exclude alternate forms of inquiry.6t Thus, scien-
tists continue to describe their evaluation process generally in terms of
scientific method, despite their skepticism. 62
56 See Kuhn, supra note 49, at 2-3 (explaining that since "out-of-date theories are not in
principle unscientific because they have been discarded," science includes "bodies of belief
quite incompatible with the ones we hold today").
57 See id. at 200.
58 Every hypothesis may rely on an underlying set of assumptions, or "auxiliary hypoth-
eses," that in turn must be justifiable. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 42, at 274 (discussing
"auxiliary hypotheses," and critiquing Popper for his perceived failure to address this prob-
lem). Popper does address the problem of using assumptions. See Popper, supra note 36,
at 83, 104-05. However, his critics (including O'Connor and Lakatos) contend-wrongly,
in this author's opinion-that Popper largely ignored the implications. See Irme Lakatos,
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes 49 (1978) (explaining importance of
requiring assumptions to have empirical content); id. at 80 n.4 (discussing use of assump-
tions). On the contrary, Popper acknowledged the inevitability of using assumptions, but
required that assumptions also have falsifiable consequences. See Popper, supra note 36,
at 83 (explaining that assumptions or "auxiliary hypotheses" may be introduced to assist
theory, but also must add explanatory value).
59 Although the term "scientific method" has been criticized by philosophers of science
as too monolithic to have meaning, scientific argument still proceeds from this basic con-
cept while taking issue with it. See Alan G. Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 32 (1990).
60 See Popper, supra note 36, at 42 ("[Wjhat characterizes the empirical method is its
manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested.").
61 See id. at 54 (explaining importance of designing scientific rules of procedure "in
such a way that they do not protect any statement in science against falsification");
Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 254 (describing how Popper's reluctance to
embrace standard scientific method stemmed from belief that alternate forms of inquiry
are beneficial).
62 See, e.g., Stephen David Ross, The Scientific Process 81 (1971) ("Science, as a mode
of human activity, is dominated by a conception of what it means to explain events through
prediction and control, by collecting evidence for proposed hypotheses, by solving certain
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Moreover, even without a single, universal scientific method,
there is consensus about certain basic principles.63 Probabilistic as-
sessment of data, independent verification of new procedures, and
concern over false positives are fundamental to scientific argument in
every discipline.64 Metaphor is also basic to scientific understanding
in every field.65 In addition, quantum physics has added the insight
that precise prediction of future behavior is impossible; the most that
can be predicted is the probability of various behaviors. 66 Principles
of complexity theory-which state that complex systems consist of in-
teracting parts capable of shaping themselves into organized fluctuat-
ing patterns-have replaced deterministic notions of causation.67
These ideas form the background of much modern scientific discourse.
Thus, the reality of scientific method is a common understanding of
the centrality of probabilistic reasoning; the importance of testability,
interdisciplinarity, and rationality; and an emphasis on the explana-
tory power of a proposed hypothesis.
kinds of problems."); cf. Gross, supra note 59, at 32 (arguing that although "there is no
scientific method, no global strategy for all of science[,] .. there are scientific methods, the
aggregate of agreed-upon procedures").
63 Although most procedures have limits, and therefore detractors, and no method is
universally accepted, argument nonetheless proceeds from certain basic understandings
about these procedures. See Gross, supra note 59, at 32 (explaining that -commitment in
science... rests ultimately on agreed-upon procedures").
64 See, e.g., Lincoln E. Moses, Statistical Concepts Fundamental to Investigations, in
Medical Uses of Statistics 5, 14-26 (John C. Bailar III & Frederick Mosteller eds., 2d ed.
1992) (applying probabilistic thinking to medical analyses). As noted earlier, probabilistic
assessment of data means interpreting results of a study in terms of relative frequencies in
repeated trials under controlled conditions. See supra note 14 (discussing long-run relative
frequency). Independent verification of new procedures requires that a methodology be
repeatable by another scientist to achieve similar results. A false positive means that a
result is claimed or observed that actually did not occur. Scientists would prefer to err on
the side of claiming no result when there actually was one rather than the converse.
65 See generally Gross, supra note 59, at 47 (discussing centrality of metaphor to sci-
ence and explaining that scientific models should be understood as metaphors); see also
Michael R. Matthews, Science Teaching- The Role of History and Philosophy of Science
205 (1994) (observing that "[a] good deal of science method courses are devoted to prac-
tice in the use of metaphor and models"). Indeed, Lakoff & Johnson argue that metaphor
is indispensable to reasoning in any human endeavor. See George Lakoff & Mark John-
son, Metaphors We Live By 221 (1980) ("The use of many metaphors that are inconsistent
with one another seems necessary for us if we are to comprehend the details of our daily
existence.").
66 For example, the exact position of electrons cannot be determined. See Beecher-
Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 253 n.51 (contrasting predictability of trajectories of
Newtonian mechanics with unpredictability of wave functions in quantum ph)sics, where
exact location of electron even in simple system is impossible to describe).
67 See id. at 252-53 (comparing Newtonian determinism, which suggested that, once
initial conditions for event were known, it was possible to calculate not only what would
happen next, but what had happened before, with modem understandings of fluctuations,
instability, self-organization, multiple choices, and limited predictability). For an overview
of complexity theory, see generally M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity (1992).
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1. Probabilistic Reasoning
Probabilistic reasoning underlies modern science, especially sci-
ence involving complex systems like biological systems. 68 By proba-
bilistic reasoning, I mean a way of thinking about the physical
characteristics of an object or event.69 I do not mean subjective
probabilities 70 as prediction about whether a theory is true or not.71
Although scientists may attach subjective probabilities to their conclu-
sions, for modem scientists, probability is a quantitative measure of
chance, a physical quality just like weight or shape, and has nothing to
do with the personal beliefs of the scientist.72 Scientists understand
68 See Ian Hacking, Was There a Probabilistic Revolution 1800-19307, in 1 The Proba-
bilistic Revolution 45, 45 (Lorenz Kruger et al. eds., 1987) (arguing that "today our vision
of the world is permeated by probability"); see also Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and
Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73
Cornell L. Rev. 469, 483 n.70 (1988) (observing that "testing and rejection of hypotheses
based on statistical analysis is integral to science and offers a more realistic paradigm of
scientific thought than does pure deduction").
69 See Jan von Plato, Probabilistic Physics the Classical Way, in 2 The Probabilistic
Revolution, supra note 68, at 379, 379-80 (explaining statistical probability as physical
property of macroscopic systems rather than indication of likelihood or degree of belief).
70 Theodore Colton proposed the probability of the President of the United States dy-
ing in office as a useful example to illustrate the difference between subjective and fre-
quentist probability. This probability, Colton suggested, either can reflect the
consideration that the President is one of a group of males of a particular age living in a
particular geographic locale (the frequentist approach), or it can mean one's belief in the
likelihood of the President's death (the subjectivist approach). See Colton, supra note 14,
at 63. This Article adopts the frequentist approach.
71 Probabilistic reasoning does not mean that one can say a theory is more or less prob-
able. See Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge 55 (1981). Rather, it refers to an under-
standing that probability (or propensity, as Popper called it) is as much a property of the
object being observed as is its mass and exists independently of anyone's belief. See Ian
Hacking, The Emergence of Probability 14 (1975) ("The propensity to give heads [on a
coin flip] is as much a property of the coin as its mass, and the stable long run frequency
found on repeated trials is an objective fact of nature independent of anyone's knowledge
of it, or evidence for it.").
72 See Colton, supra note 14, at 71 (noting that Bayesian ideas have not supplanted
frequentist methods of statistical inference). Under a subjectivist (or Bayesian) paradigm,
probability denotes a degree of expectation (or subjective certainty). See Andreas
Kamlah, The Decline of the Laplacian Theory of Probability: A Study of Stumpf, von
Kries, and Meinong, in 1 The Probabilistic Revolution, supra note 68, at 91, 112; see also
Colin Howson & Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach 11 (1989)
(acknowledging, although their viewpoint is Bayesian, that frequentist "classical methods
of statistical inference[ ] have achieved pre-eminence" in science). But, as Popper points
out, "it is absurd to explain objective statistical frequencies by subjective ignorance." Karl
R. Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics 106 (W.W. Bartley, III ed., Rowan
& Littlefield 1982) (1956); see also Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation 120
(1953) (explaining that "the probability of disintegration of a radium atom contains no
reference to... belief"). But see Pagano & Gauvreau, supra note 14, at 135-40 (suggesting
that Bayes Theorem may be useful for measuring accuracy of medical screening and
diagnosis).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[V/ol. 75:1563
INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS
that "fluctuations, instability, multiple choices, and limited predict-
ability" are inherent "at all levels of observation."' 3
In other words, it is inconsistent with scientific notions of
probability to say that a theory is more likely true than not. 4 Scien-
tists understand that there is simply no way to prove a theory true or
even probable, as any theory may be subject to being disproved. 5 So
the most that can be said is that a particular theory has withstood
criticism and provides the best explanation of the data.76
Probabilistic reasoning encompasses the idea that statistical laws
are fundamental to scientific explanation. 77 Statistical inference, with
its concepts of probability, independence, and randomness, is basic to
scientific discourse and forms the cornerstone of data analysis as well
as the basis for causation and other explanatory arguments.78 Funda-
73 Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 253.
74 See Braithwaite, supra note 72, at 123 (noting that scientific hypothesis cannot be
established as true because "however many observations we have made[,J a further obser-
vation may serve to refute the hypothesis"); see also Popper, supra note 36, at 316-17 (dis-
cussing distinction between probability theory and probability of hypothesis). Many
scientists vehemently believe in their theories. My point is that they understand that there
may be a disconnect between their belief and the reality of science in practice. Cf.
Hacking, supra note 71, at 14 (recognizing that majority of practitioners ignore distinction
between objective and subjective probability).
75 See Stephen F. Lanes, Error and Uncertainty in Causal Inference, in Causal Infer-
ence 173 (Kenneth J. Rothman ed., 1988). As Stephen Lanes wrote, "there can be no
empirical support for the conclusion that causation is the 'most likely' explanation for any
association." Id. at 183. He added that "[t]he uncertainty in causal inference is attributa-
ble to the fact that we cannot establish that an association is valid." Id. at 185. An uniden-
tifiable error may exist and it may cause the observation. See id. The most that can be
expected of probability factors such as "strength of an association, the shape of a dose-
response curve, [and] the level of statistical significance" is that they -affect subjective
beliefs." Id. at 186. Truth, in other words, must be distinguished from its fallible signs. See
Irme Lakatos, Mathematics, Science and Epistemology 108 n.2 (1978) (explaining that "a
proposition may correspond to a fact but there is no infallible way to establish this
correspondence").
76 See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 254-55. As Patrick Supps ex-
plains, "probability theory is designed to discover and to analyze partial causes in complex
situations for which a complete causal analysis is not feasible." Patrick Suppes, A Proba-
bilistic Theory of Causality 8 (1970).
77 See Lorenz Kruger, The Slow Rise of Probabilism: Philosophical Argument in the
Nineteenth Century, in 1 The Probabilistic Revolution, supra note 6S, at 59.
78 See Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers 107 (1990) ("Statis-
tical inference rests on concepts of probability and randomness."). As Suppes explains,
"[t]he concept of independence is one of the most profound and fundamental ideas, not
only of probability theory but of science in general." Suppes, supra note 76, at 109. The
concept of independence explains that discrete biological or physical events, like coin
tosses, have no memory of time and place. See Lynn Arthur Steen, The Science of Pat-
terns, 240 Science 611, 615 (1988). In other words, knowing whether a coin toss yielded
heads or tails on the previous flip will not help predict what the next coin toss will yield.
See Frederick Mosteller et al., Probability with Statistical Applications 31 (2d ed. 1970).
On the other hand, an idealized "fair" coin has a probability of yielding heads on any given
toss of 112 and when (n) such coins are tossed, the probability that all the coins land on
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mental to science is the idea that regularities may be discovered even
in processes with random or chance elements.79 Any observation of
regularity in complex systems-any model or "law" of nature-de-
pends on statistical theorems that describe the behavior of large sam-
ples of objects.80 Statistical concepts such as normal distribution,81
significance levels,82 and power 83 are all basic to science. Finally, false
positives are disfavored in all scientific fields; that is, scientists must
heads is (1/2) to the (n)th power. See id. at 114-15. Even after 10 heads have appeared in
a row, however, the probability of a tail grows no larger. See id. at 31. The coin cannot
change its configuration probability since it has no memory.
Equally important is the concept of a random variable. A random variable is a varia-
ble whose value is "determined by the outcome of an experiment," id. at 172, such as the
number of heads when three coins are tossed, see id. at 171-72. For more detailed defini-
tions and explanations of these fundamental statistical concepts, see generally id.
79 See Mosteller et al., supra note 78, at 7-8 (discussing empirical study of variability
and demonstrating by experiment with deck of cards that one can measure expected fre-
quency of outcome); Suppes, supra note 76, at 100 (discussing probability theory).
80 See Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 78, at 107 ("[A]ny regularity or 'law' of nature
observed at ordinary scales is itself a consequence of statistical theorems that describe the
aggregate behavior of large samples of objects.").
81 Normal distribution is the theoretical probability distribution sometimes referred to
as Gaussian distribution or, more commonly, the bell curve. See Colton, supra note 14, at
81-82. As one scientist explained, "[t]his distribution is the most common in nature and is
such that two-thirds of all values are within one standard deviation .. of the mean (or
average value for the entire population) and 95% are within 1.96 standard deviations of
the mean." Shayne C. Gad, Statistics and Experimental Design for Toxicologists 6 (3d ed.
1999). Generally, results of an experiment will not be identical, but will cluster around a
particular mean value. Scientists then make inferences based upon that mean value and
the amounts that the results deviate from that value. See Colton, supra note 14, at 81-84.
82 Statistical significance is set by convention at a level of significance, or p-value, of .05
(which corresponds to a confidence level of 95%). See Shayne C. Gad & Carrol S. VOil,
Statistics for Toxicologists, in Principles and Methods of Toxicology 221, 223 (A. Wallace
Hayes ed., 3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter Principles and Methods]. Statistical significance tests
keep the scientist from asserting a positive effect when the effect may actually be due to
chance. See David Ozonoff & Leslie I. Boden, Truth & Consequences: Health Agency
Responses to Environmental Health Problems, Sci. Tech. & Hum. Values, Summer/Fall
1987, at 70, 73-74. Statistical significance describes the probability that the procedure pro-
duced the observed effect by chance. Cf. Stephen E. Fienberg et al., Understanding and
Evaluating Statistical Evidence in Litigation, 36 Jurimetrics 1, 25 (1995) (discussing confi-
dence intervals). If a test is not statistically significant, it may either be because the results
were due to chance or because the test lacked the power to discern a difference between
no effect (the "null hypothesis") and the hypothesized effect. See id. at 22.
83 The power of a test refers to the "chance that a ... test will declare an effect when
there is an effect to declare," or "[m]ore precisely,.., the probability of [the test] rejecting
the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is right." David H. Kaye & David A.
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in Federal Judicial Ctr. Manual, supra note 9, at
331, 381 & n.152. Power increases with the size of the study and with the degree of differ-
ence between the alternative hypothesis and the null hypothesis; the more extreme the
alternatives, the better the power. See Fienberg et al., supra note 82, at 22. Power, there-
fore, will be an issue for small studies of low effects-precisely those most likely to be
proffered in toxic tort cases. Thus, separate studies of small numbers of subjects may not
yield statistically significant results simply because each individual test may lack the power
to distinguish the null hypothesis of no effect from results that are not extreme. See id.
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attempt to minimize the probability of claiming an effect when there is
none.84
Probabilistic assessments also employ assumptions, taking it as
given that all knowledge is incomplete.85 Background assumptions
are pervasive and inevitable;86 such assumptions are not unique to sta-
tistics, as every branch of science employs them.87 No experiment can
be performed without using assumptions-but which assumptions are
justified? Within a particular theory, or model, scientists agree on a
set of basic premises.88 These premises are assumptions that have an
empirical and consensual basis, and they operate just as rebuttable
presumptions work in the law: Under most circumstances, scientists
will rely on these background assumptions, but in some circumstances
the assumptions will be demonstrably false. In these cases the scien-
tist needs to explain the discrepancy.8 9
84 See Colton, supra note 14, at 116 (explaining implications of choosing significance
level of 5% as chance that, with repeated tests at 5% significance level, on average 95%
"will correctly not reject true null hypotheses"); Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter,
Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other Environmental Disease
in Individuals, 10 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 33, 72 n.158 (1985) (noting that scientists at-
tempt, whenever possible, to control and eliminate inaccuracies).
85 Cf. Stephan F. Lanes, The Logic of Causal Inference, in Causal Inference, supra note
75, at 59, 64-65 (stating that "knowledge is always theoretical" since one cannot "calculate
the probability that a theory is true"); see also Frederick Suppe, The Search for Philo-
sophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, in The Structure of Scientific Theories 3. 107-
108 (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977) (noting pervasiveness of assumptions in experimen-
tal design and execution). This is the idea behind Lakatos's revised theory of falsification,
in which a series of theories, rather than a single theory in isolation, is subjected to critique
and a new series is preferable if it increases the empirical content of the explanation. See
Lakatos, supra note 58, at 32-35.
86 See Naomi Oreskes et al., Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical
Models in the Earth Sciences, 263 Science 641, 641 (1994) (using example of numerical
simulation models in earth sciences, and noting that "the observation and measurement of
both independent and dependent variables are laden with inferences and assumptions").
87 For a smattering of articles employing assumptions in widely varying fields, see, for
example, S. Baumgartner et al., Geomagnetic Modulation of the 36C1 Flux in the GRIP Ice
Core, Greenland, 279 Science 1330 (1998) (geomagnetic force shields); Brush. supra note
46 (Newtonian physics); Eric NV. G. Diau et al., Femtosecond Activation of Reactions and
the Concept of Nonergodic Molecules, 279 Science 847 (1998) (molecular chemistry);
Thomas R. Knutson et al., Simulated Increase of Hurricane Intensities in a C02-Warmed
Climate, 279 Science 1018 (1998) (hurricane prediction); Lynn Arthur Steen, The Science
of Patterns, 240 Science 611 (1988) (statistics); see also Alan E. Shapiro, New Turnings, 250
Science 1600, 1600 (1990) (book review) (stating that scientific revolution was based on
conceptual transformation that involved new set of assumptions).
88 Collective judgment about which background assumptions are %warranted and under
what circumstances is not static; this consensus is subject to revision, and this collective
judgment forms what Lakatos calls a "research programme." See Lakatos, supra note 58,
at 47-52.
89 Kuhn points out that sometimes the anomalies in which background assumptions fail
are just ignored, but when too many accumulate, the theoretical framework (or research
programme, as Lakatos called it) collapses and is replaced by a new framework (or pro-
gramme). See Kuhn, supra note 49, at 81-85.
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True verification and validation of theories is impossible, and
therefore theories must be evaluated in relative terms. Data (from
experiment or from observation), theory, contingencies, and assump-
tions are juxtaposed to provide an explanation for the way things
work.90 The operative question is which theories explain the data, not
which data establish the theory.91 Causal inference-like other scien-
tific hypotheses-is a matter of explanation. 92 This is the foundation
of probabilistic reasoning, and judges must understand this to make
scientific admissibility determinations properly.
2. Falsifiability, Criticism, and Rationality
Karl Popper's philosophy of science has had a marked impact on
the way scientists think about what they do.93 Although Popper cer-
tainly is not the most recent philosopher of science, nor is he uncon-
troversial, subsequent philosophers of science have had to respond to
his ideas.94 Popper's thesis argues that, among other things, a valid
theory must be falsifiable.95 Popper defined falsifiability as compris-
ing three concepts: testability, openness to critique, and rationality. 96
These ideas remain central to scientific argument.97 Therefore, they
90 See Knorr-Cetina, supra note 47, at 21 (stating that observation and interpretation,
and fit between them, are concerns basic to scientific reasoning); Oreskes et al., supra note
86, at 642 (explaining that most that can be said of scientific model is that it "does not
contain known or detectable flaws and is internally consistent" and is therefore "valid," in
sense of being "legitimate," rather than "true"). See generally Suppes, supra note 76.
91 See Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery 64 (1958) (discussing connec-
tion of theories of cause and effect).
92 See Lanes, supra note 85, at 66 (advancing Popperian view of causal inference).
93 For an historical account of Popper's influence, see generally Ian Hacking, Repre-
senting and Intervening (1983); Suppe, supra note 85.
94 For a number of prominent scientists who have responded to Popper's ideas, see,
e.g., Paul Feyerabend, Against Method 93-98 (1978) (disagreeing with Popper by advocat-
ing positive role of ad hoc hypotheses in development of scientific theories); Howson &
Urbach, supra note 72, at 224 (acknowledging pre-eminence of Popper's philosophy while
attempting to refute it); Lakatos, supra note 58, at 8-9 (discussing Popper's theory of scien-
tific revolution and Kuhn's criticism of it).
95 Many scientists ignore Popper's principle in practice. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-
Rill, supra note 5, at 256 (noting that "[i]n practice, however, many scientists strive to
prove their theories correct (not incorrect)" and thus "[w]hile non-scientists believe that
scientists follow the principle of falsifiability, in reality many do not"). However, the fact
that scientists think they are performing experiments to confirm a prediction, rather than
to falsify it, does not make their belief correct. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 42, at 274.
96 See Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowl-
edge 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability,
or refutability, or testability."). For further explanation of these concepts, see generally
Popper, supra note 36. For a discussion of Popperian notions of falsifiability, diversity, and
rationalism, see Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 256.
97 See Oreskes et al., supra note 86, at 645 n.36 (demonstrating continued centrality of
Popper's philosophy by challenging use of geological modeling in Popperian terms). Even
Popper's critics, who challenge his ideas as insufficient to explain what really goes on in
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are useful ideas for judges faced with the task of assessing scientific
validity.98
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Daubert, testing hypoth-
eses is a key factor in determining "good" science.99 Affirming the
importance of empirical content to scientific theory, testability sug-
gests that what makes a hypothesis scientific is that it can be corrobo-
rated (provisionally) or falsified by observation and experiment. 100
The greater the empirical content of a theory, the stronger the theory,
because it is more open to testing and more easily falsifiable.101
As a corollary to testability or falsification, the hypothesis being
tested must have precise logical consequences that are incompatible
with alternative hypotheses. The articulation of what the testing
means is also critically important10 2 Popper explained that the scien-
fist's task is continually to criticize and reassess scientific theories in
light of new theories and data. 0 3 The importance of a control group
(for experimental studies) or a null hypothesis (for observational stud-
ies) is that by such means a researcher exposes the chosen hypothesis
to the possibility of falsification. If the data, gathered with proper
science, are forced to acknowledge the force of his philosophy. See, e.g., Alfred Jules
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic 38 (2d ed. 1946) (critiquing falsifiability on basis that
falsifiability, like confirmation, presupposes certain conditions); see also supra note 94.
98 As Lakatos explained, theories cannot be appraised without some presuppositions
regarding the growth of knowledge. See Lakatos, supra note 75, at 159.
99 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citing Popper
for importance of falsifiability in determining whether "a theory of technique is scientific
knowledge"); cf. Gross, supra note 59, at 32 (explaining that "commitment in science...
rests ultimately on agreed-upon procedures").
100 See Francisco J. Ayala, Biology as an Autonomous Science, 56 Am. Sci. 207, 207
(1968) (stating that testability requires that "scientific explanations have precise logical
consequences which can be verified or falsified by observation and experiment"). A the-
ory can be corroborated at any given point in time only provisionally; further testing may
reveal hitherto undiscovered flaws that refute it. See Popper, supra note 36, at 275.
101 See Popper, supra note 36, at 121 (observing that rule that prefers theories "which
can be most severely tested... [is] equivalent to a rule favouring theories wvith the highest
possible empirical content"). Thus, "[s]cience advances toward truth (though never arriv-
ing at certainty) by a combination of bold conjecture and severe criticism." Gieqy, supra
note 51, at 395; see also Faigman, supra note 49, at 1018 ("[Tjhe fact that scientific theories
are vulnerable to falsification imparts a strength stemming from having taken the risk of
refutation.").
102 See Lakatos, supra note 75, at 109-10 (explaining that articulating meaning is funda-
mental precondition for appraisal).
103 See Popper, supra note 36, at 275 (explaining that appraisal of statements is relative
to information available at particular point in time). In addition, the effects of secondary
variables-variables other than the ones examined by the test--either must be controlled,
known (as in an experiment), or explicitly assumed (as in observational studies of human
populations). For a descriptive distinction between experiment, quasi-experiment, and ob-
servational study, see Fienberg et al., supra note 82, at 15-17.
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controls, do not refute the proposed hypothesis, it may be (provision-
ally) valid.10 4
The concept of testability has been challenged on several
fronts.105 Testability alone ignores the problem of identifying underly-
ing assumptions. 106 Testability assumes a laboratory science paradigm
of methodology; the idea must be stretched to encompass epidemiol-
ogy, for example, with its reliance on statistical inference rather than
controlled experiments. 107 Even fields outside the laboratory para-
digm, however, have criteria for validity that need to be met, and thus
their own form of testability. But testability does not stand alone as
the sole criterion for distinguishing science from pseudoscience.108
In addition to testability, Popper believed that valid science re-
quires theories to be open to information from and critique by the
entire scientific community. 10 9 Instead of relying on a narrow focus,
Popper believed that the interaction of various scientific disciplines
was important to the growth of knowledge.110 He thought that scien-
tific inquiry could only benefit by listening to interdisciplinary
104 As one scientist explains, "it]he practice of scientific method is the persistent critique
of arguments in the light of tried canons for judging the reliability of the procedures by
which evidential data are obtained, and for assessing the probative force of the evidence on
which conclusions are based." Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science 13 (1961).
105 For a number of such challenges, see, e.g., Lakatos, supra note 58, at 32-33 (arguing
that Popper's proposed asymmetry between falsification and corroboration is much less
significant than he thought); Conley & Peterson, supra note 9, at 1201-02 (presenting criti-
cisms of Supreme Court's reliance on testability as ultimate criterion for what makes some-
thing scientific knowledge). In fact, some commentators have argued that using
falsifiability as a criterion for good science would render much of modem science unscien-
tific. See, e.g., Alan Chalmers, Science and Its Fabrication 18 (1990) (contending that if
criterion of falsifiability is "formulated sufficiently strongly to have some force, then phys-
ics would fail to qualify as a science"). What is important, the critique suggests, is that any
new theory must explain the partial success of its predecessor and also something more.
See Lakatos, supra note 58, at 142.
106 See Lakatos, supra note 58, at 1-7.
107 Testability also may not be an adequate notion for psychology and other social sci-
ences where retrospective observational studies, rather than controlled experimentation,
are the norm. Empirical data, statistical description, openness to critique, and coherence
with the underlying theory are also indicia of validity in these fields. The Supreme Court
made this point in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 136 (1999), where it empha-
sized that Daubert analysis must be applied even to "soft science" fields such as engineer-
ing and psychology. See id. at 147.
108 For a discussion of the critique that, although testability is necessary, it is not suffi-
cient to distinguish good science from bad science (pseudoscience), see Lakatos, supra note
58, at 1-7.
109 See Popper, supra note 36, at 44 & n.1; Karl Popper, Normal Science and Its Dan-
gers, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 51, 57 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave
eds., 1970) (arguing that science progresses through "critical comparison of the competing
frameworks").
110 See Popper, supra note 36, at 44 & n.1.
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voices."' The more that different fields of science interact to learn
from and critique each other's ideas, the more we will know about the
world. 112 Using studies from many disciplines thus forms an impor-
tant facet of good scientific argument.113
The force of rationality is a third underlying tenet of Popper's
philosophy of science. 14 Popper believed that rationality consists of
"stating one's problem clearly and... examining its various proposed
solutions critically.""l 15 Popper thus equated rationality with a critical
attitude.1 6 Rationality consists of comparing ideas and has little to do
with belief.117 A background in science is not required to understand
scientific ideas.1 8 Rather, scientific ideas ought to be tested in a pub-
lic forum by experts from many different fields.
For Popper, rationality encompasses testing the internal consis-
tency of the theory or hypothesis, testing the consistency with other
theories, and testing the consistency with the experimental data. 119
Indeed, Popper distinguished science from myth by science's fal-
sifiability in which Popper included its testability, openness to interdis-
ciplinary critique, and rationality.120 However, it is the explanatory
power of increased empirical content that makes one falsifiable theory
superior to another.12'
111 See id. at 399.
112 An important example of this interdisciplinarity is the rapid spread and application
of chaos theory and principles of nonlinearity to a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines,
including chemistry, physics, and ecology, among others. See Celso Grebogi et al., Chaos,
Strange Attractors, and Fractal Basin Boundaries in Nonlinear Dynamics, 238 Science 632,
632 (1987) (noting "explosive growth" in field of chaotic dynamics of dissipative systems,
and its many applications "across a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines").
113 See Oreskes et aL, supra note 86, at 645 n38 (noting that "diversity in confirmation
helps to explain why it is important to test a model in a wide variety of circumstances-
including those that may appear quite different from the expected circumstances").
114 See Popper, supra note 36, at 16-17 (describing "rational discussion" as basic method
of natural sciences and philosophy).
115 Id. at 16.
116 See id.
117 See, e.g., Lakatos, supra note 75, at 196 n.10.
118 Popper differed radically from elitists such as Polanyi and Feyerabend, who stressed
the notion that only a privileged elite can understand science. See Lakatos, supra note 58,
at 91 (critiquing Polanyi who regarded elaboration of rational standards as hopeless enter-
prise, in contrast to Popper and Lakatos who developed standards for rationality).
119 See Popper, supra note 36, at 40.
120 See id. at 16 (noting force of rationality); id. at 40 (discussing falsifiability as criterion
for demarcation); id. at 44 n.*1 (noting importance of interdisciplinary critique). Thus, a
theory is not better for Popper just because a scientific elite prefers it, but because the
ideas have withstood severe criticism and offer a better, more persuasive, rational explana-
tion that is higher in empirical content than rival theories. Cf. Lakatos, supra note 75, at
228-42 (arguing for clear theses in science "where logic can assist criticism and help to
appraise the growth of knowledge").
121 See Popper, supra note 36, at 277 & n.*1 (discussing explanatory power of scientific
theories).
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3. Explanatory Power
The explanatory power of a scientific theory is its ability to ex-
plain what happened. A testable, critiquable, and rational scientific
theory is still useless, unless it can tell us why the results turned out
the way they did, and what the new theory explains that the previous
one did not.122 Empirical support for this explanation may take many
forms. 123 Thus, scientists gather all the information available in sup-
port of a plausible theory. Scientific explanation consists of juxtaposi-
tion of theory and data, that is, the ability to take data and turn them
into a valid scientific argument. 24 What makes one theory stronger
than another, or why one theory should supplant a prior theory, is a
function of its explanatory power.
The explanatory power of science builds on metaphor.1 25 A sci-
entific model is a metaphor, an analogy to something more familiar.126
The better the model, the more it will take into account all of the data
tested or observed. 27 The most common scientific metaphors (or
models) in current use are the pump and the computer, and many
disparate systems are described in terms of these metaphors.1 28 The
heart, for example, is commonly described as a pump, 29 and the brain
122 See Lakatos, supra note 58, at 32 ("[A] scientific theory T is falsified if and only if
another theory T" has been proposed with the following characteristics: (1) "r has excess
empirical content over T... (2) T explains the previous success of T... and (3) some of
the excess content of T is corroborated.").
123 As noted in the Federal Judicial Center Manual, "[m]ultiple avenues of deductive
reasoning based on research data lead to scientific acceptance of causation in any
field .... " Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifm, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in
Federal Judicial Ctr. Manual, supra note 9, at 181, 212 (acknowledging difficulty of quan-
titatively describing process of inferring causation from multiple studies).
124 See generally Hacking, supra note 93 (examining relationship between data, observa-
tion, and theory).
125 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining use of models and metaphors
in science).
126 See Gross, supra note 59, at 80-81 (arguing that metaphor seems to have indispensa-
ble role in science, even though use of metaphor seems inconsistent with mature scientific
knowledge).
127 See Ayala, supra note 100, at 207 (stating that "distinctive characteristic of science" is
"that it strives to provide explanations of why the observed events do in fact occur");
Oreskes et al., supra note 86, at 644 n.19 (observing that "scientists routinely modify their
models to fit recalcitrant data").
128 See, e.g., id. at 81 ("[A] unit of a living cell is a pump, and a biochemical process is a
cascade that embodies a positive feedback mechanism." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
129 See, e.g., Marcia Barinaga, How Much Pain for Cardiac Gain?, 276 Science 1324,
1325 (1997) (referring to heart as pump).
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is described as a computer. °30 These metaphors are useful but, to
some degree, inaccurate. 131
Explanatory power encompasses the idea of reliability, which in
science refers to the reproducibility of results. 132 The explanatory
power of a theory, however, is more than reliability. Explanatory
power is what distinguishes a good experiment from one that merely
can be reproduced. Just because results are reproducible, however,
does not mean that they are correct. On the other hand, the ir-
reproducibility of results suggests that something is wrong with the
methodology.13
It is important to remember, however, that although the explana-
tory power, or persuasiveness, of a theory can make it superior to
competing theories, it is impossible to say whether a given theory is
"true."1' "4 It is superior if it offers a better metaphor, and if it accounts
for most, if not all, of the known data in a more persuasive way than
other theories.3 5 In addition, the theory must be capable of accom-
modating newly discovered information.136
It is around these basic principles of testability, criticism, rational-
ity, and explanatory power-principles inherent in the scientific
method-that any heuristic must be framed if it is to be useful to
judges in assessing the admissibility of scientific arguments.
II
THE HEURisnc: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES IN DECIDING TnE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A judge confronted with a scientific admissibility determination
has to decide whether the scientific expert is testifying about valid sci-
entific knowledge, which Daubert explained as knowledge grounded
130 See, e.g., Harry Levin, Successions in Psychology, 236 Science 1683, 1683 (1937)
(book review) (describing computer as metaphor for human information processing).
131 See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 256 (noting that inescapable dif-
ferences between model and actual process, along with "intrinsic problems and hidden
assumptions," can render metaphors slightly inaccurate).
132 See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 83, at 341.
133 For example, the irreproducibility of the cold nuclear fusion experiments tipped off
the fraudulent nature of the experiments. For a discussion of the "discovery" of cold nu-
clear fusion and the repeated attempts to prove its existence, see generally Gary Taubes,
Bad Science: The Short Life and Weird Times of Cold Fusion (1993).
134 See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 254-55 ("[WV]e only can be defi-
nite about the superiority of one theory over another, not about its absolute truth.").
135 Lakatos explained that "[a] hypothesis, however novel in its intuitive aspects, will not
be allowed to be proposed, unless it has novel empirical content in excess of its predeces-
sor." Lakatos, supra note 58, at 142.
136 See Popper, supra note 36, at 279 (stating that accommodating newly discovered
evidence is hallmark of valid theorizing).
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in and derived by the scientific method. 137 Scientific method, insofar
as it exists, consists of a common discourse about probabilistic assess-
ment, testability, criticism, rationality, and explanation. How can
these themes be teased into a useful heuristic to solve the validity
puzzle?
There are five basic factors a judge should consider in making the
decision to admit expert testimony into evidence. First, the judge
must identify and understand the underlying theory and hypothesis.
Second, in order to determine whether the theory is supportable, the
judge must examine all of the available information-human studies,
animal studies, cellular studies, and chemical structure-in concert. t38
Third, where there are information gaps (which are inevitable), judges
should fill them with scientifically justifiable default assumptions.
Fourth, the judge should conduct an inquiry into the methodology (in-
cluding the laboratory or observational methods as well as statistical
methodology) and assess whether it conforms to generally acceptable
practices in the field. Finally, the judge must put all this information
together in such a way as to make a probabilistic assessment of the
strength of the links between theory, assumptions, methodology, and
the conclusion the expert espouses. This Part explains each of these
five steps in detail.
A. What's the Theory? Examine the Explanatory Power of Theory
and Hypothesis
Expert testimony is proffered to support a hypothesis. Underly-
ing the hypothesis is a more general theory. Theories are the starting
point for scientific analysis.139 The difference between theory and hy-
pothesis is a matter of degree: A theory has undergone more testing
and refinement (and therefore gained more acceptability) than has a
hypothesis.140 Judges cannot decide whether a scientific theory or hy-
pothesis is correct.141 Neither can scientists. Instead, the most anyone
can decide in making a decision about whether a given theory or hy-
pothesis is "valid" is whether the theory is supported adequately
137 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
138 In this vein, it is unscientific to expect a single study to uphold an entire explanation.
See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should consider studies
in combination with one another to determine whether all proffered testimony and evi-
dence support expert opinions).
139 See Brennan, supra note 68, at 483 ("[S]cientists understand that theories define un-
certainty and provide the basis for hypothesis building.").
140 See Popper, supra note 36, at 121 (stating that if hypothesis repeatedly withstands
testing it may become accepted as theory).
141 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (explaining that theories cannot be
proven true, or even probable).
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enough by facts and logic to be reliable, either as evidence at trial or-
in the case of a scientist-as a basis for further experimentation. Un-
derstanding science as a process of idea construction rather than mere
description makes it possible for a judge to examine the logic of the
ideas about which the expert proposes to testify and how those ideas
are rationally related to what they are intended to show.
Knowing what the underlying theory is and whether it makes
sense-both on a general level and as it applies to the specific case-is
the first step in this process. In a toxic tort case, for example, the
underlying theory on the most general level is that exposure to chemi-
cals can cause illness or birth defects; less broadly, that a particular
chemical can cause specific effects; and at the level of specific causa-
tion, that certain chemicals to which plaintiffs were exposed caused
plaintiffs' particular disease or birth defects.142 In a criminal case
where identification is the issue, the theory is that each individual has
unique identifying characteristics (DNA, fingerprints, handwriting,
etc.) shared by relatively few other people, that these characteristics
can be measured, and that the frequency with which these characteris-
tics appear in the general population is quantifiable and therefore
helps identify the defendant.
Identifying the theory is deceptively simple, although courts
rarely stop to explain the theory that underlies the expert's testimony.
Assessing the theory's validity-that is, determining whether each of
the theory's parts fit together to make a coherent whole-is more dif-
ficult, and courts routinely get it wrong. Yet the court must identify
and understand the underlying theory before moving on to evaluate
the data, assumptions, methodology, and the strength of the links be-
tween them.
A good theory accommodates most or all of the available evi-
dence. It explains data that appear to refute it. Examining all the
available data is therefore key to deciding whether the theory explains
the phenomenon well enough to be admissible.
B. Examine All of the Available Data
Many courts-including the Supreme Court in Joiner-mistak-
enly require that each study proffered by an expert support the en-
tirety of the expert's hypothesis in order for that expert's testimony to
142 Civil courts refer to the broad theory level as general causation; the more specific
theory level is referred to as specific causation. See, e.g., Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.
Supp. 756, 771 n34 (E.D. Va. 1995) (explaining difference between general and specific
causation).
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be admissible.' 43 This notion results from a fundamental misconcep-
tion about the scientific process. No single study should be expected
to establish the validity of a theory on its own, nor should the support-
ing data be limited to one particular field of inquiry.1 " Not only are
many steps and sources of data necessary to build a theory, but each
step itself builds on a theory comprising many steps, and so on. More-
over, experimental studies using different methodologies (such as in
vivo animal studies, in vitro tissue culture studies, and structure-activ-
ity relationship studies) 45 may produce inferential synergy. 146 That is,
taken together such studies may have far greater inferential force than
if considered separately. 47 Of course, not all evidence will corrobo-
rate the expert's hypothesis, and the expert should be able to explain
contradictory or conflicting data.
In Joiner, Justice Stevens properly expressed annoyance that the
parties had presented a record devoid of the studies and data on
which the experts relied. 48 An assessment of the studies' scientific
validity could not be undertaken without access to the underlying
143 The Supreme Court in Joiner made this mistake when, rather than assessing how the
various studies in conjunction supported the experts' hypothesis, the majority seemingly
approved the district court's method of examining the studies seriatim as well as the court's
conclusion that none was individually sufficient to justify the experts' causation conclusion.
See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997). The Court found that it is
within the trial judge's discretion to determine whether proffered studies, "whether indi-
vidually or in combination," are sufficient. See id.
144 Stephen E. Fienberg and coauthors emphasize the scientific merit of combining dif-
ferent studies. They comment:
Complex scientific inferences are rarely the result of a single statistical infer-
ence, but are based on disparate pieces of scientific evidence of different per-
spectives in different contexts. For example, a cause-and-effect relationship
may be inferred from a consistent association in several epidemiological stud-
ies, a relationship between exposure or dose and response in toxicological ex-
periments with animals, and a causal mechanism consistent with some
biological theory.
Fienberg et al., supra note 82, at 13; see also supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
145 See infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing value of drawing biological
explanations from studies in various fields of science).
146 See David A. Schum, The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning 282-83
(1994) (discussing ways in which different items of evidence can be "synergistic" such that
they may enhance or reduce force of other evidence).
147 See id. at 283 (emphasizing that "one item of evidence can act to enhance the infer-
ential force of another" while noting that "there are other situations in which one item of
evidence can act to reduce the inferential force of another item" (emphasis added)).
148 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 151 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens argued that the district court erroneously excluded studies piecemeal rather
than weighing all the available scientific evidence. See id. at 152-53. Assessing the facts of
Joiner, Justice Stevens concluded that had the district court permitted the proffered studies
to be used in conjunction with each other, "an expert could reasonably have concluded
that the study of workers at an Italian capacitor plant, coupled with data from Monsanto's
study and other studies, raises an inference that PCB's promote lung cancer." Id. at 154.
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data. What kind of data should judges be looking for? In the best of
all possible worlds, a sound biological explanation would be drawn
from many well-performed studies of humans, animals, cells, general
metabolic processes, and chemical structures.149 Each of these kinds
of studies provides different information contributing to an under-
standing and recognition of the importance of the other studies.
Many courts refuse to apply this kind of wide-ranging, interdisci-
plinary analysis, mistakenly believing that it is only a "methodology
result[ing] from the preventive perspective that the agencies adopt in
order to reduce public exposure to harmful substances," and not a
useful means of establishing the reliability necessary for judicial ad-
missibility.150 However, this multidisciplinary approach is used not
149 See, e.g., Ronan O'Rahilly & Fabiola MUller, Human Embryology & Teratology 8-9
(2d ed. 1996) (explaining importance of animal studies to understanding human develop-
ment); James L Schardein, Chemically Induced Birth Defects 25-37 (3d ed. 2000) (discuss-
ing use of structure-activity studies, pharmacokinetics, animal models, and in vitro methods
for studying birth defects); Barbara D. Beck et al., The Use of Toxicology in the Regula-
tory Process, in Principles and Methods, supra note 82, at 19, 25 (observing in context of
regulatory decisionmaking that "[t]he rational approach is to examine all sources of infor-
mation in the evaluation of toxic chemicals"); Christopher P. Chengelis & Shayne Cox
Gad, Introduction to Animal Models in Toxicology 1, 1 (Shayne Cox Gad & Christopher P.
Chengelis eds., 1992) ("[E]xperiments in animals have provided the necessary building
blocks that permitted the explosive growth of medical and biological knowledge in the
later half of the twentieth century."); Ernest Hodgson, Introduction to A Textbook of
Modem Toxicology 1, 6-7 (Ernest Hodgson & Patricia E. Levi eds., 2d ed. 1997) (explain-
ing interrelatedness of toxicology with other sciences).
The EPA uses this broad-based or "weight of the evidence" approach to assess the risk
of cancer or birth defects presented by various chemicals. See EPA Proposed Guidelines,
supra note 10, at 17,961 (explaining that "decisions come from considering all of the evi-
dence"). This same approach is used by the World Health Organization's International
Agency for Research on Cancer (LARC) and by the National Toxicology Program (NTP)
of the National Institute of Environmental Health Science (NIEHS). See Bert Black, Post-
Daubert and Joiner Caselaw. The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 1998 A.LI.-A.B.A.
Course of Study. Products Liability 147, 154 (discussing Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g
Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996), and noting that IARC, OSHA, and EPA all follow
"weight of the evidence" approach); Cranor et al, supra note 39, at 69-70 (stating that NTP
and IARC use same criteria for evaluating carcinogens). In this respect, the agencies have
it right.
150 Allen, 102 F.3d at 198. In Allen, the plaintiff's experts sought to testify that the
plaintiff's exposure to ethylene oxide had caused his brain cancer. The experts relied on
imperfect epidemiological studies, animal studies, and cell biology data, none of which
standing alone was sufficient to explain the plaintiff's illness. See id. The Fifth Circuit
took notice of the recognized connection between ethylene oxide exposure and other kinds
of cancers, the "suggestive" link between the chemical and brain cancer demonstrated by
the proffered epidemiological studies, and considered both proffered animal studies show-
ing brain tumors developed in rats after exposure to the chemical and cell biology studies
showing the chemical at issue to have "mutagenic and genotoxic capabilities." See id. at
197-98. Despite all of this, the court found that the "paucity of epidemiological evidence,
the unreliability of animal studies, and the inconclusiveness of cell biology combine to
undercut the expert testimony." Id. at 198. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the dis-
trict court properly excluded the experts' testimony. See id.
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just in preventive agency determinations, but is applied widely. 51 The
broad-based, multistudy approach is the most widely used methodol-
ogy by the scientific community and has firm scientific support.152
Although an expert's unexplained adoption of agency risk assess-
ments should be viewed critically by trial judges because they may be
based on underlying default assumptions meant to protect the public,
that does not mean the entire methodology should be categorically
dismissed. Such a rejection fails to recognize that most agency deter-
minations are based on scientific probability assessments rather than
on worst-case scenarios, and therefore may assess the environmental
risk realistically. 153
Most importantly, assessing the cumulative force of all the availa-
ble information is consistent with modern research methods. 54 Sci-
ence accommodates change. Judges too should accommodate changes
in research. Although human studies may be the most relevant in as-
sessing the effect of a given chemical on human beings, animal studies
and information about the physical, structural, and chemical proper-
ties of a suspected agent also can yield important information about
its risk to humans.' 55
151 In focusing on the regulatory aspect of the "weight of the evidence" approach, courts
are confusing risk assessment with risk management. That is, the EPA may make a risk
assessment that a chemical has only a slight possibility of being carcinogenic, for example,
and nevertheless decide as a matter of risk management to regulate it to protect public
health so that people are exposed at only very low levels. See EPA Proposed Guidelines,
supra note 10, at 17,965.
152 See, e.g., Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 123, at 186; Interdisciplinary Panel on
Carcinogenicity, Criteria for Evidence of Chemical Carcinogenicity, 225 Science 682, 686
(1984) ("[E]ven in the instances where data are available from humans, the data must be
supplemented with information from other sources before a conclusion can be reached.").
Although EPA risk assessments should not be adopted necessarily as dispositive in toxic
tort litigation, there is nothing inherently biased about the methodology used in reaching
the risk characterization. But see Ellen Relkin, The Sword or the Shield: Use of Govern-
mental Regulations, Exposure Standards and Toxicological Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 6
Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1, 7-9 (1997) (cautioning against wholesale adoption of regula-
tors' risk assessment models).
153 Indeed, the EPA's Proposed Guidelines explain that while initial assessments may be
"worst case" in their default assumptions, subsequent risk assessments based on more com-
plete information will replace the initial assessments as more data become available. See
EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,965.
154 See id. at 17,961 (stating that examination of all available information is consistent
with "the growing sophistication of research methods, particularly in their ability to reveal
the modes of action of carcinogenic agents at cellular and subcellular levels as well as
toxicokinetic and metabolic processes").
155 See id. at 17,977 (approving use of and finding great relevance in animal studies and
studies of "physical, chemical, and structural properties of an agent"). Physiochemical
properties of suspected toxic chemicals include how a particular chemical is absorbed by
the body, how it is distributed and degraded in the body, and how it reacts with body cells.
See id. In extrapolating the results of animal studies to humans, and to studies of absorp-
tion, distribution, biotransformation, and excretion, one can compare the effects of a par-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:1563
INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS
The more complete the picture presented by these various stud-
ies, the better the judge can assess the expert's conclusions.156 But all
pictures are incomplete. Deciding whether conflicting data and gaps
in the information provided by the studies weaken the expert's posi-
tion or prove fatal to the expert's proffered testimony depends upon a
careful evaluation of these uncertainties.'- In litigation, this means
that the party offering scientific evidence (usually the plaintiff in toxic
tort actions, or the prosecutor in criminal cases) will have to show how
the individual studies on which the expert relies link together analyti-
cally to support the inferences the expert wishes the court to draw.158
But it also means that experts must be permitted to proffer studies
other than human studies in support of their hypotheses to fill the
gaps in scientific knowledge of human reactions.
Facts alone, even scientific facts, are not knowledge. They be-
come scientific knowledge only in conjunction with coherent answers
to the following questions: What range of facts deserves investiga-
tion? What is the proper way to investigate them? And what do the
results of the investigation mean?159 Linking the data to the hypothe-
sis requires answering all three of these questions.
Even the best testing process (or observational study) depends,
for its scientific validity, on how well (i.e., how logically) the data is
analyzed.160 A scientist needs not only to justify the choice of experi-
ticular chemical among species and determine the implications of animal response for
human hazard assessment. See, e.g., id. at 17,980 (outlining factors to consider in extrapo-
lating results of animal studies to humans).
156 See id. at 17,980 (noting importance of "complete... data package" and "data-rich"
source of information).
157 See id.; see also id. at 17,981 (noting importance of "a collective evaluation of all
pertinent information so that the full impact of biological plausibility and coherence are
adequately considered").
158 See, for example, Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316.319 (7th Cir. 1996), where
Judge Posner castigated the expert for attempting to infer precipitation of the plaintiff's
heart attack from a nicotine patch manufactured by the defendant. The expert based his
conclusion on long-term animal studies showing that nicotine can contribute to the forma-
tion of plaque over time. Yet as Judge Posner correctly pointed out, the expert had failed
to distinguish between long-term studies and the short-term effects of wearing a nicotine
patch for three days. In other words, the expert failed to provide a link between the long-
term studies and the short-term effects suffered by the plaintiff. See id. Thus, the studies
did not combine analytically to support the plaintiff's theory.
159 See Gross, supra note 59, at 4 (stating that "scientific knowledge consists of the cur-
rent answers" to these three questions, and arguing that scientific facts are meaningless
without structure provided by answers to these fundamental questions).
160 Cf. Gad, supra note 81, at 26-29 (explaining principles of experimental design and
analogizing experimental design to logic flow analysis); Polanyi, supra note 45, at 161 (ex-
plaining importance of analysis of facts); Brennan, supra note 68, at 483 (discussing impor-
tance of theory in empirical studies).
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mental design,161 but to provide models of data,1 62 and to describe
how well the data actually fit the expected theoretical model.163 The
theory of the experiment permeates all these considerations, and the
theory may not be assessed adequately without understanding the as-
sumptions upon which it rests.
C. Use Assumptions to Fill the Gaps
The scientific process often leads to the phenomenon of "battling
experts" both inside and outside the courtroom. Yet battling experts
may both offer valid hypotheses. Different approaches to data analy-
sis may lead to radically different conclusions, depending on the re-
searcher's underlying assumptions and strategies. 164 Even in a
controlled, randomized study, two investigators from the same team,
assessing the same data, can reach opposite conclusions. 165 It is "often
not that one analyst is right and the other wrong[,] but that different
assumptions, implemented through different analytical strategies, can
produce conflicting results.' 66 These (often unstated) assumptions
161 Issues with respect to choice of design include the number of trials and choice of
experimental parameters. See Gad, supra note 81, at 21-31 (explaining principles of exper-
imental design).
162 A model is the formal description of how observations are produced, incorporating
various assumptions implicit in the presentation of the evidence. See Fienberg et al., supra
note 82, at 2.
163 See Suppe, supra note 85, at 258-59.
164 See, e.g., Daryl E. Chubin, Research Malpractice, in Science Off the Pedestal: Social
Perspectives on Science and Technology 95, 99 (Daryl E. Chubin & Ellen W. Chu eds.,
1989) ("The history of science is littered with examples of how strong belief-pro or con-
can alter perception."). Data is defined and given significance by the particular scientist as
well as by the conceptual structure of the scientific discipline in which the scientist is partic-
ipating. See Rubin, supra note 50, at 1883 ("[S]cientists determine the significance of the
data they have... generated and defined.").
165 This is precisely what happened in the clinical trials of antibiotic treatment for "glue-
ear," a common childhood ailment. See Andrew W. Osterland, A Child's Guide to Medi-
cal Ethics, Fm. World, Aug. 16, 1994, at 54, 54 (chronicling disagreement between Drs.
Erdem Cantekin and Charles Bluestone over whether or not antibiotics are effective in
treating "glue-ear"). One of the assumptions at stake in the "glue-ear" controversy be-
tween Drs. Cantekin and Bluestone may have resulted (at least according to Dr. Cantekin)
from drug company funding of the studies. This funding may have skewed results in favor
of the drug. See id.
166 George Davey Smith, Increasing the Accessibility of Data, 308 Brit. Med. J. 1519,
1519 (int'l ed. 1994) (urging scientists to make data public so others can evaluate assump-
tions and inferences they made). The court-appointed expert in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996), explained the importance of inference-drawing,
observing that two experts validly may draw different inferences from the same data. See
Letter from Merwyn R. Greenlick to U.S. District Judge Robert Jones and Oregon Court
of Appeals Judge Nely Johnson, reprinted in Hall, 947 F. Supp. app. B at 1448 (observing
that "both [plaintiffs' and defendants' experts' inferences] are based on scientifically valid
data" and that they "have arrived at somewhat different positions as a result of different,
but legitimate, interpretations of the results"). The court did not respond to this
explanation.
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must be analyzed to assess whether the expert's conclusion is a valid
interpretation of the studies on which the expert relied. 67
Gaps in scientific knowledge are inevitable; they are not fatal
flaws.168 Making assumptions to fill gaps in scientific knowledge is a
normal and necessary part of scientific analysis. As one scientist
explained:
All scientific work is incomplete whether it be observational or ex-
perimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by
advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us a freedom to
ignore the knowledge we already have, or to postpone the action
that it appears to demand at a given time.1 69
Appropriate inferences in the context of litigation should be
based not only on the concerns of scientists, but also on judicial policy
concerns. Thus, basic assumptions should "ensur[e] scientific validity,
minimiz[e] serious errors in estimating risks, maximiz[e] incentives for
[safety] research, creat[e] an orderly and predictable process, and fos-
ter[ ]... trustworthiness." 170 Merely rejecting studies as "too specula-
tive," as many courts dismissively deem them, without explaining the
basis for rejecting the underlying assumptions, is not enough.17t Intel-
167 Judges commonly assume in assessing scientific testimony that the expert who relies
on a particular study must adopt the study's conclusion. See infra notes 385-87 and accom-
panying text. Such an assumption is mistaken, however, because it is the underlying data
from the study-no doubt in conjunction with the underlying data from other studies-
which the expert uses to reach a different, but (absent any errors in reasoning) equally
valid conclusion. "Science as we know it would not exist if scientists did not defend their
theories, by criticizing either the assumptions that go into the design of an experiment that
supposedly refutes their theories, or the alternative theories that are proposed as replace-
ments for their theories." Warren Schmaus, An Analysis of Fraud and Misconduct in Sci-
ence, in American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, supra note 50, at 87, 89.
168 Inferences based on general scientific knowledge about phenomena are not only ac-
ceptable, but unavoidable. See Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of
Risks to Pub. Health, National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Govern-
ment: Managing the Process 11 (1983) [hereinafter Risk Assessment in the Federal Gov-
ernment] (discussing "pervasive uncertainty" which necessarily surrounds inferences about
risk assessment).
169 Hill, supra note 37, at 300.
170 Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants, National Research
Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment 7 (1994) (proposing criteria to consider
when establishing guidelines for risk assessment).
171 For cases rejecting studies as too speculative without analysis of assumptions, see, for
example, Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
court's rejection of chemical toxicity studies because studies were speculative), cert. de-
nied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir.
1996) (deeming reliance on animal studies of carcinogenicity of ethylene oxide too specula-
tive); Frank v. New York, 972 F. Supp. 130, 136-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that multiple
chemical sensitivity studies are too speculative); Cohen v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., No. 94-0353V, 1998 WL 403784, at *15 (Fed. Cl. July 1, 1998) (excluding
plaintiff's expert's testimony interpreting prior studies because speculative); Gherardi v.
Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-1466V, 1997 WL 53449, at *4
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lectual due process 172 requires explicit acknowledgment of the as-
sumptions used-or rejected-by the court, and the reasons for the
court's determination. The following sections discuss the default as-
sumptions upon which sound judicial validity determinations should
be based.
Judges, like scientists, should understand rules of thumb in assess-
ing argument. Categorizing studies according to their persuasiveness
(roughly analogous to the ranking of legal authority) simplifies and
clarifies decisionmaking. An important caveat, however, is that, as
with legal rules of thumb, the scientific hierarchy is crude and is fre-
quently inapplicable and ignored by scientists. Even the "lowest"
kinds of studies in the rough hierarchy are still good studies offering
valuable information. Thus, although there may be good reasons to
disregard the hierarchy, it is important nonetheless to understand the
hierarchy and its assumptions.
The following rules of thumb regarding rankings and assump-
tions, although flawed and not always applicable, are still employed
often by scientists and thus should be understood by judges in assess-
ing the validity of scientific studies:
(1) Statistical methods are critical to making appropriate assump-
tions, but statistical methods themselves rely on a number of
assumptions.
(2) In studies of human disease, human studies are most valuable,
followed by animal studies, in vitro studies, and studies comparing
the relationship of an element's chemical structure to the element's
effects. However, properly performed and controlled human stud-
ies are scarce, and each type of study offers important information.
(3) The assumption made by identification experts, such as forensic
scientists, that all humans have unique characteristics, is problem-
atic in all but a few areas (such as DNA identification techniques).
As previously noted, as with all rules of thumb, there are numer-
ous caveats, exceptions, and countervailing notions to these rankings
that may make them inapplicable in particular instances. Thus, al-
though the general hierarchy that follows has some scientific merit
and simplifies decisionmaking, it is not necessarily optimal. Things
are not really as simple as this hierarchy suggests. Each of the canons
has a counterpoint. Each type of methodology has inherent strengths
(Fed. C1. Jan. 24, 1997) (deeming evidence of tainted vaccine too speculative), aff'd, No.
99-5018, 2000 WL 158469 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2000); Housand v. Secretary of the Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., No. 94-441V, 1996 WL 282882, at *6 (Fed. CI. May 13, 1996)
(rejecting Guillian-Barre Syndrome statistical evidence as speculative), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1206
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
172 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of intellectual due
process.
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and weaknesses, as does each particular study. Judges constantly must
remember that automatically empowering one sort of information, or
one kind of study, to the exclusion of others, makes no scientific or
evidentiary sense. The rules of thumb are explained in the following
sections.
1. Statistics and Numbers Count
In the scientific hierarchy, numbers count. Statistical analysis un-
derlies all scientific disciplines. 173 Understanding the statistical as-
sumptions made in extrapolating data from studies is often key to
assessing the validity of a study's announced results. Scientists rou-
tinely examine the use of statistics and their underlying assumptions in
critiquing each others' work, and so should judges. 174
Conventional wisdom dictates that large samples-studies of a
large number of subjects-are better than small ones. 175 More trials
and more studies are better than fewer.176 There are several reasons
for this preference for large samples and more trials. First, scientists
must ensure that in collecting data from successive experiments, the
researcher identified and rejected mistaken data-data that results
from random' 77 or systematic error.178 Secondly, power, which is an
important statistical concept, 79 increases with the size of the study.160
173 See Gordon J. Apple et al., Scientific Data and Environmental Regulation, in Statis-
tics and the Law 417, 423 (Morris HL DeGroot et al. eds., 1986) (explaining importance of
statistical methods for interpretation of scientific data, using example of environmental
data).
174 See Foster & Huber, supra note 37, at 148 (observing that "[s]cientists universally
acknowledge the central role of statistics in their profession"); see also Colton, supra note
14, at 1-2 (emphasizing importance of statistical analysis to scientific argument and citing
study in which 73% of published papers in three of "most frequently read medical jour-
nals" contained significant statistical errors).
175 See Bailey et al., supra note 39, at 139 (noting, in context of epidemiology, that "re-
searchers can increase the accuracy of the measurement of the risk of disease by enlarging
the sample size").
176 See Hacking, supra note 71, at 149 (referring to WVemer Heisenberg as solving prob-
lem of lack of knowledge in probability functions by "repeating the experiment many
times").
177 Random or statistical errors are unavoidable fluctuations in the data that generally
may be accounted for by statistical methods, but are otherwise beyond the control of the
researcher. See Stuart L. Meyer, Data Analysis for Scientists and Engineers 14,16 (1975).
178 Systematic error is caused by improper experimental procedure or design and can be
corrected if the cause of error is determined. Determining whether an error is random or
systematic is not easy, of course, and partly for this reason proper experimental design
includes running a number of tests to gather the same data. See Gad, supra note 81, at 5.
179 See supra note 83 (defining power).
180 See Fienberg et al., supra note 82, at 22 ("[T]he power of a test increases with the
size of the sample... ."). Power also increases with the degree of difference between the
proposed hypothesis and the null hypothesis-the more extreme the alternatives, the bet-
ter the power. See id.
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The validity of experimental design depends on this power or sensitiv-
ity of a test to detect the response the researcher seeks. 81 Finally,
with some variability, researchers expect the data to cluster around
the mean or average result in a characteristic manner.182 The stan-
dard deviation indicates how far two particular data points deviate
from the mean.183 So when the sample is small, or based on few indi-
vidual measurements, the variance' 84 and standard deviation increase,
and the study may be suspect. 85 The reason for suspecting such a
study is that small sample size decreases the power or sensitivity of the
test to detect changes. 86 In general, a large study's findings will be
more persuasive than those of a small study, and more repetition of
tests is better than fewer.
Judges often think that more is better when it comes to relative
risk as well. Relative risk (or the odds ratio) is a concept experts util-
ize in epidemiological testimony. 87 It is defined as the ratio of the
incidence of disease occurring in people exposed to an agent to the
incidence of disease in unexposed individuals. 188 If this ratio is greater
than one, there exists a positive association between exposure and dis-
181 See supra note 83; see also Gad & Weil, supra note 82, at 222 ("Power for a statistical
test refers to the probability that the subject hypothesis test will reject the alternative hy-
pothesis (that there is a difference) when it is indeed false.").
182 See Gad, supra note 81, at 6 (describing normal distribution in which "two-thirds of
all values are within one standard deviation ... of the mean... and 95% are within 1.96
standard deviations of the mean"). The mean of a set of numbers "lies somewhere in the
middle of the data." Kaye & Freedman, supra note 83, at 360.
183 See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 83, at 409 (defining standard deviation as "how
far a typical element deviates from the average").
184 Variance is the "square of the standard deviation." Id. at 412.
185 Another way of expressing this concept is that the confidence intervals widen. The
confidence interval is an "estimate, expressed as a range, for a quantity in a population."
Id. at 396.
186 See Fienberg et al., supra note 82, at 22 ("[Tlhe power of a test increases with the
size of the sample, and tests have greater power, and therefore perform better, the more
extreme the alternative considered becomes."). In epidemiology, for example, very large
sample sizes are necessary to detect any increased incidence of disease in the presence of
exposure to a chemical agent. See Bailey et al., supra note 39, at 139-41 (explaining effects
of sample size on accuracy); see also Philip E. Enterline, Epidemiologic Basis for the As-
bestos Standard, Envtl. Health Persp., Oct. 1983, at 93, 96 (noting that sample of at least
1000 individuals would be necessary to detect 50% increase in deaths from asbestos).
187 See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 & n.16 (11th Cir. 1999)
(considering relative risk in assessing thyroid disease testimony); Grant v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992 (D. Ariz. 2000) (considering relative risk in assessing and
rejecting testimony on disease caused by silicone gel breast implants).
188 See David E. Lilienfeld & Paul D. Stolley, Foundations of Epidemiology 200 (3d ed.
1994). Relative risk is thus "used to measure the strength of an association in an observa-
tional study." Id. For further discussion of relative risk, its calculation, and its interpreta-
tion, see id. at 200-02.
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ease.18 9 Judges, however, often mistakenly insist that proffered stud-
ies find a relative risk of two-a doubling of the risk-in order to be
admissible. 190 This is mistaken because, as long as there is some in-
crease in disease over background levels 91 (i.e., a relative risk of
greater than one, such that the incidence of the disease in the exposed
population is greater than the incidence of the disease in the unex-
posed population), epidemiological data simply cannot predict
whether exposure caused disease in any given case.192 In sum, a rela-
tive risk of greater than one is necessary before there is an epidemio-
logical association between exposure and disease, but insistence on a
particular number greater than one is unwarranted. 193
One instance where bigger is not better is statistical significance.
Often referred to as the p-value, statistical significance measures the
probability of getting by chance alone a test result equal to or greater
than the observed result.194 If the p-value of a test is five percent or
less, the result is said to be statistically significant.1 95 A p-value of one
percent is considered highly significant. 196
Not only do numbers count, but judges should be aware that, as
the old saw has it, if you torture statistics long enough, they'll tell you
anything you want to hear. Common statistical errors that should set
off warning signals about the validity of a study include: making inap-
propriate inferences based on questionable statistical techniques, fail-
ing to report contradictory evidence, and choosing statistical or
graphing techniques that make the data look better than it is97
Judges, like scientists, should question whether the data was
189 See Bailey et al., supra note 39, at 148; see also Lilienfeld & Stolley, supra note 188,
at 200 ("The magnitude of the relative risk reflects the strength of the association; i.e., the
greater the relative risk, the stronger the association.").
190 See Greenland & Robins, supra note 14, at 324-25 (explaining fallacy of judicial con-
flating of relative risk of two with probability of causation). For cases wrongly insisting
upon a relative risk of two or greater, see infra note 206.
191 Background levels of a chemical are those levels to which the general population is
exposed, and which cannot be attributed to any particular source. Cf. Gad, supra note 81,
at 210 (discussing importance of concurrent controls because background tumor rates may
vary over time).
192 See Greenland & Robins, supra note 14, at 333-34 (indicating that in certain cases,
one cannot infer lack of causation from relative risk of less than two).
193 See generally Mark Parascandola, What Is Wrong with the Probability of Causa-
tion?, 39 Jurimetrics 29 (1998) (arguing that courts are unjustified in demanding relative
risk of two before finding epidemiological evidence admissible). For a general discussion
of relative risk, see Harold A. Kahn & Christopher T. Sempos, Statistical Methods in Epi-
demiology 45-71 (1989).
194 See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 83, at 402 (defining p-value).
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See Woolf, supra note 50, at 78 (discussing "deleterious effects" of research
misconduct).
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"trimmed" to favor a certain outcome and make sure that the results
"were not the product of overenthusiastic data torture."' 98 Data that
is "too good" is as suspect as data that does not fit the conclusions at
all or is absent. 199 Of course, this requires judges to examine the data
in the studies proffered by experts. Only by examining the data can
the conclusions drawn by the studies be verified.200 The only way to
tell if such errors are contained in an expert's report or proffered testi-
mony is to examine the data and the statistical inferences drawn from
it, not for mathematical errors but for errors in logic.20 Such an ex-
amination may appear a tall order for a lawyer or judge, but it is fun-
damental not only in assessing scientific evidence, but in analyzing
information of all sorts.2oz Analyzing information is the heart of legal
decisionmaking.
One well might question the admissibility of any statistical stud-
ies, on the grounds that they are so error-prone. Yet, these studies are
a crucial part of scientific argument and can yield important insights if
they are methodologically sound and based on viable assumptions. 20 3
At a minimum, lawyers and judges involved in scientific evidence de-
terminations need to know enough about statistics to suspect a study's
conclusions if the study included too small a number of observations
198 Smith, supra note 166, at 1520.
199 As Patricia Woolf notes, "[s]cientists are frequently suspicious of data that are 'too
good' and thus appear to defy the ubiquitous randomness of nature; lawyers, especially in
defensive postures, appear to take good data at face value." Woolf, supra note 50, at 71.
Moreover, she comments, "lawyers have argued that the absence of primary data strength-
ens the case of a scientist whose work is impugned; but scientists take missing data as a
significant indicator of misconduct." Id.
200 See Smith, supra note 166, at 1519 (noting that ability to "check whether the conclu-
sions drawn from an analysis are justified increases confidence in these conclusions").
201 See John M. Yancey, Ten Rules for Reading Clinical Research Reports, 159 Am. J.
Surgery 533, 533-38 (1990), reprinted in Foster & Huber, supra note 37, at 149 box 6.4.
202 For example, just by reexamining the raw data of studies published by Dr. Samuel
George Morton, purporting to show that black people and members of other races had
smaller cranial capacity than white people, Stephen Jay Gould was able to demonstrate
conclusively that Morton's claims were groundless because the data had been misinter-
preted and manipulated (consciously or unconsciously) to support his hypothesis. See
Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man 68-69 (1981). Moreover, examining statistics
in the scientist's report is no more formidable than familiar legal tasks such as checking the
accuracy and assumptions of accounting documents. Contradictions and inaccuracies can
be revealed only by such examination.
203 See Apple et al., supra note 173, at 423 (providing examples of important insights
statisticians can offer to legal factfmding); see also Kenneth J. Rothman, Significance
Questing, 105 Annals Internal Med. 445, 445 (1986) (editorial) (indicating statistical mea-
surement "is important because it provides the sharpest way to examine whether the de-
ductions from theories correspond to observations").
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(or data points) or the method used to measure the data was
imprecise 204
An emphasis on statistics does not mean that scientists can neg-
lect the context of the system being studied, however.20 s Epidemio-
logical studies failing to meet the relative risk of two, an admissibility
requirement for many judges, nonetheless may be extremely signifi-
cant, biologically speaking20 6 Small studies can have biological signif-
icance even without statistical significance.20 7 Both biological
significance and statistical significance are important to reasoning
about biological systems.208 It is possible to have either biological or
statistical significance in the absence of the other and still reach im-
portant conclusions. Statistical significance, which is a function of the
size of the study,209 may be present in the absence of biological signifi-
cance. Conversely, biological significance may be present in the ab-
sence of statistical significance. This is because the way a given
chemical works in terms of its absorption, distribution, and metabo-
lism is as important as the statistical attributes of the study. For exam-
ple, a toxicology study that reveals a rare tumor type appearing in
more animals than expected, but in too few to be statistically signifi-
cant, nonetheless has persuasive biological significance.210 The results
of such a study are by no means irrelevant. On the other hand, statis-
204 See Colton, supra note 14, at 142-46 (explaining how to determine correct sample
size and observing that study with large standard deviation or large confidence intervals
may be suspect because study sample may have been too small); Fmkelstein & Levin, supra
note 78, at 188 (noting that "large samples are needed to detect relatively small differences
with adequate power").
205 See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of
Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L 181, 255-57 (1993)
(observing that scientists do not "apply the principles of significance testing in ... an all-or-
nothing dichotomizing way").
206 See generally Parascandola, supra note 193 (explaining that judges who require rela-
tive risk of two are not basing that requirement on sound science). For cases requiring a
relative risk of two, see, for example, Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315
n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting epidemiological study that showed statistically significant
correlation of silicone and disease, but had relative risk of only 1.24); Barrow v. Bristol-
Meyers Squibb Co., No. 96-689-CIV-ORL-19B, 1998 WL 812318, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29,
1998) (requiring studies to show relative risk of two in order to have statistical significance,
and thus be admissible, while confusing statistical significance with relative risk), affd, 190
F3d 541 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY-91-3015-
AAM, 1998 WL 775340, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21,1998) (requiring relative risk of two for
admissibility). For further discussion of relative risk, see supra notes 187-93 and accompa-
nying text.
207 See Gad & Weil, supra note 82, at 222.
208 See id.
209 See Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 78, at 186-88 (observing that level of statistical
significance and power increase with larger sample size).
210 See Gad & Well, supra note 82, at 222 (explaining difference between biological and
statistical significance and importance of distinguishing between them, and providing ex-
amples of each).
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tical significance without biological meaning can be found in clinical
chemistry studies revealing biochemical parameters that are not
independent of each other.211 Where damage is commonly associated
with an increase in exposure to three biochemicals, for example, a sta-
tistically significant rise in just one may be biologically meaningless.212
Biological and statistical significance are both important and
sometimes intertwined. For example, the ability to identify an individ-
ual by using DNA has meaning only in relation to how frequently a
given sequence of base-pairs can be expected.2 13 The point is that sta-
tistical inference is meaningless without a biologically plausible the-
ory.21 4 Both provide different kinds of important information about
the study.215 Unfortunately, courts often display confusion regarding
the difference between biological significance and statistical signifi-
cance and the nature of different types of data.216 The availability of a
variety of studies in different disciplines showing association of agent
and disease permits scientists to make valid causal inferences even in
the absence of statistical significance in any particular study.2 17 When
faced with different types of studies, judges must categorize and assess
each with an eye to both their biological and statistical significance.
2. The Type of Study Counts
a. Humans First. For suggesting causation of human disease,
human studies are the most relevant, because studies offering the
most analogous data to the hypothesis the expert espouses are the
most persuasive.218 But there are numerous kinds of human studies,
211 See, e.g., Colton, supra note 14, at 117 ("A result may be highly statistically signifi-
cant, yet medically it may be quite unimportant.").
212 See id.
213 See infra note 493 (presenting basic theory of DNA identification).
214 See Colton, supra note 14, at 304 (cautioning against permitting statistical analysis to
generate hypotheses); Gad & Weil, supra note 82, at 222.
215 See Gad & Weil, supra note 82, at 222.
216 See, e.g., Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) (re-
jecting testimony in absence of statistical significance); Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte
Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 881 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (rejecting testimony based on studies failing
to show statistical significance); LeBlanc v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 782,
784 (E.D. La. 1996) (granting summary judgment based on lack of "new and statistically
significant studies" as required by earlier case rejecting studies proffered by plaintiff); Mer-
rell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,724 (Tex. 1997) (under Texas equivalent
of Daubert, rejecting any level of statistical significance below five percent); see also Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145-47 (1997) (affirming trial court exclusion of ex-
pert testimony based on studies, some of which showed no statistical significance).
217 Cf. Bailey et al., supra note 39, at 126 ("A strong association that is demonstrated
consistently in a series of research projects leads a researcher to infer that a causal relation-
ship exists.").
218 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,972-73 ("[W]hen available
human data are extensive and of good quality, they are generally preferable over animal
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and each of these also may be ranked according to a rule-of-thumb
hierarchy. In this general hierarchy, clinical double-blind studies are
best,219 followed by cohort studies,2-0 with case-control studies221
fairly close behind, and finally case reports.m Courts seem to have
little difficulty accepting this ranking of human studies.2-3 Nonethe-
less, it is important to remember that, like any rule of thumb, this
ranking is not absolute.
Another default assumption regarding human studies is that epi-
demiology studies on particular groups of human beings can be gener-
alized to apply to the human population as a whole. Courts routinely
data and should be given greater weight .... "); see also Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs.
Inc, 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1454 (D.V.I. 1994) (recognizing hierarchy of studies in teratology),
aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994). While noting the role animal testing plays in teratologi-
cal investigation, the court in Wade-Greaux also indicated that "human data is the glue that
holds together all other data." Id. at 1453.
219 The "gold standard" is the human clinical double-blind drug trial, used by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in its approval process, in which participants are ran-
domly separated into groups receiving either the drug being studied or a placebo, and
neither the researchers nor the participants know who is in which group (hence, "double-
blind"). See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 643, 646-47 (1992).
220 In cohort studies,
the researcher identifies two groups of individuals: (1) individuals who have
been exposed to a substance that is thought might cause a disease and (2)
individuals who have not been exposed. Both groups are followed for a speci-
fied length of time, and the proportion of each group that develops the disease
is compared.
Bailey et al., supra note 39, at 134.
221 Case-control studies compare a group of individuals with a particular disease with a
control group that does not have the disease. See id.
222 Case reports are anecdotal filings describing "the temporal relation betwveen an ex-
posure and a disease." Troyen Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals
Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Com-
mon Law Courts, 51 U. Pitt. L Rev. 1, 46 n.192 (1989). An example is the study required
by the FDA of adverse drug effects before a new drug can be marketed. Because there are
few controls in case reports, courts tend to disparage these reports and give them little
weight. See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1411 (D. Or. 1996)
("[C]ase reports and case studies are universally regarded as an insufficient scientific basis
for a conclusion regarding causation because case reports lack controls." (citing cases re-
jecting case studies)); see also Green, supra note 219, at 658 (noting that problem with case
reports is "that they may be purely coincidental," but observing that "case reports are
sometimes validated by subsequent" studies). Although such rejection might reflect sound
reasoning if case reports are the only evidence available, "occasionally some extremely
powerful effects" may make case reports "tentatively sufficient to establish a link," particu-
larly in conjunction with other evidence. Patricia E. Lin, Opening the Gates to Science
Evidence in Toxic Exposure Cases: Medical Monitoring and Daubert, 17 Rev. Litig. 551,
584 (1998).
223 See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999)
("While we acknowledge the importance of anecdotal [case] studies... in the face of
controlled, population-based epidemiological studies which find otherwise, these case stud-
ies pale in comparison.").
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and without discussion employ this default assumption.224 The EPA
also makes this default assumption in its risk assessments, while recog-
nizing its limitations.22 In the absence of information to the contrary,
it is a supportable default assumption for judges to assume that results
of studies of a particular group showing a toxic effect from exposure
to a particular agent apply to humans generally. 226
The problem with human studies, however, is that they are rarely
available since it is unethical to experiment on humans in all but the
most limited of circumstances, and those human studies that do exist
are subject to numerous imperfections. 227 For example, clinical
double-blind studies-the "gold standard" of human testing-are
rarely available for litigation purposes.228 Human studies of any type
are expensive and time-consuming. 229 Moreover, even when human
224 See, e.g., Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing
admission of studies on exposed individuals without reference to applicability of study to
general population); Tyler v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1241-43 (N.D. Okla.
1998) (allowing expert testimony on relationship between aspirin and Reye's Syndrome
despite plaintiff having consumed aspirin for reasons different from those of humans tested
in proffered human studies).
225 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,967. The assumption's limita-
tions include, for example, the inapplicability of occupational studies focusing on healthy
adult male workers to women, children, or unhealthy individuals.
226 A finding of no observed effect in human studies (as opposed to an observed effect),
however, is a result that cannot be generalized necessarily. This is because a failure to
disprove the null hypothesis (that there is no effect) "does not justify a conclusion that the
null hypothesis has been proved." Bailey et al., supra note 39, at 175; see also Enterline,
supra note 186 (using asbestos studies as example). As one researcher explained, "'[wlith
epidemiology, you can tell a little thing from a big thing. What's very hard to do is to tell a
little thing from nothing at all."' Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits, 269 Science
164, 164 (1995) (quoting Michael Thun). In addition to the problem of detecting small
effects, there is the problem of identifying groups and individuals at high risk from expo-
sure. See, e.g., Edward J. Calabrese, Pollutants and High-Risk Groups 165-66 (1978)
(describing increased risk of "all people at some time" and every individual at some point).
For example, epidemiology studies of worker populations would miss the effects of lead
exposure on peripheral nerve function that is often observed in young children. See, e.g.,
Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Preventing Lead
Poisoning in Young Children (1991) (discussing effects of lead studies on young children).
Children are not, however, always more sensitive to chemicals than adults. For example,
adults are considerably more susceptible to the renal toxicity of fluorides than are children
or the elderly. See Calabrese, supra, at 31 (discussing effects of fluorides). Most human
cancer studies were performed on adult male industrial workers who, as explained above,
may not represent the exposed population. Age, sex, and individual sensitivity may all
cause differences in effect. See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,967 (ex-
plaining that worker populations may be sensitized to particular chemical, or that there
may be sensitive subpopulations who would react differently).
227 See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 123, at 187 (discussing difficulties with human
studies).
M28 See Green, supra note 219, at 647 (noting ethical difficulties associated with perform-
ing clinical double-blind studies when there is even suspicion of toxicity).
229 See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2128 (1997) (noting that among
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studies are available, they are not always the best evidencepo For
one thing, the results in human studies are nearly always equivocal
because controls in human studies tend to be imperfect.P' Not only
are epidemiological studies notoriously poor at observing small effects
in human populations, but the effects also may differ significantly on
different human populations.232 Epidemiological studies usually have
low power to detect and attribute responses in a healthy population
and to attribute those responses to other potentially sensitive exposed
populations.233
In addition, each of the various kinds of human studies has its
own inherent weaknesses234 In environmental epidemiology studies,
a major limitation is the lack of exposure information-with respect to
both the exact chemical species to which subjects have been exposed
and the actual concentrations of exposure.235 Often, complex expo-
sures are involved, making it difficult to pinpoint a causal associa-
tion.236 Thus, not only do the types of studies that judges would prefer
experts to rely upon probably not exist in most cases, but those that
do exist are fraught with imperfections. Therefore, judges must assess
information from a variety of alternative sources in conjunction in or-
der to decide whether there are good grounds for the experts' theory
of causation.237
difficulties underlying epidemiological studies is that "considerable time and money are
required to design and implement" them).
230 The Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence explains the
potential pitfalls of human epidemiological evidence. See generally Bailey et al., supra
note 39; see also Alvan R. Feinstein, Scientific Standards in Epidemiologic Studies of the
Menace of Daily Life, 242 Science 1257, 1257 (1988) (observing that conflicting results
were obtained for 56 epidemiological studies and attributing this to difficulty in conducting
such studies).
231 See Bailey et al., supra note 39, at 129 (describing important factors that cannot be
controlled directly in human studies).
232 See generally Enterline, supra note 186 (explaining need for relatively large in-
creases in effect given sample sizes generally available for investigations in human studies).
233 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,967 (warning that generalization
of human studies of particular populations might "underestimate the response of certain
sensitive human subpopulations").
234 For example, double-blind controlled experiments cannot be performed with toxic
substances; cohort studies and case-control studies are subject to numerous forms of error,
which are explained in numerous law review articles as well as in the Federal Judicial
Center's Manual. See, e.g., Bailey et aL, supra note 39, at 129-46; Green, supra note 219, at
647-53 (reviewing sources of error in human epidemiologic studies, and explaining that
"[b]oth cohort and case-control studies are susceptible to a variety of errors ... that may
affect the validity of the studies' results").
235 See Beck et al., supra note 149, at 23.
236 See id. (citing example of complex pollution indicators during 1958-1972 London fog
episodes).
237 For example, in National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 965 F. Supp.
1490, 1507-09 (E.D. Ark. 1996), aff'd per curiam, 133 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998). the court
was presented with a variety of studies, the cumulative impact of which it clearly did not
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b. Animals and Extrapolation. In this oversimplified version
of how judges should rank studies for their explanatory power re-
specting human effects, animal studies rank below human studies in
persuasiveness. Further, primate studies are more persuasive than
studies of other mammals,238 followed by bird studies, reptiles, and so
on down the evolutionary or phylogenetic tree.239 In some ways,
though, animal studies are better than human studies, because animal
studies may have more controls and have greater sensitivity.240
Animal studies are also more persuasive than epidemiology in demon-
strating small increases in risk.241 To understand the mechanisms of
many diseases, animal studies are imperative.242 Assumptions based
on phylogenetic grounds-that primates are closer phylogenetically to
humans, and therefore tests done on them are the most relevant-can
understand. The court listed what it conceded were five "well-established methodologies"
that could be used to assess the validity of the expert's causation hypothesis: structure-
activity relationships, in vitro studies (analyzing the agent's effects on cells or tissues main-
tained in tissue culture), animal studies, epidemiological studies, and secular trend data.
See id. But the court nonetheless declined to admit the plaintiff's expert testimony be-
cause one study-the only extant epidemiological study-showed no developmental effect
on the babies that had been exposed in utero. See id. at 1519.
238 See Drugs and Pregnancy 9 (Larry C. Gilstrap & Bertis B. Little eds., 2d ed. 1998)
(noting that "nonhuman primates are better predictors.., than are nonprimate models
because they are phylogenetically close to humans"); Frederick A. King et al., Primates,
240 Science 1475, 1475 (1988) (explaining that "similarities in the biological mechanisms of
humans and primates underlie the value of these animals for research").
239 Cf. Drugs and Pregnancy, supra note 238, at 8-9 (discussing phylogenetic hierarchy in
choice between nonhuman primate studies and rodent teratology studies); Shayne Cox
Gad, Model Selection and Scaling, in Animal Models in Toxicology, supra note 149, at 815
(discussing basis for choice of "ideal" animal models). But see Chengelis & Gad, supra
note 149, at 8-9 (acknowledging that "[a]ssumptions based solely on phylogenetic grounds
can be quite misleading").
240 See James Huff, Chemicals and Cancer in Humans: First Evidence in Experimental
Animals, Envtl. Health Persp., Apr. 1993, at 201, 204 (discussing similar metabolic
processes among all mammals); see also Michael A. Kamrin, Toxicology 54-55 (1988) (ob-
serving that human epidemiological studies are difficult to control). By sensitivity, toxicol-
ogists mean the ability of a test to detect changes in the animal's health. See, e.g., Gad,
supra note 81, at 4 (defining sensitivity as "number of subjects experiencing each experi-
mental condition divided by the variance of scores in the sample").
241 Even the best epidemiological cohort study may not be able to show small increases
in risk. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk As-
sessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,995-96 (1986) ("[Elpidemiologic studies are inherently
capable of detecting only comparatively large increases in the relative risk of cancer.");
N.E. Day, Statistical Considerations, in International Agency for Research on Cancer, In-
terpretation of Negative Epidemiological Evidence for Carcinogenicity 13, 13-14 (IARC
Scientific Publications No. 65, N.J. Wald & R. Doll eds., 1985) (explaining why epidemio-
logical data is often inconclusive).
242 Cf. Interdisciplinary Panel on Carcinogenicity, supra note 152, at 686 (stating that
extrapolation from animal to human "if exploited to the fullest, can provide a basis for
distinguishing the degrees of risk from different carcinogens"); see also Beck et al., supra
note 149, at 23 (explaining that each type of study offers "qualitatively different informa-
tion, with unique advantages and limitations").
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be misleading.2 43 In some cases, the similarity between the metabo-
lism of a particular drug in a dog and a human will be stronger than
the similarity between the metabolism in a monkey and a human.244
Of course, animal studies have their own limitations, stemming
partially from the "uncertainties in extrapolating from animals to
humans" and the "uncertainties in extrapolating from the high expo-
sures in animal studies to the lower exposures typically experienced
by humans. '245 The point is that animal studies are not "second
best. '246 Each type of study has its strengths and its weaknesses. Live
animal studies, in vitro studies, and structure-activity reports-as well
as human studies-all provide important information about the asso-
ciation of chemicals and disease. 247 The strengths and weaknesses of
the various studies complement each other, and judges are simply not
scientifically justified in categorically rejecting them as evidence.
With a few notable exceptions,24 judges universally have diffi-
culty understanding the persuasive impact of animal studies2 49 Post-
Daubert courts in toxic tort cases often find expert testimony based
243 See Chengelis & Gad, supra note 149, at 8-9.
244 See id. at 9 (discussing how reaction of certain chemicals in humans is more similar
to reaction of those chemicals in dogs and rats than in monkeys).
245 Beck et al., supra note 149, at 25.
246 Id. (arguing that different studies provide very different kinds of information).
247 See id.
248 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1994). In
Paoli, the Third Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding plain-
tiffs' proffered animal studies, and thus held the animal studies admissible, in part because
"there is reason to think that animal studies are particularly valuable because animals react
similarly to humans with respect to the chemical in question." Id. at 781. Important con-
siderations for the court were the reliance of the EPA on animal studies in the PCB context
and the existence of inconclusive epidemiological data. See id. But see General Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997) (rejecting animal study of mice exposed to PCB
because "far-removed" and "dissimilar" to human exposure at issue).
249 See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharms. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (find-
ing that animal studies have "'testing' problems" and noting that "[t]he only way to test
whether data from non-human studies can be extrapolated to humans would be to conduct
human experiments or to use epidemiological data"); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947
F. Supp. 1387, 1410 (D. Or. 1996) (finding that animal studies "are generally not consid-
ered reliable in the absence of a scientific explanation of why such extrapolation is war-
ranted" and excluding animal studies since plaintiffs presented no such explanation);
Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1480 (D.V.L) ("The notion that
one can accurately extrapolate from animal data to humans to prove causation without
supportive positive epidemologic studies is scientifically invalid because it is inconsistent
with several universally accepted and tested scientific principles."), aftd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d
Cir. 1994); Nelson v. American Sterilizer Co., 566 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(excluding expert testimony that plaintiff's liver disease was caused by low-dose exposure
to chemicals merely because animal studies relied on by expert were high-dose rather than
low-dose studies); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 729-30 (Tex.
1997) (rejecting animal studies as unreliable and unable to be extrapolated to humans
under Texas equivalent of Daubert).
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primarily on animal studies inadmissible simply because the testimony
relates to animals rather than to humans.250 This reflects a fundamen-
tal misconception about animal models, since scientists routinely gen-
eralie animal studies to human populations.25'
Animal studies are .performed by exposing animals to a particular
chemical and'extrapolating the results to humans using what is known
aboutthe 9tructurefunction, and metabolism of the particular chemi-
cal and the similarity -of the actions of the chemical in the animals
studied and in human beings. 252 No modem scientist seriously ques-
tions the relevance of animal studies, as long as the animal studies are
part of a larger story in which chemical structure, absorption, metabo-
lism, distribution, and physiologic analogy are a part.253 Information
about biological similarity and chemical structure and function (in-
cluding the chemical's interaction with other chemicals, and the way
the chemical acts in the body) is unquestionably important.25 4 Even
250 See Berger, supra note 229, at 2124-25 (noting courts' difficulties with admitting ex-
pert testimony based on animal studies). Even pre-Daubert courts using the Frye general
acceptance standard had difficulty understanding the worth of animal studies. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Richardson Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that
animal studies only raise "suspicion" of causation in Bendectin case); Lynch v. Merrell-
National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that animal studies "did not
furnish a foundation for [expert's] opinions. Studies of this sort, singly or in combination,
do not have the capability of proving causation in human beings in the absence of any
confirmatory epidemiological data."); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (commenting that data from animal studies rests on
"surmise and inapposite extrapolations"), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
251 See, e.g., Chengelis & Gad, supra note 149, at 1 (observing that use of animal studies
"in experimental medicine, pharmacological study, and toxicological assessment has be-
come a well-established and essential practice"); Joseph M. McCune, Animal Models of
HIV-1 Disease, 278 Science 2141 (1997) (noting importance of developing animal model
for study of AIDS).
252 See, e.g., EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,975-77 (discussing types and
design of animal studies).
253 See Schardein, supra note 149, at 26-28 (observing that "not a single chemical exists
that is teratogenic in the human that also has not produced malformations in rodents,"
discussing ability to extrapolate to humans from tests on other types of animals, and noting
that confirming studies in multiple species increases confidence in results); see also Inter-
national Agency for Research on Cancer, Preamble to 63 IARC Monographs on the Eval-
uation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans 9, 17 (1995) (noting that "it is biologically
plausible and prudent" to extrapolate evidence of carcinogenicity from animals to humans
and that assessment of extrapolation should consider "physical and chemical characteris-
tics," "constituent substances," and "genetic and related effects").
254 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,747 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining "fit"
requirement that "in order for animal studies to be admissible to prove causation in
humans, there must be good grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans, just as the
methodology of the studies must constitute good grounds to reach conclusions about the
animals themselves"). It was the lack of such an explanation that caused the dismissal of
the plaintiff's case in Joiner and led the majority to remark in affirming the trial court's
rejection of plaintiffs' studies that the studies were linked together by nothing more than
the "ipse dixit" of the experts and that there was "simply too great an analytical gap be-
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when such information is absent, however, extrapolation can provide
the missing linkL 55
i Extrapolating animal models to humans. Scientists widely
assume that positive toxic effects in animal studies indicate a similar
effect in humans 25 6 That does not mean that it is always true. - Yet,
absent information to the contrary, extrapolation is a sound assump-
tion.258 It is an appropriate default because most of the data we have
shows that to be the case. 59 Therefore, judges logically should as-
tween the data and the opinion proffered." General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997).
255 For example, scientists universally accept extrapolation from rodent studies to
human cancer causation as valid because "virtually all of the specific chemicals known to
be carcinogenic in humans are also positive in the rodent bioassays, and sometimes even at
comparable doses and with similar organ specificity." L Bernard Weinstein, Mitogenesis Is
Only One Factor in Carcinogenesis, 251 Science 387, 388 (1991). A corollary to this ac-
ceptance is that the validity of the extrapolation depends on knowing the similarities be-
tween the disease-producing mechanisms of the studied chemical in the animals studied
and human beings. See generally Edward J. Calabrese, Principles of Animal Extrapolation
(1983). Although such extrapolation is well accepted in studies of agents causing disease,
extrapolating from results of animal studies of agents causing birth defects (called ter-
atogens) to humans is more controversial. As Michael D. Green commented:
Among thirty-eight known human teratogens, thirty-seven produced an effect
in at least one animal specie and twenty-seven produced an effect in more than
one specie. The converse is not as accurate. Of one hundred and sixty-five
agents believed not to be teratogenic in humans, forty-one percent were found
to have an effect in at least one animal specie and only twenty-eight percent
were negative in all species.
Green, supra note 219, at 655 (citing various studies). Green also observes, however, that
"monkeys were a relatively good human predictor, as eighty percent of the human non-
teratogens elicited a similar effect in monkeys." Id.; see also Gary P. Carlson, Factors
Modifying Toxicity, in Toxic Substances and Human Risk: Principles of Data Interpreta-
tion 47 (Robert G. Tardiff & Joseph V. Rodricks eds., 1987) (discussing factors one must
consider in extrapolating from animals to humans).
256 See Chengelis & Gad, supra note 149, at 1 ("Animals have been used as models for
centuries to predict what chemicals and environmental factors would do to humans.").
257 For example, the utility in toxic tort litigation of animal studies designed for regula-
tory risk assessment is a frequent topic of legal controversy. See Erin K.L Mahaney, As-
sessing the Fitness of Novel Scientific Evidence in the Post-Daubert Era: Pesticide
Exposure Cases as a Paradigm for Determining Admissibility, 26 Envtl. L 1161, 1182-83
(1996) (arguing for closer examination of fitness requirement and discussing ability of
animal studies to meet fitness requirement).
258 The courts' widespread rejection of animal studies results from a failure to accept the
scientifically uncontroversial default assumption that metabolic pathways in animals are
similar to those in humans. See, e.g., Nelson v. American Sterilizer Co., 566 N.W.2d 671,
675 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that courts view animal studies with suspicion because
"it is scientifically invalid to extrapolate observations in animal experiments directly to
human beings to determine human outcomes").
259 Extrapolation in science is similar to a rebuttable presumption in law. That is, in the
absence of contrary evidence, one is entitled to make certain assumptions-here, that ani-
mals and humans will react similarly, biologically speaking, to chemical exposure. These
assumptions must be justifiable on scientific and policy grounds. The scientific grounds
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sume that, in the absence of data to the contrary, animal studies can
be extrapolated to humans.2 60
Despite the obvious differences between humans and laboratory
animals, biochemical and metabolic processes carried out in most or-
gans of humans and animals are similar.2 61 For example, all of the
chemicals recognized to cause cancer in humans also cause cancer in
animals.262 Chemicals that cause birth defects in humans also cause
them in at least some animals.2 63 Studies of other kinds of diseases
show a similar pattern, although they are studied less frequently.264 If
data exist showing the opposite, then discarding the default becomes a
question of the strength of the data supporting the contrary
inference.265
Indeed, animal studies have a number of advantages. Laboratory
conditions for animal studies permit the researcher to have better con-
include the overwhelming similarity of DNA, metabolism, absorption, and distribution be-
tween animals and humans. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text. An important
policy justification is found in economics. If chemical manufacturers, for example, wish to
rebut the extrapolation presumption, they are in a better position than litigants (or the
public) to engage in research about their products. This policy would circumvent the need
that a number of commentators have cited for eliminating the entire causation requirement
for toxic torts. See Berger, supra note 229, at 2117, 2131. Courts should not reject the
assumption of analogy between animals and humans for policy reasons because one of the
bases of legal causation is a conclusion that "on the basis of the available evidence... the
recurrence of that act or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur."
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.,
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 71 (1975) (arguing that causal links have predictive value).
Probabilistically speaking, this is precisely what animal studies are designed to show,
namely if the exposure event recurs, the chances of the injury recurring increase.
260 The arguments against using animal studies as evidence of general causation include
the physiological differences between the animals studied and humans, the high dosages
ordinarily used in animal studies in contrast to the low dosages typically at issue in toxic
tort cases, and laboratory conditions. These are valid objections. These objections, how-
ever, are not dispositive, as high-dosage extrapolations from animals to humans can pro-
vide realistic indications of causal relationships in humans as long as the animal studies are
supplemented by information regarding chemical structure; absorption, metabolism, and
distribution of the chemical in the body; and the degree of physiologic analogy between the
species studied. For an outline of factors of extrapolation, see Carlson, supra note 255, at
47-70.
261 See Cranor et al., supra note 39, at 50 (stating that there are more physiologic, bio-
chemical, and metabolic similarities between laboratory animals and humans than there
are differences).
262 See International Agency for Research on Cancer, supra note 253, at 17.
263 See supra notes 253-55 (noting strength of extrapolation but acknowledging its
limitations).
264 See, e.g., Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 123, at 191 ("If a heavy metal such as
mercury causes kidney toxicity in laboratory animals, it will almost certainly do so at some
dose in humans.").
265 See Popper, supra note 36, at 399 (explaining interrelationship of empirical data to
informative content); see also EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,965 (discuss-
ing circumstances under which default assumptions should be employed).
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trols over the experimental conditions.26 6 The higher dosages nor-
mally employed in animal studies more accurately reveal the presence
of a dose-response relationship. Also, the time required to conduct an
animal study is much shorter than for human studies. 2 67 Thus, animal
studies are often the primary source of information regarding the im-
pact of chemicals on humans., 68 Differences between animals and
humans in metabolism, body size, dose, life span, and other factors
should be accounted for, but courts should not reject animal studies
categorically as they now often do.269
iL The quantitative extrapolation: extrapolating high doses in an-
imals to low doses in humans. There are two fundamental types of
extrapolation from animals to humans.270 The qualitative extrapola-
tion discussed in the previous section-if a chemical causes an effect
in one species, then it also will cause it in humans-is well-accepted by
scientists. The quantitative extrapolation, represented by the dose-re-
sponse curve, addresses the specific level at which the chemical will
have an effect.271 There is more debate over this quantitative estima-
tion of the magnitude of dose producing a similar effect in animals
and humans 272 Nonetheless, this debate is generally resolved in favor
266 See Brennan, supra note 68, at 507 (noting that, as opposed to animal studies,
"[r]esearchers cannot control the factors that affect the quality of the data" in epidemio-
logic studies).
267 See Green, supra note 219, at 654 ("[M]any animal species reproduce readily and
have short life cycles, thereby reducing the time required to conduct an experimeantal
study.").
268 See Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 16S, at 22 ("The infer-
ence that results from animal experiments are applicable to humans is fundamental to toxi-
cologic research .... Notwithstanding uncertainties associated with interpretation of some
animal tests, they have, in general, proved to be reliable indicators of carcinogenic
properties .....").
269 But see Jack L. Landau & W. Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibil-
ity of Animal Studies to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 Idaho L Rev. 521,
565 (1998-99) ("Animal studies have no place in the courtroom."). Indeed, for most toxic
tort cases, there is a paucity of data, not necessarily because there is no causation, but
because "many toxic tort cases share .. a history of manufacturer neglect in conducting
basic safety research on the safety of their products." Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast
Implants Revisited. Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 Wis. L Rev. 705, 732-33 (noting that
asbestos, tobacco, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, ultra-absorbent tampon, and Bendeetin
litigations all suffered from inadequate manufacturer testing).
27o See Interdisciplinary Panel on Carcinogenicity, supra note 152, at 6S5 (discussing two
types of extrapolation).
271 See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 123, at 191.
272 See Michael A. Dorato & Mary Jo Vodicnik, The Toxicological Assessment of Phar-
maceutical and Biotechnology Products, in Principles and Methods, supra note 82, at 189,
193 (explaining that qualitative extrapolation is more reliable than quantitative extrapola-
tion); David G. Hoel et al., Implication of Nonlinear Kinetics on Risk Estimation in Card-
nogenesis, 219 Science 1032, 1032 (1983) (discussing extrapolation controversy and
suggesting that studies of chemical metabolism and pharmacokinetics may be helpful); In-
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of quantitative extrapolation, because animal testing of chemical ef-
fects (including quantitative extrapolation) predicts human toxicity in
all but ten percent of comparisons.2 73
In other words, the corollary assumption to the applicability of
animal studies to human populations, that high dosage studies can be
extrapolated to the low dosages more commonly found in human en-
vironmental exposure, is well-substantiated. 274 Scientists understand
that high dosages for short time periods are roughly equivalent to low
dosages over extended periods.27 5 In addition, it is known that "as
animal species become larger, they also become more sensitive to
short term toxicities. '' 276 Humans can be many times more sensitive
than experimental animals.277 All these factors indicate that judges
should adopt as a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of data
to the contrary, high dosage studies validly can be extrapolated to the
low dosages found in most environmental exposures.27 8
terdisciplinary Panel on Carcinogenicity, supra note 152, at 685-86 (discussing uncertainties
in quantitative extrapolation).
273 See Dorato & Vodicnik, supra note 272, at 193; see also Interdisciplinary Panel on
Carcinogenicity, supra note 152, at 685-86 (noting uncertainties of extrapolation from high
to low doses, but concluding that reliable estimates of risk are nonetheless possible, espe-
cially if combined with information about metabolism and pharmacokinetics).
274 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,967 (stating that default assump-
tion accepted by many scientists is that "effects seen at the highest dose tested are appro-
priate for assessment" while acknowledging that "it is necessary that the experimental
conditions be scrutinized" when making such assumption).
275 See, e.g., J. Carl Barrett, Mechanisms of Multistep Carcinogenesis and Carcinogen
Risk Assessment, Envtl. Health Persp., Apr. 1993, at 9, 9-20; Hoel et al., supra note 272, at
1032 (explaining that standard method of testing of chemical effects of high doses-which
necessitates extrapolation to low doses common for environmental exposure-is necessary
because of impracticably large number of animals that would be required for low-level
testing and suggesting that pharmacokinetics may add valuable information to extrapola-
tion); R.L. Melnik et al., Cell Proliferation and Chemical Carcinogenesis: A Symposium
Overview, 7 Molecular Carcinogenesis 135, 135-38 (1993). But see Philip H. Abelson, Risk
Assessments of Low Level Exposures, 265 Science 1507, 1507 (1994) (editorial) (urging
development of low-level tests because linear extrapolation implies that "no dose, however
small, is safe" and because "[e]xamples of instances in which these assumptions are invalid
are becoming numerous").
276 Gad, supra note 239, at 826 (attributing higher sensitivity in larger species to "in-
creases of available target tissues and decreases in metabolic rate as size increases").
277 See Dorato & Vodicnik, supra note 272, at 193 ("Humans can be as much as 50 times
more sensitive on a milligram/kilogram (mg/kg) basis than experimental animals."); see
also Gad, supra note 239, at 826 (observing that some scientists "believe that humans are
more sensitive than any test species, even if that species is larger than humans").
278 The overwhelming consensus on correlating an observed dose response curve to a
relationship at lower doses is to use a linear model. See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra
note 10, at 17,968 (adopting linear default approach in absence of data); Hoel et al., supra
note 272, at 1032 (noting that "[t]he standard way of doing the low-dose extrapolation has
been to assume a parametric model relating applied dose to tumor response, and to use the
high-dose data to estimate the model parameters"). This view should not be accepted
merely because it is prevalent, of course, but because the theory is falsifiable, has been
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Biological damage processes (as we currently understand them)
fall into two broad classes: those implying either threshold or non-
threshold responses.279 For systemic toxicants (as opposed to carcino-
gens), the threshold response theory asserts that "there is a level of
exposure below which there is minimal, if any, chance for an adverse
effect."280 Under this hypothesis, "multiple cells must be injured
before an adverse effect is experienced and.,, the injury must occur
at a rate that exceeds the rate of repair."' 81 As long as the dose is
small enough, the threshold theory says that adaptive processes will
repair any damage. 2 Courts are familiar with this theory, and fre-
quently use it to reject expert testimony where the plaintiff's precise
exposure level is unknown, citing Paracelsus's maxim that the dose
determines the poison.28 3
Nonthreshold effects, on the other hand, are associated with dis-
eases like cancer that are caused by genetic mutations, and do not
subjected to testing, and remains the best explanation for the observed data. Cf. Popper,
supra note 36, at 121 ("[Tlhose theories should be given preference which can be most
severely tested .... ).
279 See D. Cooper Rees & Dale Hattis, Developing Quantitative Strategies for Animal
to Human Extrapolation, in Principles and Methods, supra note 82. at 275, 276.
280 Beck et al., supra note 149, at 40. The prevalent theory for the action of carcinogens,
on the other hand, is that they are nonthreshold. See infra notes 284-8 and accompanying
text.
281 Beck et al., supra note 149, at 40.
282 See Rees & Hattis, supra note 279, at 276 (explaining that as long as dose of toxin is
"small enough that it does not disturb the homeostatic relationships beyond specific limits,
it is assumed that adaptive processes will repair any damage that may have been tempora-
rily produced").
283 Paracelsus was a Renaissance alchemist who believed in the doctrine of signatures.
This doctrine demanded that diseases be treated with remedies similar in shape to the
affected organ. For example, to cure a liver ailment, he would propose to treat it with an
herb shaped like a liver. See Hacking, supra note 71, at 42. Despite the long-ago de-
bunking of the doctrine of signatures, courts continue to cite Paracelsus as authority. See,
e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1490,1506 (E.D. Ark.
1996) (relying on Paracelsus for notion that "toxicity is a function of dose" (quoting
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756,769 n.27 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044
(1998))), aff'd per curiam, 133 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998); Cartwright v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 906 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (same); Cavallo, 892 F. Supp. at 769
n.27 (same); Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253,1990 WL 312969, at *74 & *96 n.7
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) (relying on Paracelsus for idea that "all substances are poisons
and the right dose differentiates between a remedy and a poison"), affd in part and revd
in part mem., 47 F.3d 1164 (4th Cir. 1995). Why modem courts cite his maxim without
understanding his theory is a perplexing question. The classic toxicology argument states
that "most chemicals exhibit a dose-response relationship, resulting in an apparent or ef-
fective threshold for at least some agents." Gad, supra note 81, at 235 (presenting common
arguments). Yet this is untrue with respect to at least some carcinogens. See id. at 234-38
(summarizing arguments for and against threshold responses).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 2000]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
depend on the size of the dosage.284 The nonthreshold, or linear ef-
fects, theory holds that "even a single molecule of a DNA-reactive
substance has a small but nonzero chance of setting in motion a chain
of events leading to mutagenesis or carcinogenesis. '28 5 In addition,
the threshold dose notion is scientifically questionable as applied to
carcinogens because, among other reasons, it is impossible to demon-
strate a no-effects level mathematically. 2 6 Further, "there is... no
empirical or theoretical basis for determining the dose at which [this
threshold] may occur."287 Although there is some evidence that not
all cancers are mediated by direct action on the genes, and therefore
some carcinogens may have threshold effects, for most diseases, in-
cluding cancer, a nonthreshold theory is the most plausible default in
the absence of specific data to the contrary.2 88
Unfortunately, even if we find the threshold theory of biological
responses persuasive, there is usually not enough information to
demonstrate either threshold or nonthreshold responses (both for
cancer and other diseases). 89 Because we rarely have biologically-
based or case-specific models for the levels both above and below the
threshold, we typically must assume that all diseases operate on a non-
threshold basis (the linear default approach). 290 Although the re-
84 See Gad, supra note 81, at 234-35 (summarizing arguments against existence of
threshold for carcinogens and opining that arguments for threshold are "more mechanis-
tic"); Rees & Hattis, supra note 279, at 276 (noting that threshold processes are "generally
assumed to underlie gene mutation, and, by extension, that portion of carcinogenesis that
is produced by gene and chromosomal mutations").
285 Rees & Hattis, supra note 279, at 277. Mutagenesis is the process of genetic muta-
tions, while carcinogenesis is the process of cancer formation.
286 See R.W. Hart & L. Fishbein, Interspecies Extrapolation of Drug and Genetic Toxic-
ity Data, in 1 Toxicological Risk Assessment 3, 32 tbl.19 (D.B. Clayson et al. eds., 1985)
(presenting arguments against "threshold dose" theory).
287 Id. Gad points out that the huge numbers of animals that would be required for
testing of low-level doses in order to test the threshold theory makes such experimentation
infeasible. See Gad, supra note 81, at 233.
288 For arguments in favor of and against "threshold dose" theory, see Hart & Fishbein,
supra note 286, at 31 tbl.18, 32 tbl.19. It is important to note that even if there were a
threshold response, that "would actually only mean that a linear (or any other dose-re-
sponse relationship) would start at some point above zero, being discontinuous only in the
extreme lowest dose range." Gad, supra note 81, at 234. Moreover,
the presence of a background exposure of carcinogens and promoters, and of
spontaneously occurring cancers in a population at risk as large and diverse as
that of human beings, implies that even if there are thresholds for some or
most individuals, there will still remain others who have been "jumped over"
their individual thresholds by background events.
Id.
289 See Hart & Fishbein, supra note 286, at 32 tbl.19.
290 See id. In Popperian terms, the competing linearity and threshold theories need to
be continually reevaluated in light of the severity of criticism each has withstood (or can
withstand). See Popper, supra note 96, at 368; Popper, supra note 36, at 170 n.2, 418.
However, until more studies are performed that support the threshold theory, the linearity
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ceived wisdom is that linear dose-response assumptions are
conservative in that they overestimate risks to protect the public
health, there is evidence that they actually may underestimate risk at
low doses.291 Moreover, as a policy matter, a linear presumption in
toxic tort cases is fairer to plaintiffs, because information about expo-
sure levels is rarely available.292
Nonlinear approaches therefore should be limited to those situa-
tions in which adequate data on the mode of action (that is, how the
chemical affects bodily processes and the progression of disease) show
that linearity is not reasonable.293 Thus, in the absence of information
to the contrary, a nonthreshold response is generally assumed by
scientists and therefore should be assumed by judges.29
ii Extrapolating to different target organs. Not only must the
results of high dosage animal studies be extrapolated to the low dos-
model (which has more empirical support, with a few documented exceptions) is a solid
working theory. See, e.g., Lakatos, supra note 58, at 14 (explaining that Newtonian physics
worked well as theory, despite documented anomalies, until Einstein's explanation sup-
planted it). The EPA Proposed Guidelines suggest, in the absence of data supporting a
case-specific or biologically-based model, that a curve-fitting model be used for the ob-
served range of data and a linear model for extrapolating to the unobserved range. See
EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,968. The EPA Proposed Guidelines ex-
plain that "the linear approach is to draw a straight line between a point of departure from
the observed data ... and the origin (zero dose, zero response)." Id.
291 See Leslie Roberts, Is Risk Assessment Conservative?, 243 Science 1553,1553 (1989)
(citing studies on vinyl chloride).
292 For arguments in favor of placing the burden on defendant manufacturers to offer
contrary information to defeat the presumption, see Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1039-
92; Berger, supra note 229, at 2140-52; Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Man-
ufacture of Toxic Products, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 796, 810-32 (1997). For cases excluding
expert testimony where plaintiffs did not know their exposure level, see, for example,
Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F3d 809, 810 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming exclusion of
expert testimony that chlordane, carcinogen acknowledged to be applied in manner that
violated federal criminal law, caused plaintiffs' injuries where testimony was based on
animal studies that used high-dosage levels rather than low-dosage levels to which plain-
tiffs were exposed); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490
app. F at 1552-54 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (discrediting plaintiff's expert testimony because defen-
dants' expert proffered single epidemiology study showing no effects, even though plaintiff
offered evidence to show study's results were inconclusive because it involved only five
subjects who were exposed to unknown pesticides at unknown levels), affd per curiam,
133 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756,766 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(finding testimony inadmissible because expert could not identify plaintiff's exposure levels
or dose-response relationship with respect to jet fuel at issue), affd in part and revd in
part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044
(1998); Schmaltz v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (N.D. I11. 1995) (exclud-
ing testimony where expert did not know level of plaintiff's exposure to herbicide);
Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 345-46 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (excluding
testimony where expert did not know how much Retin-A was absorbed by plaintiff or
dosage level at which Retin-A becomes unsafe for pregnant women).
293 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
294 See id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 2000]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ages common to human exposure, but one also must account for the
possibility that a different organ might be affected in the animal stud-
ies than was affected in the plaintiff. Whether the effects on the organ
in the studies (the target organ) may be extrapolated to a different
organ in human beings is controversial. Most scientific knowledge in-
dicates that target organs should be the same in the animals studied
and in humans.2 95 There is typically a close correspondence between
the target organ in human studies and the organ in at least one of the
animal species studied.2 96 Still, various tissues react differently across
species.297 Thus, there might be justifications in a particular case for
scientists and judges to adopt either the assumption that the affected
organs must be the same, or the contrary assumption that they may be
different.298 The EPA has taken the default position that, with respect
to cancer, in the absence of contrary data it does not matter which
organ is affected; if an animal develops cancer in any organ, the agent
will be assumed to be generally carcinogenic in humans.299 Under this
assumption, demonstrating the development of lung cancer in mice,
for example, would be admissible testimony where human cancer in
any organ was at issue. Because we know so little about cancer causa-
tion, there is justification for this assumption at least with respect to
cancer.
On the other hand, the basis for the EPA's position that a carcin-
ogen in an animal organ can be a carcinogen in any human organ is
that this assumption protects the public health and minimizes false
negatives.300 Judicial decisionmakers must strive to minimize both
false negatives and false positives, so the EPA's assumption should
295 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,967 (stating that "[t]arget organs
of carcinogenesis for agents that cause cancer in both animals and humans are most often
concordant at one or more sites" across species).
296 See id.; see also Huff, supra note 240, at 204 (discussing similar metabolic processes
among all mammals and noting that "mechanisms of chemical toxicity are, to a large ex-
tent, identical in animals and man").
297 See Huff, supra note 240, at 204 (comparing similarities in human and animal cancer
development).
298 The Interdisciplinary Panel on Carcinogenicity explains the basis for assuming that
target organs need not be identical: "A malignant neoplasm [cancer] ... displays, or it has
the capacity for, invasion of normal tissues, metastasis, and causing death to the host."
Interdisciplinary Panel on Carcinogenicity, supra note 152, at 686 n.4 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This capacity for invading normal tissues is what accounts for the possibil-
ity of different target organs in cancer. Because "benign neoplasms may represent a stage
in the evolution of a malignant neoplasm," finding tumors in any organ may be sufficient
justification to assume the affected organs may be different. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
299 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,967 ("The default assumption is
that positive effects in animal cancer studies indicate that the agent under study can have
carcinogenic potential in humans.").
300 See id.
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not be adopted wholly by judges. As a policy matter, a more justifia-
ble assumption for the legal system is that, absent evidence showing a
range of target organs, the target organ affected in animal studies
should be the same as that affected in the injured plaintiff.310 A posi-
tion that the organs must be the same is more defensible (both scien-
tifically and for legal purposes) because the metabolic route to those
organs usually will be similar in animals and humans. Therefore, if the
expert relies on animal studies showing an effect on different organs
than those affected in the plaintiff, the studies would be inadmissible
in the absence of further explanation.
iv. Route of exposure extrapolation. A further extrapolation
involves deciding whether exposure to a chemical in one manner (e.g.,
through the skin) is equivalent to exposure in a different manner (e.g.,
by ingestion). We call this the route of exposure extrapolation. The
three main exposure routes in humans, either alone or in combination,
are ingestion, inhalation, and dermal (skin) absorption. The route of
administration of a chemical in laboratory animal experiments may be
different from the route of exposure of the plaintiff: The agent may
have been injected into the animals, for example, whereas the human
plaintiff's skin was exposed to the chemical.302
No matter what the route of exposure, however, the critical mea-
surement in a toxicological study is the bloodstream concentration of
the chemicalP 03 The level of chemical in the target organ is generally
301 That is, just because in most cases metabolic processes are similar, animal studies
showing, for example, an agent's toxic effects on the lungs should not be assumed by
judges to be relevant to the issue of whether a plaintiff's pancreatic disease (other than
cancer) was caused by the agent. The expert must provide other studies showing a differ-
ent metabolic pathway in humans that would make it likely that the agent would affect
both the lungs in mice and the pancreas in humans. The EPA Proposed Guidelines recog-
nize that the default of extrapolation to different target organs adopted by the Guidelines
may not be appropriate when data allows the consideration of "the influences of route of
exposure, metabolism, and particularly, hormonal modes of action." EPA Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,968. Therefore, a more appropriate assumption for the
legal system is that target organs should be similar.
302 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997) (approving district
court's rejection of studies of mice that developed cancer after being injected ith PCBs to
support plaintiffs assertion that PCB exposure to plaintiff's skin caused cancer).
303 See Andrew Gordan Renwick, Toxicokinetics-Pharmacokinetics in Toxicology, in
Principles and Methods, supra note 82, at 10607 (explaining that slope of plasma-concen-
tration time-curve is key measurement in toxicological studies). Moreover, if -dosage is
adjusted so that equivalent serum concentrations are maintained, [interspecies] differences
in response tend to disappear." Steven E. Mayer et al., Introduction: The Dynamics of
Drug Absorption, Distribution, and Elimination, in Goodman & Gilman's The Pharmaco-
logical Basis of Therapeutics 1, 26 (Alfred Goodman Gilman et al. eds., 6th ed. 1980).
Thus, absorption is equivalent to "the appearance of the substance in the circulation," and
the "rate of absorption can be determined from the plasma concentration time-curve" of
the chemical in question. World Health Org., Principles of Toxicokinetic Studies 28 (Envtl.
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a function of its concentration in the blood.30 4 Aside from local ef-
fects at the site of contact, 30 5 a toxic substance can cause injury only
after absorption by the body.306 Absorption, regardless of the site of
contact, is dependent upon solubility of the chemical in question. 30 7
Thus, for example, asbestos (which is relatively insoluble) has a
greater effect when inhaled than when ingested because the particles
stay in the lungs longer (and therefore dissolve more) than they do in
the gut.30 But if one accounts for solubility differences, the route of
exposure makes little difference. 30 9 Extrapolation from one exposure
route to another can be accounted for mathematically through physio-
logically based pharmacokinetic models,310 even though such models
Health Criteria 57, 1986). In sum, the limiting factor for chemical effects is that the chemi-
cal "must be present in appropriate concentrations at its sites of action," Leslie Z. Benet et
al., Pharmacokinetics: The Dynamics of Drug Absorption, Distribution, and Elimination,
in Goodman & Gilman's The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics 3, 3 (Alfred
Goodman Gilman et al. eds., 9th ed. 1996) [hereinafter Goodman & Gilman's (9th ed.)],
and this depends principally on the amount of chemical that gets into the bloodstream, see
id. fig.1-1.
304 See Frank C. Lu, Basic Toxicology: Fundamentals, Target Organs, and Risk Assess-
ment 23 (3d ed. 1996).
305 A local effect is one that occurs at the site of first contact with a chemical. See Curtis
D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in Goodman & Gilman's (9th ed.), supra note 303, at
63, 66. An example of a local effect is the injury to the skin caused by exposure to te-
tramethyl lead. See id. A systemic effect is, on the other hand, one that occurs after ab-
sorption and distribution of the chemical. See id. The two categories "are not mutually
exclusive." Id. For example, tetramethyl lead causes both local effects at the site of con-
tact (skin) and systemic effects on the central nervous system. See id. Most toxic sub-
stances produce systemic effects. See id. When substances have a predominantly local
effect, "the frequency of tissue reaction depends largely on the portal entry (skin, gastroin-
testinal tract, or respiratory tract)." Id. Because most toxic tort cases involve systemic
rather than local effects, the assumption that the route of exposure is of minimal impor-
tance is a sound one. If, on the other hand, the defense can demonstrate either predomi-
nantly local effects or that the systemic effects of the chemical in question are route-
dependent, then the default presumption would be rebutted.
306 See Lu, supra note 304, at 13.
307 See Mayer et al., supra note 303, at 5 (discussing factors that modify absorption of
drugs).
308 See William E. Pepelko, Effect of Exposure Route on Potency of Carcinogens, 13
Reg. Toxicology & Pharmacology 3, 11 (1991) (discussing potency of carcinogens inhaled
versus carcinogens ingested).
309 See id. at 13.
310 Pharmacokinetics refers to the way a chemical is absorbed, transported through the
bloodstream to the target organ, metabolized, and excreted. See generally Charles Mann,
Women's Health Research Blossoms, 269 Science 766, 768 (1995) (discussing
pharmacokinetics in relation to gender); Mayer et al., supra note 303 (discussing
pharmacokinetics); Renwick, supra note 303, at 101 (defining pharmacokinetics).
Pharmacokinetic models "describe... processes affecting the disposition of a chemical and
its metabolism from the time it is absorbed to its interaction with different and various
body tissues." Beck et al., supra note 149, at 39. These models attempt to account for
"variation[s] with time of drug concentration in the blood, serum, or plasma as a result of
absorption, distribution, and elimination." Mayer et al., supra note 303, at 21 (emphasis
omitted) (describing elementary kinetic model of fundamental pharmacokinetics); see also
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themselves use many assumptions and simplifications and are more
accurate when data is available with respect to exposure level and
toxic effect.31 ' In the absence of such information, therefore, a fair
assumption is that exposure routes are equivalent.
In assessing differences in the way the chemical agent was applied
in the animal studies and in exposed humans, the EPA uses the default
assumption that, for carcinogens, exposure by one route is equivalent
to exposure by another route.31 The EPA recognizes that as long as
the internal dose is the same, there is no reason to suspect the chemi-
cal agent will act differently if it was absorbed into the body through
the skin or taken internally.313 The metabolism of the internal dose
will be the same 3 14 In other words, "[m]easurement of plasma con-
centrations provides much needed proof of absorption and
exposure. '3
15
The assumption that chemical agents act the same, regardless of
application, not only protects the public health to some degree, but it
also offers the soundest scientific explanation of how things work.3 16
Absorption and distribution are similar in all mammalian species 3 17
Toxicologists note "that almost every toxicant can pass through one or
more portals of entry, although there may be considerable differences
in rate. '31 8 Unquestionably, data is needed with respect to absorption
Renwick, supra note 303, at 106-07 (discussing mathematical model to describe changes in
blood plasma levels).
311 See Kannan Krishnan & Melvin E. Anderson, Physiologically Based
Pharmacokinetic Modeling in Toxicology, in Principles and Methods, supra note 82, at 149,
174 (arguing that "appropriate equations to represent each exposure pathway" may ac-
count adequately for exposure route differences and allow extrapolation).
312 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,978 (adopting default assumption
that exposure routes are equivalent, and stating that "if it is not contrary to available data,
it is assumed as a default that toxicokinetic and metabolic processes are qualitatively com-
parable between species").
313 See id.
314 That is, "[tjo produce its characteristic effects, a [chemical] must be present in appro-
priate concentrations at its sites of action" within the cell. Benet et al., supra note 303, at 3.
See generally Rees & Hattis, supra note 279 (explaining basic principles of pharmacokinet-
ics). This is particilarly true for carcinogenic chemicals, where dose route has little effect.
See Pepelko, supra note 308, at 11.
315 Dorato & Vodicnik, supra note 272, at 212.
316 See Chengelis & Gad, supra note 149, at 9 (noting that route of exposure makes little
difference and explaining that important factor in toxicology is access to circulatory sys-
tem); W.E. Pepelko, Feasibility of Route Extrapolation in Risk Assessment, 44 Brit. J.
Indus. Med. 649, 649 (1987) (explaining necessity of route extrapolation and use of uncer-
tainty factors when environmental exposure differs from experimental route of exposure).
317 See Chengelis & Gad, supra note 149, at 8 ("The principles that govern absorption
and distribution apply fairly equally across all species."). There are metabolic rate differ-
ences, but most of these can be accounted for mathematically. See id.
318 Ernest Hodgson & Patricia E. Levi, Absorption and Distribution of Toxicants, in A
Textbook of Modem Toxicology, supra note 149, at 27 (explaining that "few, if any, chemi-
cals will be excluded from entry" to body because of route of exposure).
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characteristics and toxicity across routes.319 The "[d]evelopment of
scientifically based principles, procedures, and data for route-to-route
[exposure] extrapolations" would undoubtedly improve their valid-
ity.320 But in the absence of such information, the default assumption
of equivalence is justified as simply the best we can do.
In addition, this judicial assumption makes sense from a policy
standpoint since it encourages manufacturers to engage in safety re-
search.321 If manufacturers wish to demonstrate that there is no
equivalence in exposure routes, they are in the best position to pro-
duce the data to support that counterassumption. 322 They are in a
better position to produce the necessary data than are consumers
since they are in the business of producing and testing the chemical. 32 3
From a policy perspective, placing the burden on plaintiffs of proving
in each case-without access to research facilities-that exposure by
different routes would be the same makes little sense.324
319 See Summary Report of the Workshops on Principles of Route-to-Route Extrapola-
tion for Risk Assessment, in Principles of Route-to-Route Extrapolation for Risk Assess-
ment 1, 2-3 (Timothy R. Gerrity & Carol J. Henry eds., 1990) [hereinafter Summary
Report] ("At present little is known about absorption characteristics, the potential for por-
tal-of-entry effects, and the potential for first-pass metabolic effects for most compounds
by most routes.").
320 Id. at 3.
321 Pharmacokinetic information on most chemicals is simply not available. See William
E. Pepelko & James R. Withey, Methods for Route-to-Route Extrapolation of Dose, I
Toxicology & Indus. Health 153, 159 (1985) (discussing lack of data to compare "toxic
effects of similar doses administered by different routes"). Without manufacturer re-
search, no data on route equivalence may be gathered at all. Thus, the use of the exposure
route equivalence assumption is an efficient allocation of resources, placing the cost on the
party best able to assume it. See Wagner, supra note 292, at 797-803 (arguing for burden
on manufacturer to do safety research).
322 Most chemicals on the market never have been tested for safety. See Beecher-
Monas, supra note 8, at 1090 & nn.261-63. It does not seem unfair, therefore, once safety
has become an issue, to place the burden of producing evidence on those who profit from
the manufacture of the chemicals, at least to the extent of refuting a presumption of route
equivalence. This is a particular concern where little is known about the pharmacokinetics
of particular chemicals and yet those compounds are marketed widely. See Summary Re-
port, supra note 319, at 3 (discussing lack of knowledge about route-to-route
extrapolation).
323 Thus the burden of production of evidence to refute the presumption of exposure-
route equivalence should be placed on the defendant chemical marketer because of the
inequality of resources between plaintiff and defense. See Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1543 (1999) (arguing that
burdens of persuasion and production are economizing devices and therefore should be
placed on party with greatest access to resources).
324 See Peter C. Carstensen, Explaining Tort Law: The Economic Theory of Landes and
Posner, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1161, 1181 (1988) (noting that "an efficiency-increasing solution is
to identify a class of participant which has distinct cost advantages in handling any aspect
of the accident problem").
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c. In Vitro Studies. Less persuasive, as a general matter, than
(in vivo) animal studies are in vitro tissue culture studies designed to
examine the effects of agents on isolated cells, bacteria, organs, or em-
bryos.32 While they may be ranked lower in this rule-of-thumb hier-
archy, these tests can help to determine the effect of a chemical at the
cellular level. 326 In vitro studies are used to support the interpretation
of information from human and animal studies2 7 Bearing in mind
that the "rational approach is to examine all sources of information in
the evaluation of toxic chemicals,"' 28 in vitro studies are not "inferior"
studies, for they are studies that add vital information to the mix. Al-
though they may be insufficient standing alone, these studies may ex-
plain mechanisms of action that other types of studies cannot. Courts,
however, are even less comfortable when experts rely on these studies
than they are with in vivo animal studies.329 It is a mistake to disre-
gard these studies because these studies are invaluable in understand-
ing metabolic processes at the cellular level. If such studies have been
performed, they add explanatory power to the expert's hypothesis.
Courts should not reject them out of hand, but should consider in-
stead the information they provide about metabolic processes to-
gether with other proffered studies in assessing the admissibility of
testimony based upon such studies.
d. Structure-Activity Relationships. Structure-activity relation-
ship studies, which also rarely get admitted in court, explore the struc-
ture of the chemical at issue and how its structure is related to
biological effects, by comparing it to other chemicals with similar
325 Cf. Beck et al., supra note 149, at 23 (explaining that in vitro studies are employed
less frequently than in vivo animal studies). For a definition of in vivo and in vitro animal
studies and an explanation of the difference between them, see, for example, Wade-Greaux
v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441,1453 (D.V.I.) ("lit vivo animal studies are those
conducted in a living animal. In vitro animal studies are those employing animals [sic] cells
in a controlled environment, such as a test tube or Petri dish."), aftd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir.
1994).
326 See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 123, at 191 (discussing in vitro tests and criteria
for their validity).
327 See Beck et al., supra note 149, at 23.
328 Id. at 25.
329 See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (af-
firming district court's exclusion of plaintiffs' experts who relied in part on in vitro studies);
Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 811, 813 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming district
court's exclusion of expert testimony that did not establish connection between in vitro
tests and plaintiffs' illnesses). There is some reason for this reluctance. These tests rarely
have been compared with outcomes in animal studies. See Goldstein & Henifin, supra
note 123, at 191. Nonetheless, if an in vitro test consistently and accurately measures toxic-
ity and predicts outcomes on the same cells or organs as in live studies, the results should
not be ignored. See id. (listing criteria for reliability of in vitro tests).
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structure and known toxic effects. 330 Structure-activity relationships
are a standard part of toxicology.331 They too provide key insights
into the ways chemicals affect the body.332
Both in vitro studies and structure-activity relationship studies il-
luminate the mechanisms of a chemical at the cellular or organ
level.333 They are not inferior types of studies, as they present impor-
tant information that needs to be accounted for in any valid hypothe-
sis. Each of these kinds of studies is only a small piece of the puzzle;
as many pieces as possible are needed to put the puzzle together. But
any puzzle or theory is more or less incomplete, and the judge's job is
to decide whether or not the pieces could plausibly fit together the
way the expert says they do, or whether there are just too many pieces
missing to tell.334 It is emphatically not the judge's job to decide
whether the pieces do actually fit together the way the expert says
they do. Rather, it is up to the judge to decide only whether the stud-
ies on which the expert relied-the pieces of the puzzle-provide
plausible answers to questions of fact, not whether they provide the
"correct" answers.335
330 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,977-78; Beck et al., supra note
149, at 25 (describing use of structure-activity relationship studies in toxicology); Richard
Stone, Zeroing In on Brain Toxins, 255 Science 1063, 1063 (1992) (explaining that struc-
ture-activity relationship method involves comparing a chemical's structure to that of
known toxin).
331 See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 123, at 216 (defining structure-activity relation-
ships as "a method used by toxicologists"). The FDA, for example, requires studies of
structural-activity relationships, among other studies, before a new drug will be approved.
See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(2) (2000).
332 For example, these relationships form a vital part of physiologically based
pharmacokinetic modeling, the study of the "uptake and disposition of chemicals based on
quantitative interrelationships among the critical biological determinants of these
processes." Krishnan & Anderson, supra note 311, at 149; see also id. at 158-61 (describing
reactions of organic chemicals, nonvolatile organs, and inorganic chemicals).
333 See Beck et al., supra note 149, at 25 ("[S]tructure-activity relationships have been
used to predict mutagenicity, lethality, and carcinogenicity.... [And in vitro tests may]
support the classification of a chemical as a possible human carcinogen or the use of a
linear dose-response model for carcinogenesis.").
334 Thus, if the only information about toxicity were based on in vitro studies, it would
be too difficult to see the whole picture, and the testimony should be inadmissible. But
animal studies, in vitro studies, and structure-activity relationship studies together paint a
sufficiently complete picture for the judge to assess validity. See Beck et al., supra note
149, at 25 (explaining that "there is no 'best' source of information"); Interdisciplinary
Panel on Carcinogenicity, supra note 152, at 686 (noting that studies of various types must
be examined together to provide reliable estimate of chemical's risk to humans).
335 See Conley & Peterson, supra note 9, at 1198 (arguing that while trial courts should
determine whether "expert's methods yield answers to questions that are properly within
the purview of the trier of fact," whether they also should make "value judgment[s] about
the soundness of those answers is a more controversial question"). Thus, the court in Hall
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996), was mistaken when it ex-
cluded expert testimony because the proffered studies failed to show that it was more
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3. Is Individualization a Valid Assumption?
It should be clear at this point that living creatures share many
attributes. What then of claims made by forensic scientists that they
can achieve "absolute specificity and absolute identification" of indi-
viduals?336 Such a claim is based on an assumption that "nature never
repeats. '337 Underlying the forensic sciences is the idea that people
have unique fingerprints, handwriting, bitemarks, etc.338 Is the under-
lying assumption of these techniques-that people have unique char-
acteristics-scientifically valid?
There is little empirical support for an assumption of unique-
ness. 339 Nor is there a testable theory that would explain the concept
of individualization.340 Probability theory-on which such techniques
purportedly are based-reflects the antithesis of absolute statements
about uniqueness.341 The unlikelihood of a coincidence of particular
features must be based on the collection of data and the use of statisti-
likely than not that silicone caused the plaintiff's diseases. See id. at 1405. Deciding
whether the expert's conclusion is relevant and admissible is not the same as deciding
whether the conclusions are right. Assessing correctness is the province of the factfnder.
336 David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Statis-
tics?, 31 J. Forensic Sci. Soe'y 197, 197 (1991).
337 Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative En-
counters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 Hastings .J. 1069, 1083 (1998) (quoting
Harold Cummins & Charles Midlo, Finger Prints, Palms and Soles: An Introduction to
Dermatoglyphics 150 (1943)).
338 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 3, at 57 (explaining that theory that these traits are
uniquely personal has not undergone rigorous scientific testing necessary to meet standard
of admissibility under Daubert).
339 See Saks, supra note 337, at 1083, 1085-86 (observing "almost complete lack of fac-
tual and statistical data pertaining to the problem of establishing identity" in forensic sci-
ences and explaining that absence of frequent fingerprint matches does not establish their
uniqueness any more than statement "all swans are white" establishes that all swans really
are white just because no one has seen black one yet (internal quotation marks omitted)).
340 See id. at 1084 ("No articulated theory exists that explains why unique identifiability
must be the order of the universe.").
341 See Brennan & Carter, supra note 84, at 4647 (noting that "[p]robabilistic evidence
deals openly with uncertainty" and rejecting notion that probabilistic evidence is insuffi-
ciently scientific); see also Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Finger-
printing" Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 Cardozo L Rev. 361,
361 (1991) (advocating probabilistic analysis of DNA typing as model for other forensic
sciences). Saks explains that although the forensic scientists base their claims to individual-
ization on "the multiplication rule of probability applied to populations," Saks, supra note
337, at 1086, "probabilistic models cannot prove absolutes such as that no two are alike,"
id. at 1087. Further, Saks notes that the assumption that the variables are independent
may be questionable, and that the system of measurement and classification must itself be
tested. See id. Moreover, he observes, fingerprint identification experts "use no
probability models and have no probability data to use." Id. at 1105-06.
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cal analysis-requirements that have been startlingly absent from this
branch of courtroom science.342
Even when empirical data exists, such data support only qualified
possibilities of individualization. DNA testing explicitly relies on the
presence of a database drawn from the general population for its abil-
ity to identify an individual. 343 It also recognizes the implausibility of
making an absolute identification statement. 344
Of all the forensic identification techniques, DNA typing-origi-
nally developed not for the courtroom, but for research purposes-is
the only technique that explicitly addresses and indeed depends on
the probabilistic nature of the evidence.345 Thus, the assumption that
"nature never repeats" is an assumption not grounded in valid sci-
ence.346 Courts should not accept an assertion of individualization
without empirical support. 347 Rather, judges should adopt the alter-
native assumption, that individuals share many characteristics, as
more scientifically sound in the absence of data to the contrary.
D. Examine the Methodology
Methodology refers to the way an experiment (or series of exper-
iments) is conducted and encompasses the process of gathering, mea-
suring, and reporting data.348 Once the court has filled gaps in
knowledge with valid scientific default assumptions, the judge must
examine the workings of the studies themselves to ensure that these
assumptions may be employed fairly. The soundness of the methodol-
ogy is what gives the data derived from that methodology its credibil-
ity.34 9 Evaluating study design, the data underlying each study, and
342 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 3, at 84-85 (noting that although scientific evidence
in criminal trials often involves probability statements, few lawyers or judges understand
these statements' statistical basis or underlying assumptions).
343 See, e.g., John Horgan, High Profile: The Simpson Case Raises the Issue of DNA
Reliability, Sci. Am., Oct. 1994, at 33, 36 (explaining frequency calculation based on fre-
quency of genetic combination in general population, "and then multiply that frequency to
obtain the odds of a random match").
344 See id. (explaining that frequency calculation is merely estimate and that "[a] DNA
profile is not as unique as, say, a fingerprint").
345 See Saks, supra note 337, at 1083 (noting that DNA typing is only branch of forensic
science that "takes the burdens of the probabilistic nature of forensic identification science
seriously").
346 Cf. State v. Kunze, 988 P.2d 977, 991-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing principle with
general approval, but acknowledging that it might not be "susceptible of rigorous proof").
347 As Saks explains, "the existence and nature of probability data are at the heart of the
theory of forensic identification," making the absence of both underlying data and statisti-
cal inferences drawn from them troubling. Saks, supra note 337, at 1124.
348 See Lu, supra note 304, at 84 (listing elements of "good laboratory practice"
guidelines).
349 See John Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds of Belief in
Science 130-32 (1978) (discussing importance of methodology).
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how that data was gathered, are important aspects of validity
assessments.350
To test an articulated scientific hypothesis, the scientist must de-
sign an experiment: a series of observations calculated (provisionally)
to corroborate (or falsify) the theory.351 In designing an experiment,
the researcher decides how large a sample must be used so that statis-
tically significant results may be obtained.352 In addition, the re-
searcher attempts to control the experiment so that a minimum of
variables affects the results or complicates the discovery of a proposed
causal association.353 Whether or not a study validly shows a signifi-
cant association between exposure to a given chemical and its effects
in the body, for example, depends on the analysis of the data.3 4 Any
useful description of the methods used in a study should include a
detailed description of the data and the reasons for the selection of
variables and control processes? 55
350 See Thomas D. Cook & Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation: Design &
Analysis Issues for Field Settings 39 (1979) (stating that evaluation of any experiment re-
quires critique of data and studies). In Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co., 967 F. Supp.
1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds mem., 216 F.3d
1072 (2d Cir. 2000), for example, the proffered expert purported to rely on a series of
studies but did not describe the studies in detail or attach abstracts of the studies to the
expert's affidavit. The court rightly excluded the testimony. See id. at 1447. Thus, the
importance of examining the details of experimental data in making admissibility determi-
nations can hardly be overemphasized. For example, technician error, instrument error,
laboratory procedural error, and errors in experimental technique all may invalidate a con-
clusion. See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door,
Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of
Scientific Evidence, 15 Cardozo L Rev. 1799, 1834 (1994) (reviewing data collection tech-
niques, laboratory notebooks, and other evidence regarding "the specifics of the actual
data produced for admission in court [that] must be examined").
351 See Gad, supra note 81, at 21 (noting that experimentation has "a twofold purpose":
"whether or not an agent results in an effect" and "how much of an effect is present").
However, as Popper pointed out, the scientist at most can demonstrate that the data provi-
sionally corroborate the theory. See Popper, supra note 36, at 275.
352 See Gad, supra note 81, at 24 (explaining that fundamental aspect of experimental
design "is determining sufficient test and control group sizes to allow one to have an ade-
quate level of confidence in the results of the study").
353 See id. at 21-22 (discussing importance of controls); Fienberg et al., supra note 82, at
17 (same); see also Knorr-Cetina, supra note 47, at 21 ("The major task of the laboratory is
to rule out possibilities, manipulate the balance of choices so that one becomes more at-
tractive than the others, and to up- or downgrade variables with respect to alternatives.").
354 See Gad, supra note 81, at 21-31 (discussing importance of experimental design and
data analysis); Rothman, supra note 203, at 445 (explaining that because "[m]easurement is
never exact[,] observations and the inferences drawn from them are subject to various
errors," and therefore "[sitatistical procedures have been developed in recognition of the
need to evaluate measurement error"); see also EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10,
at 17,973-75 (discussing criteria for assessing adequacy of epidemiologic studies).
355 See EPA Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 17,973 (listing "clear, well-docu-
mented, and appropriate methodology for data collection and analysis" and "complete and
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In determining whether an experiment has yielded "reliable"
data, a scientist looks at factors relating to the control exerted over
the experiment.356 Every experiment should have "control" subjects
to compare with the subjects of the experiment. One suspect practice
that should set off warning bells for judges is the use of "historical
controls," control subjects based on previous experiments. 357 Each
time a study is performed, controls should be in place that account for
extrinsic variables.358 Background "noise" that could affect the exper-
iment must be eliminated as much as possible-the laboratory and its
equipment must be clean, for example, to prevent contamination of
the procedure-or taken into account, although inevitable human er-
ror means that no experiment ever can be performed perfectly. 359 By
performing a number of experiments and determining how far the re-
clear documentation of results" as two criteria for assessing adequacy of epidemiologic
studies).
356 Reliability is the ability to obtain consistent results using a given experimental proce-
dure. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 n.20 (1980). Reliability
should not be confused with validity. See id. (stating that validity, as opposed to reliability,
entails test's accuracy). A set of results under given conditions may be consistent-and
thus reliable-but wrong (and therefore invalid). A good example of this phenomenon
may be found in the hypothetical discussion of a new test for blood alcohol level that
"grossly underestimates the amount of alcohol in one's bloodstream, and yet... underesti-
mates the blood alcohol level in one's bloodstream by the same amount every time." De-
velopments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra
note 6, at 1534 (emphasis added). Such a test is reliable, but invalid. See Kaye &
Freedman, supra note 83, at 341 (noting importance of reliability and distinguishing be-
tween reliability and accuracy).
357 The reason historical controls-controls from past experiments-are suspect is that
they are not really controls. That is, the historically controlled subjects have not been
subjected to exactly the same conditions as the test subjects. For a detailed explanation of
why this is a problem, see Gad, supra note 81, at 22 (explaining that controls should be
concurrent and "should come from the same source, lot, age, etc. as test group"); Interdis-
ciplinary Panel on Carcinogenicity, supra note 152, at 683 (disfavoring historical controls).
The court-appointed immunology expert in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp.
1387 (D. Or. 1996), rejected one of the studies relied on by the plaintiffs expert for reasons
including the study's use of historical controls. See id. app. C at 1457-58. As one scientist
has noted, "you can prove anything with selective controls," so one must be wary of histor-
ical controls. Jon Cohen, Cancer Vaccines Get a Shot in the Arm, 262 Science 841, 843
(1993) (quoting scientist Charles Moertel).
358 "Generally speaking, the greater control a scientist has over the intervention being
studied and the secondary variables, the greater the ability to make inferences that take
account of the secondary variables without heroic assumptions .... But any method re-
quires a model and, therefore, assumptions." Fienberg et al., supra note 82, at 17.
359 Patrick Suppes calls the background noise problem "ceteris paribus conditions" and
acknowledges that "[d]etailed information about the distribution of physical parameters
characterizing the experimental environment is not a simple matter to incorporate in mod-
els of data and is usually not reported in the literature; roughly speaking, some general
ceteris paribus conditions are assumed to hold." Patrick Suppes, Models of Data, in Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress
252, 258 (Ernest Nagel et al. eds., 1962).
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sults deviate from each other and from those expected under the the-
ory, the scientist determines the study's reliabilityY-
Principles of experimental design differ widely from field to field
in science; some fields require more exacting protocols than others.361
At a minimum, however, certain basic experimental design features
must be either present or taken into account. The use of controls is
one such basic design feature. For example, in toxicology studies, the
experiment will be designed to hold all variables constant except for
the exposure to the chemical in question.3 62 The implicit assumption
underlying the use of such controls is that any changes observed will
be due to the chemical and not due to some other factor. 63 Another
basic design feature in toxicology experiments is the use of a range of
doses. In a good study, a range of doses should be used in order to
reveal the threshold level when a dose has no measurable effect. 64
The design of an experiment, or a series of experiments, should
incorporate standards of appropriate laboratory practice or provide a
logical basis for disregarding them.3 65 In every field, the experiment
360 As noted above, reliability is an important concept in evaluating experiments. See
supra note 356 and accompanying text. Essentially, this factor asks whether a scientific
study can be or has been repeated. See Gad, supra note 81, at 21-22 (explaining impor-
tance of replication of results). Courts, presented with a limited number of studies upon
which proffered experts rely, may have no way of knowing whether studies are repeatable.
Courts, on the other hand, can determine whether a sufficient number of subjects was used
to ensure accuracy in response measurement. See id. Generally, where reliability becomes
a contested issue, courts have little trouble finding the study invalid. See, e.g., Wade-
Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1462 (D.V.I.) (rejecting rabbit study as
poorly done and unrepeatable), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).
361 Protocols offer a way of standardizing methodology and address such aspects of
methodology as experimental conditions, reliability, and controls. Cf. Fienberg et al., supra
note 82, at 17 (noting that "the greater control a scientist has over the intervention being
studied and the secondary variables, the greater the ability to make inferences that take
account of the secondary variables without heroic assumptions").
362 See Lu, supra note 304, at 74-85 (discussing methodology for conventional toxicity
studies).
363 See id.
364 See Rolf Hartung, Dose-Response Relationships, in Toxic Substances and Human
Risk, supra note 255, at 29, 40 (explaining importance of experimental design).
365 For experiments in clinical medicine and drug testing, the FDA's Good Laboratory
Practices and Good Clinical Practices provide the most-followed guidelines, and must be
followed by studies supporting applications to the FDA. See Good Laboratory Practice for
Nonclinical Laboratory Studies, 21 C.F.R. § 58 (2000); Good Clinical Practice: Consoli-
dated Guideline, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,692 (1997); see also Foster & Huber, supra note 37, at
100-01 (noting that "the most widely used" guidelines to ensure reliable data "are Good
Laboratory Practices (GLP) and Good Clinical Practices (GCP)"). GLP pertains to
nonclinical laboratory studies conducted to support applications for research or marketing
permits for products regulated by the FDA. GCP provides standards for clinical trials that
involve human subjects. These formal guidelines are not applicable to basic scientific re-
search, where the methods are new or have modified existing protocols; nonetheless, there
are fundamental protocols in all fields, and departures from them should be explained. See
Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline, 62 Fed. Reg. at 25,697. In the context of
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must be designed so that the results honestly can be attributable to the
data.3 66 Good methodology requires that the scientist develop and
follow a protocol, use extensive quality control measures, and submit
to outside audits of her studies.367
Courts in criminal cases have the most difficulty dealing with lab-
oratory standards and protocols since criminal laboratories are largely
unmonitored and unregulated. 368 In civil toxic torts, on the other
hand, courts frequently have gone to the opposite extreme, requiring
strict adherence to conventional methodology. 369 Although perfec-
tion is unachievable and straying from the standards may be neces-
sary, the expert should be able to account for such deviation, giving
adequate reasons for the variance.370 When the study relied upon em-
ployed sound statistical design, followed the protocols for such studies
in the relevant field, observed proper control techniques, and demon-
strated its reliability through proper techniques, the methodology is
sound.
DNA testing, litigation and criminal prosecutions often have focused on laboratory con-
trols. See, e.g., State v. Bogan, 905 P.2d 515, 521 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (testing of seed
pods found in defendant's truck and at crime scene made tests more reliable due to blind
testing conditions); People v. Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 17-18 (Ct. App.) (discussing, but
rejecting, defense expert's complaints of lack of duplicate testing, lack of controls, failure
to accurately measure results, and performance on proficiency tests), review granted, 899
P.2d 65 (Cal. 1995), review dismissed, 987 P.2d 695 (Cal. 1999); People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1996).
366 See, e.g., Lu, supra note 304, at 57-67 (discussing factors that can modify toxic
effects).
367 For examples of established methodological guidelines, see, e.g., Good Laboratory
Practice for Nonclinicial Laboratory Studies, 21 C.F.R. § 58 (2000); Good Clinical Practice
Consolidated Guideline, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,692 (1997); AOAC Int'l, Official Methods of
Analysis of AOAC International (Patricia Cunniff ed., 16th ed. 1995) (establishing proto-
cols and methodologies for many different subjects of analysis).
368 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 3, at 67 (noting failure of forensic laboratories to
follow appropriate scientific standards and practices).
369 For an example of a court's parsing of expert methodology, see Wade-Greaux v.
Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441 (D.V.I.), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994), in
which the court examined the inadequacies of a rabbit study relied on by plaintiffs expert,
finding that, overall, too few rabbits were used to achieve statistical significance, each dos-
age group consisted of a single rabbit, there were virtually no controls, and the expert
failed to include dead rabbits in the data. See id. at 1458-61. Wade-Greaux provides both a
good example of the necessity of a civil court to examine thoroughly the details of a study's
methodology, and an excellent analysis of the methodology, as the court revealed serious
flaws in the proffered study. Most criminal courts do not examine methodology in any
more than a cursory fashion. For a criminal case refusing to examine the methodology at
all, see the analysis of State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508 (S.C.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 588
(1999), in infra Part III.B.
370 See, e.g., Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 596-98 (9th Cir. 1996) (af-
firming district court's exclusion of expert's testimony because of failure to explain why
key feature in teratology methodology, observation of distinctive pattern of birth defects,
should not be required from studies upon which expert relied).
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E. Probabilistic Assessment of Expert Conclusions:
Putting It All Together
The last step in the heuristic involves putting together answers to
the four previous inquiries (into the expert's theory, empirical sup-
port, assumptions, and methodology) to resolve the admissibility
question: Is the expert's conclusion based on sound science? 371 In
essence, this is a two-part question: (1) Are the studies the expert re-
lied upon relevant to the expert's conclusion (do they meet the re-
quirement of "fit"), and (2) does the expert have corroborating
empirical support for the proffered conclusion?372 The first question
of "fit" requires an inquiry into whether the proffered studies add em-
pirical content to the hypothesis. Do they add a piece to the puzzle?
Do they add anything to the expert's explanation of how things work?
The second question of empirical support requires examining the vari-
ety and methodology of tests to which the hypothesis has been sub-
jected, as well as those tests "that might have been performed but
were not."373 The reason for any absence of testing also must be
taken into account. For example, in toxic torts, chemical manufactur-
371 The task for the judge in an admissibility determination is not to determine "whose
evidence is most persuasive and exclude the evidence pointing the other way," but to de-
cide whether the evidence reasonably supports the expert's hypothesis. Beecher-Monas,
supra note 8, at 1073; see also Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of
Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale LJ. 376, 385 (1936) (ob-
serving, pre-Daubert, that courts conflate burdens of proof and standards of persuasion);
cf. Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases,
34 Wake Forest L Rev. 71 (1999) (discussing misuse of summary judgment standard
outside Daubert context). Conflating sufficiency with admissibility, although mistaken, still
may continue in post-Daubert cases. See Thomas J. Mack, Scientific Testimony After
Daubert Some Early Returns from the Lower Courts, Trial, Aug. 1994, at 23,30 (-[U]sing
admissibility criteria in resolving sufficiency cases may not only continue but may do so
with seeming validation from the Daubert opinion."). For cases conflating the standards,
see Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F3d 809,814 (6th Cir. 1994) (assuming admissibility
of plaintiffs' expert testimony but granting summary judgment to defendant since studies
insufficient); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY-91-3015-AAM, 1998 VL
775340, at "139-*40 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 1998); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.
Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or. 1996) (noting that plaintiffs must "prove not only the possibility
of a causal connection between breast implants and the alleged systemic disease, but the
medical probability of a causal connection" (emphasis added)); National Bank of Com-
merce v. Dow Chem. Co, 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1497 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (noting that issue of
causation is "different" from issue of admissibility and can be reached only by jury and
only after initial issue of admissibility is determined), affd per curiam, 133 F.3d 1132 (8th
Cir. 1998).
372 Only if the "scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to
allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true" may the
judge grant summary judgment or direct a verdict. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
373 Schum, supra note 146, at 243-44 (discussing Baconian probability method of
Jonathan Cohen, and noting importance of both "the number of evidential tests a hypothe-
sis survives and... the number of tests that might have been performed but were not").
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ers have a strong disincentive to engage in safety research that may
provide information that could later be used against them. 374 Tests
that would be helpful in establishing the causation hypothesis there-
fore may be absent, and this should not automatically weigh against
admissibility of expert testimony, providing it has some empirical ba-
sis.375 In other contexts, however, absence of testing may indicate a
flaw in the expert's reasoning. For example, in the criminal context,
expert failure to test the theory of individualization severely under-
mines the strength of identification evidence.376
In assessing the expert's conclusion, it is important to understand
the expert's language. Courts frequently misunderstand the language
that scientists use to articulate their conclusions.377 This applies to the
language of individual studies relied upon as well as to the expert's
ultimate conclusion. For courts seeking certainty to justify their deter-
minations, it is very frustrating to hear that a hypothesis only can be
tested empirically, but that it never can be proven true.378 Unfortu-
nately, however, there is no method of discovering the absolute truth
in science.379 Indeed, there is no method of ascertaining whether a
hypothesis is even probable.380 The most that a scientific expert can
say is that a theory is consistent internally, consistent with other theo-
ries that have withstood repeated critique, and consistent with the
data.38' For a scientist to testify to more is intellectually dishonest.
What science offers is not the truth, not certainty, but explanation. 382
In addition to the inability of an intellectually honest scientist to
say whether a proffered hypothesis is "probable," the language of sci-
entific conclusions often troubles judges. Because scientists seek to
374 Cf. supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text (explaining why burden should be
placed on manufacturers to prove when there is no equivalence in exposure routes).
375 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1090-91 (describing how manufacturers resist
performing research that would yield evidence that could be used against them).
376 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing problems with theory of individualization).
377 See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (re-
quiring expert to testify in terms of probability of causation).
378 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing Popperian notion that
scientists cannot establish truth, but only probabilities).
379 See supra note 36 (discussing Popper's view of science as uncertain).
380 See Popper, supra note 36, at 317 (observing that science is "a system of guesses or
anticipations... with which we work as long as they stand up to tests, and of which we are
never justified in saying that we know that they are 'true' or 'more or less certain' or even
probable").
381 See id. at 32-33. Science constantly must question and criticize its theories, even
those that turn out to be true. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 5, at 254-55
(discussing Popper's philosophy of science).
382 See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 Tex.
L. Rev. 1, 17 (1995) (proposing that "science does not produce fixed, unassailable conclu-
sions" but rather that "uncertainty among scientists is a natural state of affairs"); supra
note 36 (discussing Popper's view of science as uncertain).
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exclude false positives-to avoid claiming there is an effect when
there is none-scientific conclusions are couched in tentative
phrases.3 m "Association" is preferred to "causation," for example.3 s4
Thus, failing to understand that causation, like other hypotheses, can
never be proven true, courts even may reject as unreliable evidence
that easily meets scientific criteria for validity.
It is equally nonsensical for judges to discard a study just because
it reaches a different conclusion than does the testifying expert. Ex-
perts can draw diametrically opposed conclusions about a perfectly
valid study.385 That does not mean that one of the experts has drawn
an invalid conclusion or that any conclusion would be speculative. It
is more likely that the experts have used different underlying assump-
tions to fill the information gaps.38 6 This is in no way illegitimate, or
even unusual. As long as the study's data support the expert's hypoth-
esis, the expert justifiably can rely on the study for support. Thus, the
expert's reasoning, rather than the conclusions of the various studies
relied on, should be the focus of the inquiry. Unfortunately, because
they fail to understand the language of scientific conclusion drawing,
courts frequently exclude expert testimony on this basis s
383 See, e.g., Letter from Merwyn R. Greenlick to U.S. District Judge Robert Jones and
Oregon Court of Appeals Judge Nely Johnson, reprinted in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 app. B at 1447 (D. Or. 1996) (reporting that court-appointed
expert explained that "in epidemiological science the odds are stacked against incorrectly
rejecting the 'null hypothesis' ... that there is no relationship between the suspected causal
factor and the disease").
384 See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 727 (Tex. 1997) (noting
that "the discipline of epidemiology studies associations, not 'causation' per se"); cf. Bailey
et al., supra note 39, at 157 (observing that "[m]ost researchers are conservative when it
comes to assessing causal relationships, often calling for stronger evidence and more re-
search before a conclusion of causation is drawn").
385 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
386 See, e.g., 1 Schum, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining that "[t]wo astute, coherent, and
knowledgeable analysts, having access to the same evidence[ ] [may] reach entirely differ-
ent conclusions ... [because] their initial premises, hypotheses, or expectations may
differ").
387 For example, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the plaintiff
proffered a study of workers at an Italian capacitor plant who had been exposed to PCBs
to support the plaintiff's theory that exposure to PCBs caused cancer. See id. at 145. The
study's authors "noted that lung cancer deaths among ex-employees at the plant were
higher than might have been expected" but ultimately concluded that "'there vere appar-
ently no grounds for associating lung cancer deaths ... and exposure in the plant.'" Id.
The Court rejected this study since its authors reached a different conclusion than did the
testifying expert who relied on the study's data rather than its conclusions. See id. (-Given
that [the study's authors] were unwilling to say that PCB exposure had caused cancer
among the workers they examined, their study did not support the experts' conclusion that
Joiner's exposure to PCB's caused his cancer."); see also, e.g., National Bank of Commerce
v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1517 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (excluding expert testimony
based on studies that stated opinions that did not "go to the same extent as the opinions
[expert] would put before the jury"), aff'd per curiam, 133 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998);
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 2000]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Another problem posed by the language of scientific conclusion
drawing is that many-if not most-published studies conclude that
more research needs to be done.388 Judges often reject experts relying
on such studies, finding the studies irrelevant to the expert's testi-
mony, and thus failing to meet the "fit" requirement, because they are
too speculative. 389 This judicial reaction reflects ignorance of the re-
search enterprise. It is not surprising that scientists publishing the re-
suits of their studies in scientific journals conclude that more research
needs to be done.390 Of course it does.391 There are always gaps in
our knowledge, and scientists are anxious to pursue the quest of filling
them. How else to continue adding to the communal puzzle? How
else to convince funding authorities to continue to support the effort?
Good research tends to generate more research, as long as the funding
can be found. It is thus ludicrous for a judge to exclude testimony
merely because a study relied upon concludes that more research
needs to be done. What is important is not the conclusion but the
data.
So what makes an explanation scientifically sound? High empiri-
cal content is important. 392 But given the unavoidable gaps in our
knowledge, how much empirical content should a judge demand for
admissibility? There are a number of theories about evaluating evi-
dence under uncertainty, each contributing important insights. 393
The following inquiries may prove helpful to judges in deciding
whether there is sufficient empirical support to admit an expert's the-
ory into evidence. First, for each proffered study, how valuable is
each study on its own? What piece of the hypothetical puzzle does
Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D.N.J. 1996) ("The case law warns
against use of medical literature to draw conclusions not drawn in the literature itself."),
aff'd mem., 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997).
388 See, e.g., Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 877 (W.D. Tex.
1997) (excluding report suggesting that "further research was necessary before firm conclu-
sions could be drawn").
389 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144-45.
390 See, e.g., Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective Tissue Diseases and Other
Disorders After Breast Implantation, 330 N. Eng. J. Med. 1697, 1701 (1994) (finding no
statistically significant correlation between incidence of disease and breast implants, but
noting that there are other "ongoing" studies whose "results, together with ours, will help
to resolve this controversy").
391 See A.F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science? 125-26 (2d ed. 1982) (observ-
ing that "objective opportunities" for further exploration are created by work of other
scientists).
392 See Popper, supra note 36, at 120-21 (arguing for importance of empirical
corroboration).
393 See Peter Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 883, 887-88 (1986)
(arguing that Bayesianism, Baconian rationalism, fuzzy set theory, and "scenario" theory
are complementary systems and that "diverse models of inference are both permissible and
necessary").
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each study provide? How sound is the methodology underlying each
study? What are the areas of uncertainty that the study fails to ad-
dress? Given the knowledge of the first study (or set of studies), how
much more support does the second study (or set of studies) add to
the expert's hypothesis? What information gaps does the second
study (or set of studies) fill? How much does the second study (or set
of studies) explain in the absence of the first study (or set of studies)?
How rare or unexpected are the results of each of the studies?394 The
judge must consider the extent and strength of empirical support; the
level of consistency within the theory, with other current theories, and
with the data; the acceptability of underlying assumptions; whether
each of the proffered studies is methodologically sound; and whether
each contributes toward a biologically plausible theory.395
Because of the uncertainties inherent in scientific studies, studies
that conclude that more research must be done or that reach different
conclusions from that of the expert should not be considered illegiti-
mate.396 Rather, such uncertainties compel the scientist (and the
judge) to examine "how well all of the available evidence fits together
with the underlying theory. ' 397 In sum, in order to assess the scientific
basis of the expert's conclusion, it is necessary to examine theory,
data, assumptions, and methodology. The judge must ask: How well
do they fit together? How good is the explanation they provide?393
No algorithm for inference can substitute for thinking carefully about
the problem.399 A hefty dose of critical judgment is needed for this
394 See 2 Schum, supra note 16, at 192-93 (suggesting questions may be helpful in evalu-
ating inferences drawn from evidence). While the unexpectedness of results may lead one
to question methodology, if the methodology and assumptions are sound, unexpectedness
in fact may signal a robust theory. See Popper, supra note 96, at 58 (-[Every interesting
and powerful statement must have a low probability .... ").
395 For more suggestions of questions to ask in assessing scientific evidence, see 1
Schum, supra note 16, at 124-33. Schum asserts that proper conclusion-dra%%ing consists of
answering six questions: "What Did You expect?," "From The Evidence, What Do You
Know?," "'Believable Evidence': What Does It Mean?," "How Consistent Is The Evi-
dence?," "Can The Value Of Any Evidence Be Enhanced or Suppressed?." "What's Miss-
ing?" Id. at 124-27.
396 See Brennan & Carter, supra note 84, at 47 (stating that uncertainty -makes the
theories which guide the research explicit, and inform[s] the raw conclusions gathered by
scientists.... [I]t is a mistake-based on a mistaken view of the scientific enterprise-to
repudiate such [probabilistic] evidence .... ").
397 Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1094.
398 See Popper, supra note 36, at 32-33 (discussing how theories are tested by comparing
conclusions drawn from them with empirical observation).
399 See Rothman, supra note 203, at 446-47 (urging replacement of significance tests
with confidence intervals, but cautioning that even confidence intervals cannot be used as
surrogate test "to determine whether the null hypothesis value falls inside or outside the
confidence interval").
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determination, but it should be informed and guided by an under-
standing of the scientific process and scientific language.
III
APPLYING THE HEURISTIC
Armed with the proposed heuristic, what would judges do differ-
ently? The following section examines the expert evidence in two
cases in which the heuristic would have made a dramatic difference
both in rationale and in result: one civil toxic tort case and one crimi-
nal identification case. In the toxic tort case, Wright v. Willamette
Industries, Inc.,4°° the Eighth Circuit overturned a jury verdict for
plaintiffs who claimed their injuries were caused by the formaldehyde-
laced emissions of a fiberboard factory because the court decided that
plaintiffs' expert's testimony was not based on scientific knowledge.40'
Wright has been cited widely by other judges as a rationale for exclud-
ing expert testimony, both in the Eighth Circuit and elsewhere. 402
The criminal case State v. Council4 3 is a potentially influential
state case employing a Daubert-like standard to determine admissibil-
ity of mitochondrial deoxyribonucleic acid (mtDNA) testimony.
Council was only the second case in which an expert proffered
mtDNA testimony.4 n Despite the novelty of such testimony, the
court found no defense expert to be necessary, and without examining
the prosecution expert's methodology or the basis for the expert's as-
sertion of reliability, the court admitted the testimony in its entirety.
400 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996).
401 See id. at 1108.
402 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Wright
for requiring proof of level of exposure and stating that plaintiffs fell short in their attempt
to demonstrate actual level of exposure); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194,
198 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Wright in rejecting "weight of the evidence" methodology
adopted by plaintiffs' experts); National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers,
Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961-62 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (citing Wright and excluding causation
testimony for lack of exposure level data), aff'd, 191 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1999); Mancuso v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Wright in noting
widespread requirement that expert establish "general causation" through exposure level
data in scientific literature), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 216 F.3d
1072 (2d Cir. 2000).
403 515 S.E.2d 508 (S.C.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 588 (1999).
404 See infra note 480. The first time an expert proffered mtDNA testimony was in a
Tennessee state court in August, 1996, shortly after this method of DNA testing was first
implemented in the FBI Laboratory in June of 1996. See State v. Ware, No. 03C01-
9705CRO0164, 1999 WL 233592, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1999). The defendant
was convicted of murder and rape based partially on hair matching evidence using mtDNA
testing. See id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was not yet scientifi-
cally reliable and should not have been admitted, but the appellate court held the admis-
sion of the evidence not to be an abuse of discretion, and that even if it was, the error was
harmless. See id. at *14, *17.
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The heuristic proposed in this Article would have altered the admissi-
bility determination significantly in both of these cases.
A. Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc.
In this toxic tort case, the plaintiffs were a family who lived a
short distance from a fiberboard manufacturing plant, and suffered
from headaches, sore throats, respiratory ailments, and dizziness,
which they claimed were caused by emissions from the plant.405 It was
undisputed that the plant emitted particles laced with formalde-
hyde,406 that the polluting emissions exceeded state maximum
levels,4 7 and that the plaintiffs were exposed to these particles 403
After a jury trial at which the plaintiffs prevailed, they were
awarded $226,250 in compensatory damages.409 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit overturned the jury verdict, ruling that the plaintiffs
were unable to meet their burden of proving proximate cause because
their expert testimony should have been excluded as "speculation. ' '410
As far as the Eighth Circuit was concerned, although the plaintiffs
demonstrated exposure to fiberboard particles produced by the defen-
dant manufacturer, and that these particles were found "in their
house, their sputum, and their urine, they failed to produce evidence
that they were exposed to a hazardous level of formaldehyde from the
fibers emanating from Willamette's plant."411 As support, the court
cited the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on "fit,"412 ap-
parently for the notion that plaintiffs need to "prove adequate expo-
sure to a toxic substance that was somehow connected to the
defendant. ' 413 The Eighth Circuit's ruling stemmed from a funda-
mental misunderstanding of basic scientific theory, namely elementary
principles of metabolism and threshold response.414
1. What's the Theory?
In Wright, the plaintiffs' causation hypothesis was based on the
uncontroversial theory that formaldehyde causes respiratory disease
405 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1106.
406 See id. at 1106.
407 See id. at 1108 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
408 See id. at 1107.
409 See id. at 1106.
410 Id. at 1108. For a discussion of the Wright court's remarkably undeferential standard
of review, see infra note 468.
411 Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107.
412 Id. at 1108 (citing Federal Judicial Ctr. Manual, supra note 9, at 47-48).
413 Federal Judicial Ctr. Manual, supra note 9, at 48.
414 See supra Part fl.C.2.b (discussing metabolism and threshold responses).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 2000] 1637
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
in humans.415 More specifically, their experts' hypothesis proposed
that when plaintiffs inhaled the formaldehyde contained on the fiber-
board particles invading plaintiffs' home, the exposure led to the
plaintiffs' particular array of symptoms. One expert testified that "the
Wrights' complaints were more probably than not related to formal-
dehyde. ' 416 This hypothesis depended on testimony advanced by two
other plaintiff experts that formaldehyde attached to fiberboard parti-
cles has similar respiratory effects to gaseous formaldehyde.417 But
this leap was too great for the Eighth Circuit. Thus, although the
court could accept the theory that "gaseous formaldehyde" could
cause human respiratory ailments, it found causation from formalde-
hyde attached to fiberboard particles to be unsubstantiated. 418
2. Examine All the Available Evidence
Although formaldehyde is ubiquitous in the civilized world,419 the
defendant plant's emissions far exceeded statutorily permitted
levels. 420 The manufacturer had failed to install available equipment
to control the emissions.421 Emissions from the plant "fell like
'snow"' on plaintiffs' property.422 The manufacturer was the only
source of formaldehyde-coated wood particles in the vicinity of the
plaintiffs' home.423 Significant levels of the plant's toxic emissions
were found in the plaintiffs' bodily fluids. 424 In fact, the Wright plain-
tiffs were exposed to enough formaldehyde to cause metabolic by-
415 See Robert E. Gosselin et al., Clinical Toxicology of Commercial Products: Acute
Poisoning 166-67 (4th ed. 1976) (noting common symptoms from formaldehyde exposure
including dizziness, nausea, skin and eye irritation, nose and throat irritation, and difficulty
breathing).
416 Wright, 91 F.3d at 1108 (assessing testimony of Dr. Frank Peretti); see also Appel-
lees' Brief at 27, Wright (No. 95-4227).
417 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107 (assessing testimony of Drs. Fred Fowler and Jimmie
Valentine).
418 See id.
419 See Marian C. Marbury & Robert A. Krieger, Formaldehyde, in Indoor Air Pollu-
tion: A Health Perspective 223, 223-25 (Jonathan M. Samet & John D. Spengler eds.,
1991) (discussing scientific and regulatory controversies arising from numerous reports
published in late 1970s on "ubiquity of formaldehyde in consumer products and
residences").
420 See Appellees' Brief at 24, Wright (No. 95-4227).
421 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1108 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
422 Id. at 1109 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
423 See Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., No. 94-6081 at 5 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 13, 1995)
(unpublished order on file with the New York University Law Review).
424 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1109 (Heaney, J., dissenting); Appellees' Brief at 17, Wright
(No. 95-4227).
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products to appear in their body fluids.425 None of this evidence was
disputed.426
The plaintiffs' testifying experts included a forensic pathologist, a
toxicologist, and a specialist in medical particulate research. 427 The
toxicologist and forensic pathologist testified to general causation. 42
The particle science expert "demonstrated the mechanism by which
the chemically coated particles entered the respiratory tracts of the
[Wrights]." 429 The forensic pathologist testified that this mechanism
was similar to particles in the gaseous state.430 The plaintiffs' treating
physician made a differential diagnosis that the plaintiffs' symptoms
were "more probably than not related to their exposure to the plant
emissions." 431 Each of the experts relied on government studies
showing formaldehyde to be a carcinogen and respiratory irritant and
to cause symptoms similar to those the plaintiffs suffered 32
There is ample evidence upon which the experts also presumably
relied, although the court does not discuss it, that "[f]ormaldehyde can
produce health effects ranging from acute nausea, eye irritation, and
respiratory impairment to longer term effects, like cancer." 43 3 For-
maldehyde is a well-known allergen, as well as a mucous membrane
irritant,434 causing "irritation to the eyes, nose, and throat, respiratory
425 See Appellees' Brief at 17, Wright (No. 95-4227).
426 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1108-09 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
427 See Appellees' Brief at 25-26, Wright (No. 954227) (stating testimony of Drs.
Jimmie Valentine, Malay Mazumder, and Frank Peretti).
428 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107; Appellees' Brief at 26, Wright (No. 95-4227).
429 Appellees' Brief at 25, Wright (No. 95-4227).
430 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1108; Appellees' Brief at 26-28, Wright (No. 95-4227) (stating
testimony of Dr. Frank Peretti).
431 Wright, 91 F.3d at 1109 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
432 See id.
433 3 Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law § 4A.0114, at 4A-17 (20300). In
1979, the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology issued a report concluding that inhala-
tion of formaldehyde causes nasal cancer in rodents. See William D. Kerns et al., The
Chronic Effects of Formaldehyde Inhalation in Rats and Mice: A Preliminary Report, in
Formaldehyde Toxicity 111-31 (James E. Gibson ed., 1983).
434 See Edward P. Horvath, Jr. et al., Effects of Fbrmaldehyde on the Mucous Mem-
branes and Lungs: A Study of an Industrial Population, 259 JAMA 701,701 (19SS) (-Air-
borne formaldehyde is a known irritant to the eyes, upper airways of the nose and throat,
and lower airways of the lungs."); Thomas J. Kulle et al., Formaldehyde Dose-Response in
Healthy Nonsmokers, 37 Int'l J. Air Pollution Control & Hazardous Waste Mgmt. 919,919
(1987) ("Irritation of the eyes and upper respiratory tract is the most frequent finding
associated with [formaldehyde] exposures."); Larry R. Sander et al., Acute Pulmonary Re-
sponse to Formaldehyde Exposure in Healthy Nonsmokers, 28 J. Occupational Med. 420,
420 (1986) ("Formaldehyde (HCHO) has been implicated as a cause of asthma-like syrnp-
toms in some individuals .... "); E.N. Schachter et al., A Study of Respiratory Effects from
Exposure to 2 ppm Formaldehyde in Healthy Subjects, 41 Archives Envtl. Health 229
(1986) ("Descriptions of the respiratory effects of formaldehyde have been primarily asso-
ciated with irritative effects of this gas on the mucous membranes of the upper airways....
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illnesses, skin irritations, dizziness, headaches, and nausea. '435 Expo-
sure levels of 0.1 parts per million (ppm) may cause difficulty in
breathing and asthma-like respiratory illnesses.436 The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's formaldehyde exposure standard
is 0.75 ppm for an eight-hour period, with a maximum of 2 ppm for a
fifteen-minute short-term exposure limit.437 Just having large
amounts of particle board itself in the home is a risk factor for asthma,
headache, and throat irritation.438 Moreover, the absorption rate of
inhaled or ingested formaldehyde is very high.439 The EPA found that
ninety-five percent of people respond to concentrations of 0.1 to 3
ppm.440 The plaintiffs' toxicologist expert drew on these findings in
testifying that formaldehyde metabolites such as those found in the
plaintiffs' urine "are known to be toxic in animals and to cause cell
membrane disruption in humans."'441
3. Use Valid Assumptions to Fill the Gaps
The court found that the plaintiffs' experts' inability to demon-
strate plaintiffs' exposure levels was dispositive and necessitated ex-
clusion of the expert testimony and granting of judgment as a matter
of law to the defendants.442 There is no question that the plaintiffs
[A] number of reports suggest that asthmatic symptoms may follow formaldehyde
exposure.").
435 Andrew N. Davis & Paul E. Schaffman, The Home Environmental Sourcebook 89
(1st ed. 1996).
436 See id. Whether the experts relied on these known levels is another question. Pre-
sumably, they did. If not, such ignorance constitutes an expert failure, and ultimately a
lawyering failure, which is beyond the scope of this Article. This kind of failure can be
remedied by the judge asking for supplemental briefing on the underlying studies on which
the expert relied. Here, there is ample evidence available (and easily accessible) about
formaldehyde and its effects. Indeed, it has been so well litigated, and the subject of nu-
merous reports and publicized proceedings, that the court could have taken judicial notice
of the harmful exposure levels. Moreover, the Wrights' expert toxicologist proffered testi-
mony about the levels of exposure that would cause symptoms like the plaintiffs'. See
Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107.
437 See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,290 (1992) (codified at
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048(c) (1999)).
438 See Peder Daugbjerg, Is Particleboard in the Home Detrimental to Health?, 48
Envtl. Res. 154 (1989).
439 See, e.g., John L. Egle, Jr., Retention of Inhaled Formaldehyde, Propionaldehyde,
and Acrolein in the Dog, 25 Archives Envtl. Health 119, 121 (1972) (describing experiment
exposing mongrel dogs to various concentrations of aldehyde compounds and noting that
"[u]ptake of formaldehyde remained near 100% regardless of the concentration").
440 See Office of Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA, Assessment of Health Risks to
Garment Workers and Certain Home Residents from Exposure to Formaldehyde (1987).
441 Appellees' Brief at 26, Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-4227) (testimony of Dr. Valentine).
442 The court stated that
[Dr. Peretti's] opinion was not based on any knowledge about what amounts of
wood fibers impregnated with formaldehyde involve an appreciable risk of
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were exposed to formaldehyde and that the formaldehyde to which
they were exposed came from the defendant's lumber mill. The data
showed a strong association between exposure to formaldehyde at low
levels and symptoms such as the plaintiffs suffered. But the court con-
cluded that because the plaintiffs presented no exposure level data,
the rest of the testimony was irrelevant. 443 In addition, the court was
unconvinced that the absorption of gaseous formaldehyde leads to ef-
fects similar to exposure to formaldehyde bonded to particles of fiber-
board. Thus, the court was unable to fill the two information gaps it
faced: gaps as to exposure level and absorption mechanisms. Had it
used the scientifically acceptable assumptions proposed in the heuris-
tic, the court would not have had such difficulty.4"
a. Exposure Level. The Wright court insisted that "a plaintiff
in a toxic tort case must prove the levels of exposure that are hazard-
ous to human beings generally as well as the plaintiffs actual level of
exposure to the defendant's toxic substance" in order to recover.445
There is ample data to show the level at which formaldehyde affects
people.446 The problem for the plaintiffs was that formaldehyde is
harm to human beings who breathe them. The trial court should therefore
have excluded Dr. Peretti's testimony ....
... Without proving hazardous levels of exposure to Willamette's formalde-
hyde, the Wrights failed to carry their burden of proof at trial on the issue of
causation ....
Wrigh4 91 F.3d at 1108.
443 See id.
444 National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942
(E.D. Ark. 1998), aff'd, 191 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1999), is instructive, since the court correctly
excluded causation testimony, but for the wrong reasons. The plaintiff in Associated Milk
Producers claimed his laryngeal cancer had been caused by exposure to aflatoxins in con-
taminated milk at his workplace. The court excluded the testimony because the plaintiff
was unable to show level of exposure. See id. at 981-82. Had the court used the default
assumptions proposed in this Article, however, it would have recognized that a linear-dose
response default makes knowledge of exposure levels unnecessary. A linear default is
strongly defensible in cancer cases such as Associated Milk Producers. See supra notes
271-94 and accompanying text. The district court was unconvinced, citing Paracelsus's
maxim that "the dose makes the poison" and disregarding the expert's testimony regarding
linearity. Id. at 958. Using a linear dose-response assumption, the amount of contami-
nated milk to which the plaintiff was exposed would be irrelevant because exposure to any
amount would pose a small, but not zero, risk of genetic damage ultimately leading to
cancer. However, aflatoxin, even in its most virulent form-commonly found in corn and
peanut butter--causes liver cancer rather than laryngeal cancer. See id. at 962; Bruce N.
Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 Science 271, 272-73 (1937). The
default criteria for target organs suggested earlier would preclude using evidence of liver
cancer causation to show causation for laryngeal cancer without a showing that alflatodn
affects a range of target organs. See supra notes 295-301 and accompanying text. Thus, the
judge was correct in excluding the testimony but based his decision on the wrong reason.
445 Wright, 91 F.3d at 1106.
446 See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
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ubiquitous and that they could not show exposure levels at a greater
level than background.447 This does not mean, however, that they
were not exposed to levels greater than background. A sample of
emissions from the plant showed 18,000 to 20,000 ppm formaldehyde,
quantities far in excess of state maximum levels.44 8 Although the
plaintiffs' home was located at some distance from the lumber mill, it
was close enough to receive particulate matter falling "like 'snow' on
the premises.449 Their bodily fluids had significant levels of formalde-
hyde and its metabolites. This is important because when the metabo-
lite level is known, the dose can be calculated mathematically. 450
Because formaldehyde is known to have a nonlinear response
(that is, an exposure threshold),451 the defendant lumber mill argued
that the plaintiffs had to show exposure above this threshold level.45 2
This argument, accepted by the Eighth Circuit, reflects a misunder-
standing of the probabilistic nature of the threshold response. The
Wrights were already showing symptoms consistent with exposure.
They were already showing that formaldehyde had been absorbed and
distributed throughout their bodies. In other words, whether or not
most people would show symptoms at that level, their particular, indi-
vidual threshold had been reached.
Threshold is a probabilistic concept stating that most people will
not be affected until exposure exceeds a certain amount. The precise
amount of chemical necessary to achieve a response may vary among
individuals. 453 Scientists understand that some individuals will be
more sensitive to certain agents, and for them the threshold exposure
level will be lower.454 Once the threshold has been reached, the re-
sponse can be assumed to be linear.455 These plaintiffs demonstrated
447 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 18, Wright (No. 95-4227); Appellant's Reply Brief
at 5, Wright (No. 95-4227). See supra note 191 for a definition of background levels of
exposure. Everyone in industrialized countries is exposed to formaldehyde; this common
exposure is the general background level. The Wrights, however, were exposed to more
than the background level but could not prove precisely how much.
448 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1108 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that "the levels of for-
maldehyde emitted from the plant exceeded levels permitted by industry and state stan-
dards"); Appellee's Brief at 26, Wright (No. 95-4227) (stating testimony of Dr. Fred Fowler
regarding level of emissions from Willamette plant).
449 Wright, 91 F.3d at 1108-09 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
450 See supra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
451 An exposure threshold is the level at which effects become observable. For a discus-
sion of linear versus threshold responses, see supra notes 279-94 and accompanying text.
452 See Wright, 91 F.3d at 1106.
453 See supra Part II.C.2.b.ii.
454 See Rees & Hattis, supra note 279, at 277.
455 Cf. Gad, supra note 81, at 235 (summarizing argument for existence of threshold that
states that "[miost (if not all) carcinogens and mutagens exhibit a dose response relation-
ship, resulting in an apparent or effective threshold for at least some agents").
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exposure and symptoms consistent with exposure.456 There was testi-
mony that "distinguished the effects of dust and other nontoxic air
pollutants from formaldehyde."'457 After engaging in differential diag-
nosis to account for other possible causes, a medical doctor testified
that it was more likely than not that the Wright family's symptoms
were caused by formaldehyde exposure.458 Requiring more than this
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the probabilistic nature of scien-
tific evidence. 459
b. Absorption. The Wright court was unduly concerned about
the difference between exposure to "pure" gaseous formaldehyde and
formaldehyde attached to sawdust particles. Once formaldehyde gets
into the lungs, however, it makes very little difference whether it got
there in pure form or along with a sawdust carrier. The metabolism of
the internal dose will be the same.46 The quantitative relationships
between administered and delivered doses of formaldehyde are
known.461 Here the formaldehyde metabolites were found in the
Wrights' bodily fluids, showing that absorption did take place.
The effect of this decision is drastic for victims of environmental
torts.462 Information about exposure levels is commonly absent in
456 Plaintiffs clearly were exposed to enough of the emissions that particles of fiberboard
laced with formaldehyde were found in the plaintiffs' bodily fluids. See Wright, 91 F.3d at
1107 (noting that "wood fibers from defendant's plant were in their house, their sputum,
and their urine"); see also id. at 1109 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (observing that "significant
levels of toxic emissions from the plant were found in their sputum and urine"). This is not
a naturally occurring phenomenon. In addition, the testimony that formaldehyde was ca-
pable of causing the kinds of diseases from which the plaintiffs suffered was well sup-
ported. See id.
457 Id.
458 See id.
459 In addition, a threshold response was likely in light of the plaintifW statements that
their symptoms improved when they left their home and worsened when they returned.
See Appellees' Brief at 24, Wright (No. 95-4227). Such reversibility suggests traditional
acute/chronic toxicity damage produced by processes reversible at low doses. See Rees &
Hattis, supra note 279, at 277-78.
460 See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.iv (discussing route of exposure).
461 See generally Thomas B. Starr & Raymond D. Buck, The Importance of Delivered
Dose in Estimating Low-Dose Cancer Risk from Inhalation Exposure to Fbrmaldehyde, 4
Fundamental Applied Toxicology 740 (1984) (analyzing statistical relationship between de-
livered dose and administered dose of formaldehyde).
462 For cases requiring evidence of exposure level based on Wright, see, e.g., Mitchell v.
Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate "'the
levels of exposure that are hazardous to human beings generally as well as the plaintiff's
level of exposure to the defendant's toxic substance before he or she may recover'" (quot-
ing Wright, 91 F.3d at 1106)); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F3d 194, 199 (5th
Cir. 1996) ("Scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus
knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to
sustain the plaintiffs' burden in a toxic tort case." (citing Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107));
Mascarenas v. Miles, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 582, 587 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (supporting "obvious
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toxic tort actions.463 In most cases, requiring that plaintiffs show the
level of toxic chemical to which they were exposed is requiring them
to achieve the impossible. Neither of these gaps would have been dis-
positive had the court used the default assumptions proposed here.
4. Examine the Methodology
None of the experts' methodologies were contested. The court
did not examine or discuss the methodology of the underlying reports.
It was willing to accept the published literature as validly demonstrat-
ing causation at least with respect to gaseous formaldehyde. Because
formaldehyde has been so widely studied and the studies have been
subjected to critique, there may be some legitimate basis for the
court's failure to examine the methodology. Moreover, in this civil
case, discovery was available to the parties, the opponents had access
to each others' experts during depositions, and the experts disclosed
the underlying studies upon which they relied. Because such access
was available, one would have expected severe methodological flaws
to come to light had there been any.
5. Probabilistic Assessment of the Link Between Data and
Hypothesis
The plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing a valid basis for the
experts' causation hypothesis that the defendant lumber mill's emis-
sions caused the plaintiffs' illnesses. The data supporting the hypothe-
sis include formaldehyde exposure by a plant emitting far greater
amounts of formaldehyde than permissible and plaintiffs' symptoms
that are consistent with formaldehyde exposure. Do any of the data
refute the hypothesis that formaldehyde caused the plaintiffs' symp-
toms? 464 Although the defendant argued that the symptoms were
proposition" that plaintiff in toxic substance case must prove exposure to that substance
(citing Wright, 91 F.3d at 1106)); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F.
Supp. 1490, 1501-03 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (citing Wright, 91 F.3d at 1106), aff'd per curiam, 133
F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998).
463 For cases excluding expert testimony where plaintiffs did not know their exposure
level, see supra note 292 and accompanying text; see also Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110
F.3d 508, 512-14 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming exclusion of expert's opinion as unreliable in
part because expert had no information relating to plaintiff's specific exposure level); Zwil-
linger v. Garfield Slope Housing Corp., No. CV 94-4009, 1998 WL 623589, at *14
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1998) (concluding expert's testimony was inadmissible due to plaintiff's
unknown exposure level).
464 See Lanes, supra note 85, at 72 ("Empirical evidence about causal theories in
medicine should be interpreted by describing testable, competing explanations."). Com-
pare Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107-08, in which the expert testimony was excluded despite the
absence of contrary data, with Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 784-92
(D.N.J. 1996), aff'd 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997), in which the court painstakingly ex-
amined the contrary data before excluding the testimony. In Rutigliano, the plaintiff's
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:1563
INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS
equally consistent with exposure to other naturally occurring agents,
such as pollen, there was no data to support this.465 Additionally, a
physician engaging in differential diagnosis disagreed with this pollen
theory.466 The competing hypotheses should have gone-and did
go-to the jury for its factfinding determination. Only on appeal did
the court exclude this testimony.
For the general causation testimony to be admissible, several hy-
potheses had to be supported: first, that formaldehyde can cause
human disease; second, that it can cause the kinds of diseases suffered
by the plaintiffs; and third, that formaldehyde in the form and levels
to which plaintiffs were exposed (formaldehyde carried on sawdust)
can cause the kinds of illnesses the plaintiffs suffered. The first two
the court acknowledged were established. The third prong was the
issue the Eighth Circuit found the plaintiffs unable to meet,467 but
had it understood the probabilistic reasoning underlying the concept
of threshold responses, the court would have let the jury verdict
stand.468
expert causation testimony was excluded because the expert failed to account for copious
data that the plaintiff's symptoms predated her exposure to the formaldehyde in carbonless
copy paper. It was not the plaintiff's inability to demonstrate the level of her exposure that
was fatal to her case, but her inability to account for the data that carbonless copy paper
was not implicated in the kind of injuries from which the plaintiff suffered. Plaintiff com-
plained of "formaldehyde sensitization," which consists of symptoms of headache, tight
throat, skin rash, fatigue, depression, and rhinitis, symptoms which, she claimed, made it
impossible for her to work in an office, in a retail operation, or outdoors. See id. at 782-83.
Moreover, Rutigliano's expert did not perform differential diagnosis on her patient and
was unable to account for Rutigliano's allergy testing (which yielded negative results for
formaldehyde sensitivity), her predominantly normal lung function tests, or why the plain-
tiff's Epstein Barr virus diagnosis did not account for her symptoms. See id. at 786-90. In
addition, Rutigliano's expert failed to analyze her client's office environment, an analysis
she usually undertook in detail. See id. at 791. Thus, because Rutigliano's expert's conclu-
sions were untestable, and because her expert failed to account for data contrary to her
hypothesis, data that indicated her conclusions might be incorrect, the court excluded the
testimony. See id. The Rutigliano court's extensive consideration of all the data, including
contrary data, stands in sharp contrast to Wright, in which the court cursorily dismissed
plaintiffs' expert testimony even though no contrary data was presented, and without any
extended analysis of the data at all.
465 The symptoms were, the manufacturer argued, common allergic symptoms. Thus,
the argument was that something else-something unspecified-could have caused the
plaintiffs' ailments. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 18, Wright (No. 954227).
466 See Appellees' Brief at 26-27, Wright (No. 954227).
467 Curiously, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that it would not require a "mathemati-
cally precise table equating levels of exposure with levels of harm.' Wright, 91 F.3d at
1107. However, it nevertheless insisted upon a showing of exposure level, a standard that
few people exposed to environmental harms could meet.
468 The court neither discussed, nor does it appear to have applied, the traditional stan-
dard of review for the trial court's admissibility determination. Although this case was
decided before Joiner, which reiterated the traditional abuse of discretion standard of re-
view, it is nonetheless remarkable that the Eighth Circuit felt no compunction about its
lack of deference to the trial judge. The Eighth Circuit instead reviewed the district court's
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Specific causation here has yet another underlying hypothesis:
that the formaldehyde-impregnated sawdust particles emanating from
defendants' plant caused the plaintiffs' illness. In toxic tort cases,
even if general causation is sufficiently established to gain acceptabil-
ity as a theory (i.e., formaldehyde exposure causes disease in humans),
direct evidence of specific causation is nearly always problematic.469
Plaintiffs nearly always demonstrate specific causation by the testi-
mony of a physician who has engaged in differential diagnosis.470 The
plaintiffs here indeed proffered such testimony. This testimony was
supported by data that showed the presence of the lumber mill's prod-
uct in the plaintiffs' home and bodies, a huge body of literature show-
ing the effects of formaldehyde, symptoms consistent with
formaldehyde exposure, and a temporal response that improved when
the Wrights left the area.
The lumber mill defendants argued on appeal that because the
plaintiffs' medical expert initially testified only that the plaintiffs'
symptoms were "consistent" with exposure to formaldehyde, his testi-
mony was irrelevant and therefore should have been excluded.471 De-
fendants contended that "testimony as to 'consistency' (as opposed to
causation)" was inadmissible.472 Eventually-"after a great deal of
prodding"-the plaintiffs' physician phrased the causation hypothesis
in the terms the court demanded, stating that the symptoms were
"more probably than not related to exposure to formaldehyde." 473
Failing to understand the language of science and scientific conclu-
sion-drawing, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the physician's testi-
"denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law by applying the same standard that the
district court applied originally." Id. at 1106. The highly deferential standard of review for
admissibility determinations was subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Joiner.
See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). Had the Wright court applied
the Joiner deference standard, it is unlikely that the Eighth Circuit would have reversed,
because it would have had to find an abuse of discretion. Many courts employ the Eighth
Circuit's analysis, however, in making initial admissibility determinations as well.
469 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715 (Tex. 1997)
(acknowledging difficulties in adducing "direct, scientifically reliable" proof of specific cau-
sation in toxic tort cases).
470 See Rutigliano, 929 F. Supp. at 786 ("Courts have insisted time and time again that
an expert may not give opinion testimony to a jury regarding specific causation if the ex-
pert has not engaged in the process of differential diagnosis-that is, the process of elimi-
nating other possible diagnoses.").
471 See Appellants' Opening Brief at 40, Wright (No. 95-4227).
472 Id.
473 Wright, 91 F.3d at 1108.
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mony was "speculation." 474 Had it understood the language of
scientific argument, it would have concluded otherwise. 475
Additionally, the Circuit Court set aside the jury verdict because
the causation testimony involved gaseous formaldehyde rather than
formaldehyde inhaled on wood particles. 476 The court was unable to
analogize from inhalation of gaseous formaldehyde to particulate in-
halation, and failed to understand that the metabolism of the internal
dose would not differ. Although this may be an extreme example, it
underscores the general judicial unwillingness to reason by analogy in
assessing scientific evidence.477 Because the Wright court had little
understanding of the proffered evidence, and because it had no frame-
work for analysis, it reached a decision that is scientifically-and from
a policy standpoint-indefensible. Had it used the heuristic proposed
in this Article, it could have done far better.
B. State v. Council
In this murder case, the court was faced with the question of
whether a new technique for identifying hair by mtDNA analysis
could meet standards of scientific validity.478 Hairs found at the crime
474 Id. The Eighth Circuit was apparently unfamiliar with the work of David Hume.
Kenneth Rothman has noted that "Hume pointed out that observers cannot perceive
causal connections, but only a series of events." Kenneth J. Rothman, Inferring Causal
Inference-Habit, Faith or Logic?, in Causal Inference, supra note 75, at 3, 5.
475 The court failed to understand that an intellectually honest scientist cannot testify to
causation. See supra notes 377-84 and accompanying text.
476 See Wrigh4 91 F.3d at 1107-08.
477 For other cases exhibiting this failure, see Sutera v. Perrier Group of Am. Inc., 9S6 F.
Supp. 655, 664 (D. Mass. 1997) (failing to reason by analogy from animal studies to plain-
tiffs exposure); Mascarenas v. Miles, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 52, 587 (W.D. Mo. 1997);
Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co., 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds, 216 F.3d 1072 (2d. Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit, in
contrast, clearly understands the importance of scientific analogy. In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), involved plaintiffs exposed to PCBs. As Judge
Becker explained for the court in Paoli, the judge not only must assess the investigative
process used by the expert, but also must make an independent assessment of the reliabil-
ity of the expert's data and understand which inferences justifiably may be drawn from it.
See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 747-48.
478 See State v. Council, 515 S.El2d 508, 516-19 (S.C.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 58S, 588-
89 (1999). This was the second instance in which the FBI laboratories had proffered such
evidence at a criminal trial. See id. at 516 & n.13 (citing Mark Curriden, A New Evidence
Tool: First Use of Mitochondrial DNA in a U.S. Criminal Trial, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 18
(reporting first such trial)); see also supra note 404. The court emphasized that although
South Carolina utilizes neither the Frye nor the Daubert standard, see id. at 517-18, it does
make admissibility determinations based on a South Carolina rule "identical to Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence," id. at 517. Although not adopting Daubert, the South
Carolina standard for admitting scientific evidence is whether "the evidence will assist the
trier of fact, the expert witness is qualified, and the underlying science is reliable." Id. at
518. Factors in this determination include "(1) the publications and peer review of the
technique; (2) prior application of the method to the type of evidence involved in the case;
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scene were subjected to both conventional hair analysis and to
mtDNA testing and compared with samples of the defendant's hair.479
Mitochondrial DNA analysis, new to the courts, offers several advan-
tages over conventional DNA analysis.480 As the Council court noted,
because there is only one nucleus per cell but many mitochondria,
mtDNA can be obtained in much larger quantities.48' Moreover,
mtDNA is more stable than nuclear DNA, and while nuclear DNA (of
hair) is only found in the living cells at the base of a hair follicle,
mtDNA can be found in the hair shaft.482
The court admitted the evidence over objection, despite the de-
fendant's inability to procure an expert in his defense, and despite a
very curtailed opportunity to review the test data.483 The court found
the testimony admissible not on any independent validity analysis, but
based on the defendant's opportunity to attack any "'shaky but ad-
missible evidence"' on cross-examination. 484 The prosecution expert
testified that "most probably" the hair recovered from the crime scene
was the defendant's. 485 Although the prosecution expert testified
that, of those hairs that could be sequenced, the reliability of getting a
correct sequence was 100%,486 he did admit on cross-examination that
it was possible that the hair belonged to another individual. 487
(3) the quality control procedures used to ensure reliability; and (4) the consistency of the
method with recognized scientific laws and procedures." Id. at 517 (citing State v. Ford,
392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1990)). Thus, it is essentially the same as the Daubert standard,
479 See id. at 516.
480 Mitochondrial DNA differs from the nuclear DNA conventionally used in suspect
identification in that mtDNA comes from the mitochondria of the cell rather than from the
cell nucleus. See id. at 516 n.12 (citing Brian Huseman, Taylor v. State, Rule 706, and the
DNA Database: Future Directions in DNA Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 397, 409
(1997) (noting potential utility of new developments in DNA sequencing)).
481 See id.
482 See id.
483 See id. at 518. The mtDNA analysis was not released to the defense until the night
before trial, leaving the defense no opportunity to seek an expert. See id. This highlights
one of the major shortcomings of the use of scientific testimony in criminal trials: the
inability of the defense to procure an expert. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scien-
tific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va. J.
Soc. Pol'y & L. 439, 473-74 (1997) (proposing independent labs, available to defense, to
remedy abuses of scientific evidence by prosecution experts). Even after the Supreme
Court recognized the right of the defense to some expert assistance under certain circum-
stances in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985), indigent defendants' access to scien-
tific experts is frequently severely limited, as it was in Council. See Paul C. Giannelli, The
DNA Story: An Alternative View, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 380, 414-21 (1997) (book
review) (noting difficulties defendants often face in obtaining information about prosecu-
tion expert test data and in accessing experts of their own).
484 See Council, 515 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting State v. Dinkins, 462 S.E.2d 59, 60 (S.C.
1995)).
485 See id. at 517.
486 See id.
487 See id. at 519.
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1. What's the Theory?
Hair identification rests upon the theory that each individual has
unique characteristics, but this is an assumption that is largely unt-
ested.488 The prosecution proffered two types of hair analysis, micro-
scopic and mtDNA.489 With respect to the microscopic hair analysis,
the prosecution theory was that the microscopic characteristics of hair
differ among people. An FBI "white paper commentary" on micro-
scopic hair analysis, however, concedes that although the "micro-
scopic characteristics of hair can assist the examiner in determining
the racial origin, body area and whether disease, damage or artificial
treatment is present," they cannot be used to identify an individual. 4 90
Although these characteristics may be "useful," the FBI recognizes
that "hair comparisons do not constitute a basis for absolute personal
identification." 491 As a result, microscopic hair comparisons no longer
can be used alone and now must be used by the FBI laboratory in
conjunction with mtDNA analysis.492
The second part of the prosecution's identification hypothesis
rested on the theory that each person has unique genetic characteris-
tics that can be determined by sequencing the mtDNA in a hair folli-
cle. The theory behind DNA analysis in general is that genetic
differences exist between people and that DNA analysis can uncover
those differences.493 Unlike microscopic hair analysis, this theory is
488 See supra notes 336-47 and accompanying text.
4s9 See Council, 515 S.E.2d at 516.
490 Douglas Deedrick, FBI Responds to Questions Raised About Hair Comparison
Analysis, Prosecutor, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 27, 27.
491 Id. (emphasis added).
492 See id.
493 For an introduction to the forensic use of DNA evidence, see generally William C.
Thompson, Guide to Forensic DNA Evidence, in Expert Evidence: A Practitioner's Guide
to Law, Science, and the FJC Manual 195 (Bert Black & Patrick W. Lee eds., 1997). In
brief, the human genome is made up of approximately four billion organic base pairs in a
particular sequence. The base pairs all consist of adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C),
or guanine (G), A pairing with T, and C with G on the two complementary strands of
DNA. See C.G.G. Aitken, Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists
10 (1995). Most of the base-pair sequence is common to all human beings. See Thompson,
supra, at 203. The "genome" is the full complement of human DNA. See id. The mito-
chondrial genome is made up of some 16,000 base pairs. See id.
At some locations on the genome, there are distinctive sequences of base pairs, knowna
as "alleles." See id. at 203. Forensic DNA testing examines these alleles. In order to
estimate the relative frequency of a particular genotype by counting its occurrence in the
population, a huge database of samples would be needed. See George Sensabaugh &
David H. Kaye, Non-Human DNA Evidence, 39 Jurimetrics 1, 11-12 (1998) (explaining
statistical basis for DNA identification techniques). Therefore, instead of the complete
genotype, alleles-a grouping of distinct DNA characteristics at particular locations on the
genome-are ordinarily used. See id. Typically, two alleles are found at each location, one
inherited from the mother and one from the father. By comparing the groupings of the
alleles of two samples at a number of different locations, the analyst can determine
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well accepted. 494
Mitochondrial DNA analysis is different from nuclear DNA anal-
ysis, however, because in mtDNA all the DNA comes from the mito-
chondria of the cell rather than the cell nucleus. Mitochondria are
cellular structures with their own DNA.495 All the DNA in mtDNA
analysis comes from the mother, whereas in nuclear DNA analysis,
half comes from each parent.496 Therefore, all offspring from the
same mother have the same mtDNA, unless there have been genetic
mutations. 497 Thus, unlike nuclear DNA, mtDNA varies only moder-
ately among different individuals, with some areas of the mitochon-
drial genome being more variable than others.4 98
2. Examine All the Available Evidence
Samples of the suspect's hair in Council were analyzed and com-
pared with samples of hair taken from the crime scene.499 Micro-
scopic hair analysis was offered in conjunction with the mtDNA
analysis, and the expert concluded that the defendant's hair was the
same as that found at the crime scene.500 The expert explained that,
for the mtDNA analysis, he (or someone else at his lab) extracted
DNA from the mitochondria of the hair cells, amplified it, and ex-
whether or not the two samples are from the same source. This is referred to as a "match,"
but what it really means is that the null hypothesis cannot be substantiated. Then the
analyst performs statistical analysis to determine the probability that the nonexclusion
would occur by chance in the population. See id. at 11. This frequency is estimated
through the use of a database. Combining the allele frequencies into the final profile fre-
quency (the random match probability) is a mathematical function of the genetic diversity
at each location on the genome and the number of the locations tested. See Committee on
DNA Forensic Science, National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evi-
dence 146-47 (1996). The method used by the expert in Council differed in that the se-
quences of base pairs in the defendant's and the crime scene's samples were directly
compared with each other and the population frequency of such sequences assessed
through the database.
494 See Aitken, supra note 493, at 11 (discussing acceptance of "evidential value" of
DNA profiling).
495 See Charles M. Strom, Genetic Justice: A Lawyer's Guide to the Science of DNA
Testing, Ill. BJ., Jan. 1999, at 18, 24.
496 The Council court recognized this difference. See State v. Council. 515 S.E.2d 508,
516 n.12 (S.C.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 588 (1999).
497 See Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal
Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 931, 934 n.16 (1999) (noting poten-
tial utility of mtDNA testing). This is a crucial-and controversial-qualification. At least
two studies have found significantly higher mutation rates in mtDNA than in nuclear
DNA. See Ann Gibbons, Calibrating the Mitochondrial Clock (DNA Mutations and Evo-
lutionary Dating), 279 Science 28, 29 (1998) (outlining recent research suggesting rapid
mutation rates in mtDNA).
498 See Strom, supra note 495, at 24 (laying out basic information on DNA
identification).
499 See Council, 515 S.E.2d at 516.
500 See id. at 516, 517.
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amined it to determine its allele sequence.501 The sequence was com-
pared to the sequence of a sample obtained from the defendant, and
then the sequence was compared to the database of known mtDNA
sequences, which contained 742 known sequences.50 z Of the hairs that
could be sequenced, the expert testified that the "reliability of getting
a correct sequence was 100%. '"503 Three hundred and nineteen of the
sequences were from African-Americans, and the defendant was an
African-American.5°4 The expert had found matching sequences be-
tween unrelated Caucasians in the database previously, but had never
found a match between unrelated African-Americans.505 Only two re-
gions were analyzed, and, according to the expert, they were the
"most variable [regions] in African-Americans."50 6
The prosecution expert testified that mtDNA analysis has been
used for research since 1981, and that it currently is used to identify
bodies from wars. 507 At the time of the expert's testimony, over 600
papers had been published on mtDNA, although it was not clear from
the court's account of the testimony whether these papers focused on
identification, evolution, or some other use of the technique.50 Pre-
sumably, these studies formed the basis of the expert's testimony, al-
though the opinion does not say so. Mitochondrial DNA analysis has
been used to identify the remains of people massacred in human rights
violations in the Balkans50 9 and Latin America. °10 as well as in identi-
fying the bodies of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and his family.5 "1 It is
also widely used for inferring evolutionary relationships among spe-
cies and populations because the sequence of mtDNA alleles changes
only through mutation, and not through the genetic mixing of sexual
501 See id. at 517. For background on alleles and DNA testing, see supra note 493.
502 See id.
503 Id. What can this statement mean? Presumably, a judge with an understanding of
statistics and probability theory would have to view this statement with skepticism, as no
test can be 100% reliable. See supra notes 77-87, 197-204 and accompanying text.
504 See Council, 515 S.E.2d at 517 & n.14.
505 See id. at 517.
506 Id.
507 See id. at 516.
508 See id.
509 See Eliot Marshall, Tracing Croatia's "Disappeared," 269 Science 1812, 1812 (1995)
(suggesting mtDNA may be more useful than nuclear DNA in identifying bodies from
mass graves).
510 See Ann Gibbons, Scientists Search for "The Disappeared" in Guatemala, 257 Sci-
ence 479, 479 (1992) (using mtDNA to identify victims of military killings buried in un-
marked graves).
511 See Gibbons, supra note 497, at 28 (describing use of mtDNA testing to identify
soldiers' remains and remains of nine Russians exhumed from Siberian grave thought to be
of Tsar Nicholas 11 and his family).
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reproduction from generation to generation.512 Scientists have ex-
amined animal hairs for genetic information for more than a dec-
ade. 51 3 Thus, there appears to be some support for the use of this
technique in identifying individuals.
3. Use Valid Assumptions to Fill the Gaps
The individualization assumption of the prosecution expert, that
mtDNA testing can be used to identify the source of crime scene
hairs, appears warranted. This assumption rests on the theory that
each person's complete genome is unique, and that although there are
many common areas, some locations on the genome are more variable
than others.5 14 Mitochondrial DNA is not quite as strong an identify-
ing technique as nuclear DNA, because all offspring of the same
mother will share the same sequences of mtDNA, barring muta-
tions.515 Although the assumption that DNA analysis is capable of
identifying individual characteristics has strong empirical support,
methodological flaws may undermine its application severely.
4. Examine the Methodology
The technique used to analyze mtDNA is known as polymerase
chain reaction (PCR), which takes a small amount of DNA and ampli-
fies it in a test tube.516 This process makes it extraordinarily sensitive
to contamination. 51 7 The amplified DNA is then examined to deter-
512 See, e.g., Patricia Kahn & Ann Gibbons, DNA from an Extinct Human, 277 Science
176, 176 (1997) (reporting recent research using ancient mtDNA to suggest Neanderthals
are not direct ancestors of modem humans).
513 See Russell Higuchi et al., DNA Typing from Single Hairs, 332 Nature 543, 545
(1988) (noting that hair offers many advantages, because it is more easily found, trans-
ported, and stored than blood).
514 See David H. Kaye, DNA, NAS, NRC, DAB, RFLP, PCR, and More: An Introduc-
tion to the Symposium on the 1996 NRC Report on Forensic Evidence, 37 Jurimetrics 395,
399 n.36 (1997) (explaining that expected frequency of DNA profile at several locations on
chromosome is product of frequencies of different alleles).
515 See Gibbons, supra note 497, at 28 ("[M]tDNA comes only from the mother's egg.");
Mark Hansen, A Comeback for Hair Evidence, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 66, 67 ("Nuclear
DNA testing is more precise than mitochondrial testing, experts say, because the DNA
found in the nucleus .. is unique to every individual except identical twins ... [while]
mitochondrial DNA... is the same for all maternal relatives .... "); cf. Richard Lempert,
After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC II, 37 Jurimetrics 439, 455-58 (1997) (ex-
plaining that because nuclear DNA is inherited from both parents, few unrelated individu-
als are expected to share same sequences at highly variable locations).
516 See Thompson, supra note 493, at 215-16 (explaining that PCR process that is used in
mtDNA analysis involves breaking double-stranded DNA fragments into single strands
and then inducing each single strand to bind with complementary base pairs floating in
solution).
517 See Committee on DNA Tech. in Forensic Science, National Research Council,
DNA Technology in Forensic Science 65-67 (listing three types of contamination and sug-
gesting ways to avoid it).
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mine the sequence of base pairs. Proper procedures are critical be-
cause contamination from other biological material through handling
or from previously performed amplifications will cause the contami-
nating DNA to be amplified along with the sample.518 Contamination
in mtDNA testing increases the chances that sequences will be incor-
rect and may increase the chance of declaring a false match. Ordina-
rily, controls are run with the test sample to ensure that contamination
does not occur.
The FBI expert in Council testified that DNA extracted from the
mitochondria in the crime-scene hair was extracted, amplified, and ex-
amined to determine its base-pair sequences.5 19 He made no mention
of controls. Two samples, one from the suspect and the other from the
murder scene, were compared. 52° The expert did not discuss labora-
tory protocols, standards, or proficiency testing. The examiner then
compared the sequence to 742 known sequences in the database and
concluded that the two sequences matched.5 1 The expert did not dis-
cuss the frequency of the examined sequences in the population. No
error rate was proffered, although the court asserted that the FBI lab-
oratory had "validated the process and determined its [own] rate of
error."522
The National Research Council has issued two reports on DNA
evidence calling for the utilization of high quality laboratory stan-
dards, proficiency testing, and sample splitting for independent test-
ing.523 The court in Council did not question the expert on these
issues or examine any of the expert's laboratory notes before ruling on
admissibility, nor was this information available to the defense.
Rather, the court relied on cross-examination to raise any
problems.524 Releasing the test results the night before trial, however,
effectively denied the defendant meaningful access to the expert's
methodology and precluded any detailed cross-examination by the de-
fendant.525 The test results alone, without the information about pro-
518 See id. at 65-66.
519 See State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517 (S.C.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 58S (1999).
520 See id. A third sample from another suspect also was compared, but the results
excluded the other suspect as a possibility because there was no match. See id.
521 See id. Note that the expert referred to "known sequences," rather than the number
of people in the database. See id. This may indicate a problem with database size. See
supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
522 Id. at 518.
2 See Committee on DNA Forensic Science, supra note 493, at 4; see also Erika
Hagelberg et al., Identification of the Skeletal Remains of a Murder Victim by DNA Anal-
ysis, 352 Nature 427, 427 (1991) (discussing contamination of PCR methods).
524 See Council, 515 S.E.2d at 519.
525 See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 Vand.
L Rev. 791, 803-04 (1991) (arguing that mere notice that expert will testify for prosecution
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cedures and controls, were simply not enough to reveal the potential
weaknesses of the testimony.5 26 For example, control samples without
added DNA normally are processed at several stages in the testing
process, and the entire test may be discarded if DNA is found in the
controls. 27
Not only were the absence of controls and protocols suspect, but
the expert's characterization of his methodology vaunted its accuracy
to an unlikely degree when he testified that "the reliability of getting a
correct sequence was 100%. ' '528 It is unlikely that any procedure is
100% accurate, and the expert neither offered support for his state-
ment, nor was any demanded by the court. Without further explana-
tion and access to the methodology, this testimony is inherently
untrustworthy. 529
5. Probabilistic Assessment of the Link Between Data and
Hypothesis
The failure to grant a defense expert access to the underlying lab-
oratory notes critically weakens the argument for admissibility here.
Failure to follow protocols threatens the validity of DNA analysis.5 30
Because the mtDNA technique's weakest aspect is its sensitivity to
contamination, it would be crucial to know whether the testing ob-
served adequate controls. No meaningful results can be drawn from a
test run without adequate controls. 531 Moreover, proficiency testing-
a form of outside audit that tests the technician's ability to perform
the procedure correctly-was apparently not done. The court never
sought any information on controls or methodology.
The expert in Council concluded that "most probably" the hair
recovered from the crime scene was that of the defendant.5 32 The
is insufficient and that more access to laboratory results is needed than is provided in
typical laboratory report, because scientific reports rarely indicate details of methodology).
526 Defendant's council argued-correctly, in my opinion-that the admissibility deter-
mination could not be made without allowing the defense to present rebuttal evidence,
including an expert witness. See Council, 515 S.E.2d at 518 n.16, 519.
527 See Thompson, supra note 493, at 221-22 & 222 n.51 (noting that when negative
controls "'fail' by detecting the presence of DNA," contamination is strongly suggested
and conclusion-drawing in such situation is "extremely dangerous").
528 Council, 515 S.E.2d at 517. Presumably the expert meant that if a hair included a
particular allele sequence, such as ATA, this sequence always would appear as ATA in the
test results.
529 See Giannelli, supra note 525, at 804.
530 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993) (acknowl-
edging that courts must determine whether expert failed to follow protocols and, if so,
whether error made results unreliable).
531 See Thompson, supra note 493, at 252 (stating that at least three types of controls-
positive, negative, and substrate-are necessary to ensure test's reliability).
532 See Council, 515 S.E.2d at 517.
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court admitted this testimony despite the expert's concession that he
had found matches in other mtDNA analyses between unrelated peo-
ple.533 Although nuclear DNA identification techniques are well sup-
ported, and mtDNA methodology has been applied successfully in
contexts other than litigation,a5 4 admissibility of this particular
mtDNA testimony was ill advised. Mitochondrial DNA testing is not
as powerful a tool as nuclear DNA testing because people with no
maternal link still may have significant numbers of base pair
matches,5 35 and the prosecution's expert conceded as much.
Moreover, the expert's assertion that mtDNA testing is extremely
reliable is correct only if the mtDNA test is correctly performed and
interpreted. The PCR method used in mtDNA testing is extraordina-
rily difficult to perform -without error from contamination536 The er-
ror rate of false positive "matches" is a serious concern in DNA
evidence.5 37
Another problem in Council was the size of the database used for
hair comparison, which consisted of only 742 known sequences.
Larger samples give more precise estimates of allele frequencies than
small ones 5 38 Moreover, a proper method of constructing a database
533 See id. at 518. The expert qualified this statement, however, by saying that he never
had found matches between unrelated African-Americans. Because the defendant was A-
rican-American, this statement was highly misleading. It implies that there may be more
similarities between the mtDNA of Caucasians than between that of African-Americans, a
point that never has been demonstrated. The more likely cause was a small database of
African-Americans; the database used by the expert in Council consisted of only 319 se-
quences obtained from African-Americans. See id.; cf. Gibbons, supra note 497, at 29
(noting that observed high incidence of mtDNA mutations in studies of families may be
"statistical artifact" that will disappear as studies increase in size).
534 See supra note 509-11 and accompanying text.
535 See Jon Cohen, Genes and Behavior Make an Appearance in the O. Trial, 268
Science 22,22 (1995) (observing that there have been cases of matching mtDNA for more
than 200 base pairs in absence of maternal link, and that "most frequent [mtDNA] se-
quence ... appears in 3% of the population").
536 See Kahn & Gibbons, supra note 512, at 177 (noting difficulty in avoiding errors in
mtDNA testing of ancient Neanderthals); see also Giannelli, supra note 525, at 796-97
(noting false identification problems in proficiency tests).
537 See Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evi-
dence at Trial, 34 Jurimetrics 21, 26 (1993) (estimating rate of false positive matches);
William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Standards: The National Research Council's Sec-
ond Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 Jurimetrics 405, 417 (1997) (noting that "the
probability of an erroneous match is difficult to estimate"). The expert really should have
addressed how likely it was that the sequence would be reported the same in the two hair
samples if the mtDNA were not the defendant's. See Lempert, supra note 515, at 442 ("A
scientist who testifies that false positive error never happens does not address the question
the jury needs answered-namely, how likely is it that a match would be reported if the
evidence DNA was not the suspect's.").
538 See supra Part II.C.1; cf. Committee on DNA Forensic Science, supra note 493, at
114 (observing need for confidence intervals with respect to estimates if database is small).
But see Ranajit Chakraborty, Sample Size Requirements for Addressing the Population
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would be to construct a "local database of DNA samples with repre-
sentative genotype frequencies from the local population" or the geo-
graphical area of the crime.5 39 Yet the prosecution offered no
information about how the database was constructed. In addition, no
explanation was advanced-at least none was noted by the court-for
the extent of statistical error.
Instead, the court accepted at face value the expert's assertion
that the "FBI laboratory validated the process and determined its rate
of error" without any inquiry into whether proficiency testing had
been done.540 Proficiency testing is important because it demonstrates
that a technique is valid not only in theory, but in practice. 541 In sum,
Council is an instance where the court's failure to conduct a meaning-
ful inquiry into expert methodology may have significantly under-
mined its gatekeeping duties.542
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's evidentiary trilogy-Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho Tire-has made an important contribution toward rational-
izing the jurisprudence of scientific evidence. The Supreme Court has
demonstrated emphatically that neither judges nor lawyers can afford
to be ignorant of the scientific process.5 43 These cases must be read as
exhortatory rather than illuminating, however, as they offer little in
Genetic Issues of Forensic Use of DNA Typing, 64 Hum. Biology 141, 156 (1992) (sug-
gesting that relatively small databases may allow statistically acceptable frequency estima-
tion for common alleles).
539 Strom, supra note 495, at 20 (holding that such database could determine if identifi-
cation of local resident was erroneous match).
540 State v. Council, 515 S.E 2d 508, 518 (S.C.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 588 (1999). The
National Research Council explained that "there is no substitute for rigorous proficiency
testing, via blind trials." Committee on DNA Tech. in Forensic Science, supra note 517, at
55. Proficiency testing is similar to the double-blind trials discussed earlier. See supra note
219 and accompanying text.
541 See Committee on DNA Tech. in Forensic Science, supra note 517, at 55 (noting that
"proficiency testing constitutes scientific confirmation that a laboratory's implementation
of a method is valid not only in theory, but also in practice").
542 Mitochondrial DNA now has been found scientifically reliable in state courts in Ma-
ryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, as well as in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Ohio. See Leigh Jones, Type of DNA
Ruled Reliable in Rape Trial, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 2000, at 1. Yet the methodological
problems with the mtDNA evidence profferred in Council should have led the court to
exclude the evidence.
543 On the importance of scientific knowledge to judges and lawyers, see Leonard R.
Jaffee, Of Probativity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of
Chance at Trial, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 925, 928, 929 (1985) ("[M]ath is not a magic [judges and
lawyers] must bow to as cavemen to thunder-even that their logic, intuition and experi-
ence make better courtroom medicine than can a number-juggler's calculus.... [N]o
calculus of probability is competent to measure the sufficiency or weight of litigational
evidence.").
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the way of guidance for performing the analysis that they require. The
guidelines proposed in this Article attempt to offer a more usable
framework for such analysis.
The heuristic proposed here advances a method of assessing the
strength of reasoning by analogy that is the hallmark of scientific argu-
ment. Rather than attempting to explain what constitutes the sound
design of good experiments, this framework accepts as a given that
experiments as performed never measure up to the guidelines in all
respects, that information is never complete, and that analogies are
always imperfect. This framework offers judges, and the lawyers who
must inform them, a way of dealing with the imperfections, making it
possible for judges to evaluate the evidence that is available.
Because scientific knowledge is never complete, judges inevitably
make assumptions to fill the gaps. Many of the assumptions judges
currently use are unstated and make little scientific or policy sense.
To treat litigants more fairly, to give them the intellectual process they
are due, courts need to make their unstated assumptions explicit.
Moreover, judges need to adopt and rely on default assumptions that
are firmly based on good science and good policy. This heuristic al-
lows judges and lawyers to examine imperfections, to discard unjustifi-
able inferences, and to weigh the cumulative force of justifiable
inferences. Such a process is the way scientists critique each others'
work. Nonscientists who must make scientific validity determinations
also can use this process to illuminate their decisions. In short, this
heuristic offers judges a way to give intellectual due process to com-
peting explanations of reality.
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